


THE REVOLT OF ASIA

UPTON CLOSE

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IN THE LAND OF THE LAUGHING BUDDHA

AN OUTLINE HISTORY OF CHINA
(WITH DR. H. H. GOWEN)

THE INFLUENCE OF PACIFIC ASIAN POETRY
ON AMERICAN VERSE

(IN BRAITHWAITE'S SESQUICENTENNIAL ANTHOLOGY
OF AMERICAN VERSE)

MOONLADY

THE REVOLT OF ASIA

The End of the White Man's
World Dominance

By

UPTON CLOSE

(Josef Washington Hall)

Lecturer on Pacific Asian Life and Politics, University
of Washington

Co-author "Outline History of China"



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DEDICATED TO THE ELIMINATION OF ALL
THAT IS "REVOLTING" IN HUMAN
RELATIONSHIPS

THE AUTHOR REMEMBERS:

CHIN THE GOLDEN, whose bravery carried him through and whose devotion was his richest discovery between Tokyo and Cairo.

MR. WILLIAM H. SPICER, his literary assistant.

MR. GARDNER L. HARDING, of the Foreign Trade Council, India House, New York, who acted as editor.

MR. EUGENE YOUNG, Foreign Editor of the *New York World*, who cheerfully "swapped" information.

"I am gratified to learn that Mr. Josef Washington Hall (Upton Close), the well-known and adventurous explorer, observer, and writer is prepared to tell us something about the extraordinary movements in Asia which promise to change the whole aspect of world relationships. He has proved himself to be a careful and acute observer of Asiatic life, and I receive with interest this analysis of the present situation."

ROLAND S. MORRIS,
Former U. S. Ambassador to Japan

DUANE, MORRIS AND HECKSCHER,
PHILADELPHIA

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THE REVOLT OF ASIA

THE REVOLT OF ASIA

CHAPTER I

THE PENDULUM SWINGS

ALL Asia has flared into revolt against the dominant white man. The revolt takes three main phases. It is against the white man's political rule, the imposition of his culture and religion, and, most deep seated of all, his arrogant assumption of social superiority.

This little book is not another "yellow peril" scare or "rising tide of color" theme. It is a simple story, written after twenty thousand miles of investigation in every country from Japan to Palestine, and a background of ten years intimate association with men and movements in Pacific Asia, of how one-half the world, gradually brought into subservience to the other half during the past four hundred years, has awakened to its shame and risen to take its destiny into its own hands.

Excess energy generated by their Renaissance four hundred years ago, sent the peoples of Western Europe out to explore and dominate the world. The white man's conception of himself as the aristocrat of the earth came gradually through the discovery, as surprising to himself as to anyone else, that he had weapons and organization which made opposition to his ambitions futile. For long, Asia seemed passive—even indifferent—under the white man's heel.

The philanthropic urge within the white man to educate and uplift even while he tyrannized and exploited, has been the first factor in his undoing. The other is the more and more savage rivalry among Western peoples.

During the latter half of the 19th century, a new intellectual class was created in Asia through western contact. It grasped the vision of adopting the weapons of the Westerner to fight him. But the west, save in such special cases as Japan's, was still much too powerful. Then came the World War, vitally affecting this situation in two ways. First, the powers were terribly weakened; second, Russia was ostracized from the western family of nations, and deliberately turned to Asia for affiliation.

This latter is unquestionably the most far-

reaching result of the World War. The historian of a century hence will be no more concerned as to which of the European nations was the technical victor of that contest than is the present historian as to which of the city states of Greece won in the Peloponnesian war, but he will be tremendously concerned with the fact that by throwing Russia back into Asia, it completely changed the balance of power of the races and the continents, and ushered in the "end of the white man's world."

Since August, 1914, the comforting conviction has grown in the minds of Asiatic leaders that the day of the white man's reckoning has dawned. With the growth of the Chinese National Movement, this conviction, already stimulated by Turkey's example, evolves into set determination. Asia will not now stop until she has attained complete mastery in her own house, has compelled worldwide respect for her culture, and recognition by deed as well as words of equal rank in the scale of humanity with the most arrogant Westerner who ever battened his pride upon the Nordic theory.

I beg leave to be a reporter rather than a prophet in this short treatise, but one cannot witness events constituting a turning point in

the world's history without speculation as to their effect upon his own race and people and culture. An investigator without conclusions is little tolerated in this age which not only demands its news in tabloids, but its opinions in three-line editorials.

Asia's rise to consequence in the world's affairs means most patently of all, the shifting of the "center of the world" from the Atlantic to the Pacific basin. It means that America, China and Russia must assume the importance for which size and natural resources and mentality of their populations have fitted them. It means that the United States succeeds Great Britain as the spokesman of western civilization and vanguard of the white peoples in their front against a re-vivified Asia. It means the end of empire: the ushering in of a new age when every people shall have full control in its own household and an equal say in the affairs of the human race.

—That is, it means either these things, or the bankruptcy of civilization, the utter impoverishment, materially and culturally, of the human race through inability of one-half to respect the contribution and make room for the natural aspirations of the other.

CHAPTER II

TOKYO TO CAIRO

COME on a jaunt from Tokyo to Cairo. See what symptoms this revolt of a hemisphere evinces to an open-eyed observer. Some things we see will invite a return for investigation but first let the general picture unfold as we follow it westward from Japan across the continent.

On Tokyo news stands our eyes catch flaming headlines of editorials in the jingo press, proclaiming that the white powers, and especially the Anglo-Saxons, are in ruthless conspiracy to dominate the earth, and prevent normal expansion for Japan. An annual edition of the usually moderate Osaka *Mainichi* depicts America and the British Empire building a proud Tower of Babel which a just Heaven must, and will, strike into confusion. The text portrays the reasons given at the Washington Conference for superseding the Anglo-Japanese Alliance

as merest hypocrisy. The Singapore Naval Base scheme of Great Britain is taken to represent more truly the motives of the Anglo-American duo.

A young American doctor in Korea, recalling horse-play in the college laboratory, has painted *Thief* on the cheek of a boy who stole apples—and a sensational illustrated magazine comes out with a front page showing Uncle Sam in clerical coat holding by the hair a native boy roped to an apple tree, while slitting his throat, over the caption “In the Name of God and Humanity!”

The Social Revolt in Japan

So much for jingoism, which being blatant, the visitor first sees. Its steady barrage of de-traction is more than enough to account for the occasional insult we meet among the multitudinous courtesies which the Japanese extend to us. But Jingoism in Japan means as much and no more than it does in our own United States. It is by seeking out the more thoughtful leaders, the men of good will, that we learn the attitude toward the west which really shapes Japan's policies. We must give weight to their opinion, regardless of our view of its tenability.

Let us hear then, Baron-General Tanaka, president of the Seiyukai Party, "last of the Samurai" and "Friend of America" in popular parlance. He appeals to us as vastly too intelligent to listen to the "conspiracy" charge. His welcoming smile turns to stately seriousness, as he says, "You may as well know we shall never be fully assured of Anglo-Saxon friendship and never rest content, until your better nature comes to the fore to remove the stigma placed upon our race by your immigration act of July 1924, and by the similar restrictions in the British colonies." An ex-cabinet member, editor of the leading economic publication in Japan, and editorial adviser to the Tokio *Asahi* and Osaka *Mainichi* (combined daily circulation 2,500,000) can speak both with weight, and a little more explicitly. Through Mr. Minoru Oka's words we catch the vision of many in Japan who see destiny working out for them a vindication of self respect. "A nationalized China and an awakened Asia, standing behind Japan on this question of racial equality, may make Congressmen in Washington less reckless about ranking us in an inferior category of the human race," he says. "While working toward our aim in this respect, our great Asiatic neighbor is bound to

rival and possibly overshadow us politically. It is in a developed culture rather than in material greatness that the ambitious nature of our people can be satisfied. We are the most youthful of the nations, and we have unique contributions to make. And I hope you will not think me too visionary if I glimpse, in the possibly far distant future, an international socialism so to speak, which will equalize the wealth of the world to the benefit of the less blessed nations as the social-democratic movement now tends to do within nations."

We look up another eminent publicist, Yusuke Tsurumi, Japan's first great political orator. He speaks and writes delightfully both English and Japanese, and is heritor in a sense of the "Rooseveltian" methods of the "Fiery physician" his father-in-law, Viscount Goto. His idol, as he builds up a "young men's liberal party," is Woodrow Wilson. "Japan must go ahead, not looking too much at her obstacles," he declaims. "Every great nation has been built in the face of seeming impossibilities. A liberalized and fearless Japan will require, and will obtain abolition of the international social injustice now done her." We see, of course, in Japan, nothing of that acute first stage of "revolt," the fight for political and eco-

conomic control. These perforce are now "permitted" to Japan, at length accounted among the "Powers" as a full-grown fighter,—which military promotion was her first real attainment in equality of prestige. So we cross the straits of Tsushima feeling that we have seen in Japan the revolt of the Asian peoples in its most fully developed phase, the social.

Second-hand Imperialism

En route we stop at various cities up the peninsula of Chosen. A covert nationalist movement is furtively brought to our attention—it being taken for granted that all Americans are fellow framers of the self-determination doctrine. Its proponents await their chance to break out again in revolt against Japan's European style imperialism there. "We were relieved from the ancient and medieval Japanese menace until Japan imbibed the modern ideas of Power and Empire. What galls us," says our Korean host in Phengyang (once a bellhop and student in America—now proprietor of a little hosiery factory), "is the constant imputation of these islanders in all they do that they are more civilized than we. They imitate the antics of westerners."

Political Phase to the Fore in China

Our train pulls slowly over the long Yalu River bridge, passing, like as not, the four-man ricksha of some Chinese official, very recently "ex-" hurriedly changing domicile, and we are in north China. Nobody worries about an alleged superiority of the white race here in Manchuria since Russians of opposing factions poured in and proved themselves capable of an even lower standard of living than the yellow man. The Russian "Red" in China is without any special privileges whatsoever by effect of the renunciation of his government. Refugees of the "White" faction take Chinese citizenship, and join Chang Tso-lin's army for fifty cents gold a day. We have here a glimpse into why Asiatics easily regard Russians as "of themselves," ranged on their side in the conflict of the races. As we proceed farther into China we find no racial "inferiority complex" evident among the Chinese. They are sure of their own ability, a justifiable egotism bolstered by a 5,000 years history of culture and accomplishment. Yet as we talk with ex-mandarins, philosophers, university teachers, scholars, and in particular, ambitious young intellectuals educated in western

ideals through our philanthropy, we feel it not impossible that the indecisive Chinese retaliation of 1884 against our exclusion policy,—the Canton boycott of American goods—may yet be resumed. But that will not come until China has been victorious in the political phase of her revolt.

What attracts our attention now is the interest of the politically active young leaders of north China, business, professional, and military, in crowding foreigners from their every foothold—an interest, such being human nature, greater than they exhibit in getting together and giving their nation peace. In this foreign policy—one might say “antiforeign policy”—China, north and south, is, we find, a unit receiving inspiration and leadership from the bold, determined young heads of the New Nationalist Party. The eccentric General Feng Yu-hsiang, progressive, and sometime Christian; his enemy, tennis and poker playing, jazz-dancing young “Chang the Second,” son of that egregious old ex-bandit Chang Tso-lin; the professional diplomat, Wellington Koo, sometime member of the Kuomintang¹ it-

¹ The Kuomintang, is the Chinese name of what westerners call the Nationalist Party, or with reference to its reorganization after death of its founder, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the “New Nationalist

self; and the ex-Y.M.C.A. head and Versailles negotiator, C. T. Wang, now cotton spinning magnate, are characteristic of the widely divergent types of leaders who are agreed on this program, although for the most part bitter rivals as to who shall carry it out.

It is the little group which is the brains of this movement that we must seek for a direct insight into the new China. And so we go to Hankow, their new capital. We ride in through the half wrecked buildings of the expropriated British concession while off to our left the chimneys of the Hanyang Arsenal and steel works show where under Russian and German experts work goes forward to supply the southern armies with weapons of China's own make. From Hankow here, over the precipitous mountain passes to Canton 700 miles away, the southern leaders maintain their connections and develop the threat against foreign domination which has become the cutting edge of all this Asiatic movement.

Chiang Kai-shek, the young general who conquered half of China in four months, T. V.

Party." The three characters of the name literally mean Land's People Faction.

Soong, the Harvard 1915 graduate who has financed the new power of the Canton government and Michael Borodin, military training officer and Soviet adviser, are the triumvirate we meet in command. These young men are realists. They have turned against the West its own weapons. They have spread over all the territory their armies cover, a mass propaganda which leaves the people solid behind them. Their town and commercial committees are led by the students, and their work is so thorough that it has disorganized armies sent against them quite as much by propaganda as by success in battle.

What do they say and mean to the foreigner? We listen to these words of T. V. Soong; they tell the whole story:

“You foreigners are still talking about what concessions you ought to make to an awakened China. You have it all wrong. The question is, rather, what generosities is an awakened China to extend to you, who have got yourselves involved in properties here under privileges you never should have enjoyed. I believe China is going to be magnanimous. I know she is going to assume her full sovereignty.”

We discover from talks the painful beginnings of the Chinese National movement, and its or-

ganization to the point where it needed only the "push off" of a concrete incident of foreign aggression or tyranny, when on the anniversary of the signing of the Russian "treaty of equality," (May 31, 1925), the police of Shanghai (British-officered Sikhs under control of an international municipality governed by an American chairman and eight British councilmen) obligingly provided the incident. Chinese students and laborers, against the foreigner's rules, demonstrated in the "settlement" against labor conditions in the foreign owned cotton mills and alleged unjust treatment of strikers. A large number were arrested and taken to a police station. The rest, augmented from the crowd, followed. They pressed too near the station, were given a command in English to disperse within ten seconds, and then fired upon. There were thirty-odd casualties. Sympathetic demonstrations in Hankow and Canton came into armed conflict with foreign forces at concession borders. The entire population, from coolie guilds on the upper Yangtze to the native Christian congregations in the great ports, joined in the wave of feeling against the foreigner. The Peking government protested vigorously. We are shown the scorching invective of the Christian

General, Feng, the first demand from a man of responsibility for immediate abrogation of the "unequal treaties," cancellation of all the foreigner's prerogatives, and adequate indemnity. But it was, we find, the National Party government at Canton, at that time enjoying an autonomous existence with the helpless acquiescence of the Peking government and its supporting "war lords," which showed itself most untrammelled, unafraid and effective in voicing the decision of the Chinese people to end foreign dominance. The students' unions, which had existed as live centers of agitation since their organization (1919) at the time of the "student revolution," went over, heart and soul, to the movement of the recently dead and sainted Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Chinese of north as well as south, however opposed to it on personal and factional grounds, recognized it as the spokesman of Chinese nationalistic aim, and goal-setter in the campaign against the foreigner.

A compiler of contemporary history tells us that this was the third time that a sense of unity had swept over all China on the one issue apparently able to create it: resistance to the foreigner. The Boxer uprising, a Chinese Ku Klux Klan movement in 1900, was the first. The

Manchus were pulled off the throne in 1911, primarily because the nation felt they were selling it out to the foreigner in return for perpetuation of their regime,—a second instance. And now the recently chosen young heads of the Nationalist Party took advantage of this latest outburst by driving their new military machine against the chieftains of the Yangtze Valley and the north, “putting over” the second plank in their platform (unified control under their party) through the popularity of the first (elimination of foreign privilege.)

We are convinced that whatever may be the vicissitudes of the Chinese Nationalist movement and however its personnel may change the objective “China for the Chinese” will continue and with it the policy of getting behind the foreigner’s guard at every opportunity.

In China we find the Revolt in its most portentous political form: the mass uprising of a people against foreign domination. Here is the turning point toward victory which a dozen other Asiatic nations are watching with keenly observant eyes. It is the most serious situation of all those we shall examine on our trip and presently we shall return to study more closely how it has

grown and what it foreshadows to our own civilization that confronts it.

A Doomed Port

From Canton we steam down the river a half day's journey to Hongkong which we find still suffering from the devastating effects of the most efficiently prosecuted boycott in history.

It is weird, travelling on these river steamers with locked iron grilles separating all the classes, and the bridge protected by steel plates against the still active pirates of the Pearl River delta. A little down river we pass the new port of Whampoa which is being built up to supplant Hongkong, by funds from excess customs duties to which the British government was forced to acquiesce in order to get a temporary stay of the famous boycott of 1925.

Hongkong, once this process has been successful and the new port established will be scarcely more valuable to British "commercial empire" than the dismantled Helgoland is to Germany. It never would have had its former marvelous development, if it had had competition from a well administered port on the mainland which in due time it must meet in Whampoa.

The Revolt of Asia

The Revolt in the Philippines

From Hongkong we sail lazily two days to Manila. We have it brought home to us how near "America" is to Asia. Only 65 miles separate the nearest American possession from the nearest Japanese. Only 30, we are told, lie between the southern end of the Archipelago and British Borneo. The sovereignty over one island is in dispute with Holland. Being Americans, confident in the righteousness of our government, we expect no "Revolt" there other than the agitation of the *politicos*, fighting one another as egotistically as they do the Governor General, according to what we have read in press despatches. We are amazed to discover the existence of a "Supreme National Council" composed of majority and minority faction leaders at the head of a sturdy organization involving every class and ramifying the archipelago. Its treasurer is Alejandro Roces, Manila capitalist, publisher of newspapers in three languages, a personal friend of General Woods, but a devoted *independista*. It has a National Advisory Committee composed of twenty-five men, high in business or their profession, and works through a National Solidarity Central Committee composed of all elected gov-

ernors, senators and representatives. (National stigma is thus set upon officials who "work for the alien ruler" rather than for their own people.)

The Solidarity Central Committee sub-divides into Solidarity Provincial Committees which in turn work through Solidarity Municipal and, still closer to the people, township (*barrio*) committees. In each of these, business and professional men join *politicos* to prosecute the campaign of national independence. The constructive (from American "big-business" standpoint obstructive) influence of the National Advisory Committee is seen in the economic as well as political side of the program: measures consistently directed to prevent the growth of American landed and industrial interests to such size that they will be able to drag the American government into imperialistic support of their cupidity.

House Speaker Manuel Roxas invites us to accompany some organizers of the Supreme Council on an "evangelistic campaign" for building up the local committees. The arches of welcome, the huge crowds of townsmen and peasants listening to three-hour denunciations of Governor-General Wood's interference in Philippine home legislation, the pledges of tithes of wages

and crops and land assessments to support the movement, impress us that the organization is not merely a "Latin flourish." The Philippine independence movement has passed out of the stage of agitation by a few leaders, Roxas assures us, into that of "peaceful revolution," designed as much to create a nation as to gain it absolute freedom and control of its own destiny.

And Senate President Manual Queson, "catchword phraser" of the islands, expresses the sentiment which in spite of our feeling of its superficiality, we find it hard to answer: "We would rather be governed like hell and do it ourselves than like heaven and have it done for us." It gives a good insight into basic Asian psychology for us to carry over into the vast reach of South Asia where white rule, openly established, defends itself upon the ground of its benevolence.

The Revolt of the Philippines has not yet taken on the raucously self-assertive aspect we met in China, but it has gone very deep. We learn of the National Prayer Day held on the anniversary of the great liberator, Washington, when the population through the length of the islands gathered about their clergy of the Roman

Catholic, native Catholic and Protestant churches and recited:

"We entreat thee, O most Gracious Father, stay Thou the hand that would smite our liberties. Send forth Thy Spirit unto our rulers across the sea and so touch their hearts and quicken their sense of justice that they may in honor keep their plighted word to us. Let not the covetous designs of a few interests prevail in the councils of the sovereign nation nor sway its noble purposes toward our country." What grounds exist for the fear expressed in this invocation we must return to consider, but as we board ship for Hongkong to continue our preliminary survey we feel that the driving of these most "peaceful, law-abiding and loveable Christian people" into the violence of an embittered race would not be the least of the crimes that Future might avenge upon the white man.

Problems in Indo-China

We cross back to the mainland at Haiphong, and motor down the coast of Indo-China on the ancient "Mandarin road" now metalled for modern traffic into Indo-China.

First we find the French authorities very particular lest we be carrying communist propaganda or have any connection with Russia. They are very fearful of influences from Canton reaching their heretofore docile subjects. The large number of Chinese in French Indo-China who form a prosperous commercial community there as they do in the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, and Malaysia, are all members of the Kuomintang, or Chinese Nationalist party, contributing willingly and liberally, and asking if they cannot apply its principles in their new habitat.

The French are noted for their absence of race prejudice, and marry the native women without compunction. Yet we find as we drive down the ancient Mandarin Highway, cars designated "second class" for the use of natives, Europeans paying twice the amount to ride in the same kind of car—but in lordly aloofness.

There are many elements in Tonkin which have never been reconciled to the French seizure in 1884. Annam still has her own king, with a smouldering self-determination movement.

Cochin-China, the original French settlement whose capital is at Saigon, and which is a full French possession, shows scarcely a sign of rest-

lessness—save for the demand vocal in the large Chinese Community that it share in the government in proportion to its wealth and numbers. Cambodians, a large portion of whom were separated from Siam in 1887, have never been reconciled to separation from their kinsmen, the Siamese, and amalgamation with the racially incompatible Annamese.

We leave the French territory over the new road from Angkor, Asia's most splendid ruin, feeling that in humanitarian and economic development, the interests of the people have been furthered and respected by the French to a surprising degree. The splendid industrial public works and enterprises have been carried out with real thought for the happiness of the natives. Yet the hold of the white benefactor and ruler impresses us as very insecure today.

The Peaceful Revolt in Siam

We journey into Siam on the brand-new Siamese Eastern railway, and at Bangkok, which we promptly decide is the most colorful city in the world, we interview Prince Kam Pang Pet of Purchatra, economic and communications dictator of the rapidly modernizing little kingdom. This uncle of the king, still in his early forties

a graduate of both military and civil schools of engineering in England, possessing as much driving force as the traditional American business executive, tells us while he speaks to his clerks over radio devices of which New York business men have not yet availed themselves, how the railway administration of his country has been taken out of the hands of contending Germans and British, unified, and extended through purely native executive and engineering skill. The British and German engineers had built on differing gauges. One of Purchatra's problems was to change gauge on half the roads without putting the whole system into disruption. This was done practically in one night by gathering a huge force of labor along hundreds of miles of track, under skilful organization. Siam is working, the Prince tells us, and now has 1850 miles of railroad, and is adding to them at the rate of 200 miles per year. There are 3000 miles of modern highway, being extended at the rate of 400 miles per year. Siam also has completed or in sight of completion, the final linking up of the Siamese railways with the systems in Indo-China, Burma, and the Malay States.

We leave this nation builder with his fascinating combination of Oxford English and Ameri-

can hustle, to talk to Prince Damrong, far famed for his hospitality, one of the oldest and most influential of the "Elder Statesmen," and to visit his new National Museum for the preservation of Siamese cultural treasures. He informs us that Siam's policy is to replace foreign advisers and technicians as rapidly as possible. With the pensioning off in a half year of more than a score of "white" officials, this process will be practically complete. There is no high feeling about it—even the best of relations exist with the French, who committed one of the most indefensible actions of *force majeure* in history when they seized Cambodia and sent an armada up the Menam Chao Phya in 1894. But there is a calm, determined drawing of a twilight veil over the day of the white man's dominance in this part of the world.

Rivalry between the white Powers brought Siam, as so many other "inferior" nations, her opportunity. As a move against the French, the British made the first proposal to renounce extra-territoriality and customs control—the ubiquitous evidences of foreign supremacy. The Germans succeeded the British in dominance through almost complete purchase of shipping facilities, and sheer effrontery in dominating internal com-

munications and politics. Then the world war came, and the opportunity was seized by such young heads as Prince Kam Pang Pet to eject the Germans just as they were preparing to use Siam as a base against Malaya and Burma. The United States, who made her first Asiatic treaty with Siam (1832) put the new status in definite form by the protocol of 1921 abandoning jurisdiction over Americans to Siamese courts with reservation of the right to invoke cases back into consular hands at discretion. This plan has been suggested as a model for China, but is too late there, for China's uncompromising new nationalism demands full sovereignty at once and not piecemeal.

We find a strong national pride and loyalty growing in Siam, through the press, through old religious ceremonies now made national, and particularly through the theoretically universal military training. We are treated, as foreign guests, with the deference given the noble class. But there is no servility and no fear on the one hand, and conspicuously absent on the other are the caneing and booting of the native we are accustomed to see in the white man's possessions.

Christianity appears to be making its way humbly and very slowly, its once piously militant

and arrogant spirit mellowed to inoffensiveness.

Our harried spirits get a breathing space. To reach Siam, after Canton and Hongkong is like going from a boiler shop into a still chapel. We are unable to find a respectable political agitation in the entire country. This land, as large as France, and in population equal to Australia, is without a labor union, a suffrage movement, or a woman's club. Paradise indeed! The nearest approach to a possibly disruptive element seems to be the Bangkok club of Rotary International!

There is no active irredentist movement for the recovery of Cambodia, or the lost Shan states to the north, or the territory "begged and borrowed" by Great Britain on the attenuated peninsula. There is just confident waiting. It is enough. Government is efficient and humane, labor is better paid than in any other Asiatic country. Modern communications and modern ideas will do the rest.

As we leave Bangkok on the "Jungle Express" for Penang (thirty-six hours—not including delays from elephants on the track) we feel that the Revolt has taken the happiest of forms in this peaceful kingdom: the calm assumption of political and economic power

without any disagreeable manifest challenge to the white man. Siam continues unruffled as her own Gulf, which is said never to have known a storm.

In Siam we noticed many Chinese. There is an immigration of 45,000 a year by sea alone. But since Siam wisely refuses to consider them as aliens, giving them at once the status and duties of Siamese subjects (cause, by the way, of a standing diplomatic rupture with Peking) these Chinese are soon lost statistically. In our own brief contact we sensed no unrest among them. Yet to their presence is linked a possibility of involving the country with world troubles beyond its borders. Indeed, we were told, this constitutes the chief reason for a large military establishment in Siam.

As we cross over, away down the peninsula, into the British administered Federated Malay States, Chinese rubber, rice and lumber men in mingled European, Chinese, and Indo-Chinese garb fill the second class coaches. One loosely clad, pig-tailed, scraggly whiskered gentleman of the last profession whom we put down as a gentleman of the old school, a survival of medieval China, comes forward to converse in French, Hindustani or beautifully meticulous Oxford

English—as we may prefer! We discuss Tolstoi, Ramsay McDonald and Olive Shreiner, and he concludes by lending me the speeches of Rabindranath Tagore in China and Japan. He is strangely met at various stations by young Euro-Malays of poorly disguised military bearing and we are left with some doubt as to whether he is not a member of Britain's (or maybe Russia's) secret service—a figure out of Kipling's *Kim*. Our cultured battle to find one another out is soon drowned by the excited arguing of the less ethereal fellow passengers and our heads are menaced by the flourishing of the latest papers from Canton. They are all fervent members of the Kuomintang, founded here by the sainted Dr. Sun Yat-sen himself, and heavy contributors. They are discussing a possible repercussion of victorious Nationalism in China upon Chinese participation in the government of Malaya, to which they are the largest taxpayers. As we leave the mainland and ferry over to Georgetown, on Penang Island, (like Hong-kong, in spite of official western nomenclature, always called by the native name) the talk veers to the costly British failure in the Penang harbor scheme, and the amount of tax payers' money which is sunk in it.

Penang, from the lines of bullock carts unloading rubber on the harbor front to the streams of pleasure cars (about ten Chinese to four British and one Indian) pouring along the magnificent highway to "the Peak" we find to be one of the busiest hives in South Asia. Like Singapore or Rangoon, it is an outstanding illustration of how the westerner is bringing together the races of Asia in great cosmopolitan cities, originally to labor for him; eventually to unite to push him out. Chinese run the small business, docile black Tamils and their scarlet clad and tinsel bedecked women do the heavy work. Mosques, Hindu and Buddhist shrines and Chinese temples rub shoulders. Rolled whiskered Sikhs police the streets. Everybody else is there. The problem is: find the Malay. True, he drives the taxis, and operates the motion picture booths which project Hollywood heroines before huge apathetic audiences (Indian men in one gallery, women in another; Chinese "mixed" on the main floor) but ordinary employment is offensive to his gentlemanly tastes. The British community lives in a restricted area of the foreshore, and worships in a beautiful new open-sided cathedral dedicated to Marquis Cornwallis. (We find Yorktown quite unknown out

here). A costly high-relief in the portal shows him extending admonition to an abjectly reverential Malay while Britannia presides. It is something of a puzzle how this could edify the Malays who never enter the grounds.

From Penang we take a two day motor down the rich peninsula to Singapore. Along the smooth roads we pass many clearings in the flatter portions of the jungle, homesteads representing the British hope of a "White Malaya," where ex-service men are being assisted into the "rubber game." Kuala Lumpur, beautiful amid its lakes, the center of the tin industry, old Malacca-town, scene of the successive Portuguese, French, Dutch, and British footholds and base of Robert Morrison's Protestant Christian invasion of Pacific Asia are passed, and we cross to the island Singapore over the long half-completed stone connecting viaduct from Johore (a state famed for a Sultan preoccupied in keeping concord in the multitudinous bevy of his harem while he leaves administration to the British).

We have the preconceived notion that at least a plurality of the estates are British owned, but everywhere the Malay guides are taking us to admire Chinese mansions and parks, Chinese temples, and Chinese high schools of expensive

modern construction. Every time we require anything, we buy it from a Chinese shop. First-processing factories for rubber seem to be as often Chinese as British. Our minds run back to the Chinese uprising in Singapore during the World War, and we are told something of the increasing prominence of the Chinese community in administration since the incident. How profound the reaction of a nationalized China will be among the Chinese population of Malaya, the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines, seems to us a matter for earnest speculation.

Paternalism Fails in the Dutch East Indies

We slip across to Java on one of the Dutch "white liners." As we pass out of Singapore harbor though the pretty islands which enclose it we are told to keep our cameras out of sight—another intimation of far-reaching restlessness in these tropically calm waters. Here is to be built the great naval base of Britain in the Far East. We wonder if Asia's revolt will not outstrip the West's fortification.

We cross to Sumatra from Java and return by motor road along the coast. In the Netherlands possessions we find the *débris* of a communist

uprising. Officials using the old-fashioned combination of ruthlessness and compromise, seem to have things well in hand. Conversations in unofficial circles impress us, however, that the "revolt" is not ended but rather just begun in the Dutch Indies. A missionary friend tells us that disaffection is spreading from a few "sore" and "ultra-modern" chieftains to the masses, and is changing from a theoretical radicalism to general feeling against the white ruler. The old Dutch rule of working the natives from youth up, treating them humanely, but telling them nothing about government, has about had its day, and the highly efficient Dutch administration and its praiseworthy economic improvements are insufficient to offset the rising feeling. Most evident of all is that even the genial Javanese and, even more certainly, the less civil and docile Sumatran, is beginning to boil against the social discrimination made by the Dutch ruler, who, as proved in South Africa, is most tenacious of the idea that "Ham" was created to serve. In addition, there is the Chinese community to reckon with—as important here as in Malaya, the middle class throughout the Dutch Indies, and all that their position connotes.

CHAPTER III

TOKYO TO CAIRO (*Continued*)

OUR next stage is a coasting boat to Burma. It's British, of course, no opposition coastal shipping seeming to survive in Indian waters. We pay exorbitant fares, being expected to uphold the tradition that all whites are boundlessly wealthy. If we had a dash of color, we could get practically the same conveniences in second class at just half the price, without being stared out of countenance by port officials and second officers and snubbed by chief stewards. . . . We exclaim at the great oil refineries on the Rangoon River, learning that they handle 7,000,000 barrels of crude oil a year, making 300,000,000 gallons of refined product, and are with usual British caution installing new American apparatus to get twice as much petrol out of their crude. But British business conservatism and inefficiency and demand for huge dividends, makes petrol in Burma twice the usual cost of "gas" in the U.S.A. and enables Standard Oil from California

to compete with it in Indian markets. And Burmese oil is gradually running out.

Burma Uniquely Demonstrates Her Feelings

We disembark on the modern docks in Rangoon to find the Chinese and Indians running business, and sharing labor with Burmese and hill women. The Burmese men appear to be distinctly gentlemen of leisure—as the Koreans would be under a little easier living conditions. They shy away from stuffy political meetings and dislike to get overheated for a “Cause”. They would rather lounge and sip pink drinks than wave flags. The British speak very highly of them, except when seeking coolie labor.

Such active agitation as exists here is in the hands of Bengalis, who have carried both the violent movement of Das and the Swaraj of Gandhi over the bay. But we run smack into another way the Burman has found to express his participation in the Revolt of Asia.

We take a tram through the swarming market district of the city to the rolling hills where the Shwe Dagon Pagoda, Burma’s most holy place, shelters a huge shrine under its three-hundred foot gold-covered spire, by the like of which

Kipling's soldier found his Burmese maid smoking a long cheroot and kissing an idol's toe, and taught her better occupations. We take off our shoes, "check" them with the waiting boy and prepare to enter in our sock feet, as is the custom throughout southeastern Asia. The marble steps and floor look unusually dirty after the glassy floors of Siam and Malaya, but we decide that we can change our socks afterward.

Half way up the grand stairway, however, a group of angry old priests seize us and claw at our legs. "Off with your stockings, too!" they imply. "Why!" we protest, "an unheard of thing!" But it is remove them, or get out. Our dignity is insulted and, furthermore, we shrink from the risk of "Hongkong foot." Angry monks and keepers hustle us back. We luckily grasp our shoes, and jump aboard a passing tram.

Back at the Consulate our hospitable consul soothes us with tea and talk. It's a new idea, he tells us, the reflex of the "Asia for Asian rule, culture and religion" movement from India. Buddhist monastic heads and leaders met and organized for the first time a centralized authority called the National Buddhist Council, which passed the "bare skin" rule. The white resident

or tourist henceforth might view the holy places only by soiling his precious white skin with Burmese earth. The self-superior ruling race loses caste and is laughed at throughout Burma every time an unwitting tourist finds himself angry and embarrassed upon the steps of a pagoda, and the white rulers have no retaliation without appearing in the dangerous and self-repudiatory rôle of interferers with religious scruple. The Prince of Wales, on his recent visit, found the rule as rigidly applied to him as to any visitor. Once on a time it would have been answered with a procession through the shrine of hob-nailed British Tommies, but those were the days of a different Asia. Now the government has to content itself with asking all consuls to discourage their nationals from visiting the shrines at all.

“Keep Burma, Let India Go”

We mingle with the British commercial community in Burma, and hear mostly fulminations against the placing of this potentially wealthiest British possession in Asia under the Indian government. Out of every hundred rupees of taxes paid in Burma seventy-six, they tell us, is spent toward making up deficits in India. In ad-

dition Burma is exposed to the danger of involvement in Indian secession. These men want a separation of Burma just as some Americans want Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago separated from the Philippines. They have an even better ethnological basis for their proposal, Burma being Mongoloid—utterly different from India in race. It would even pay Great Britain, the most rabid of them say, to give up India and concentrate on developing the lead, tin, teak, oil, trade and other allurements of Burma. But the scheme comes too late. As in the Philippine parallel, it would give just the opportunity for Nationalists to accuse dominant nations of adopting the undisguised “divide and conquer” formula. It is bitterly opposed by the native politicians in India and their following among the large Indian population in Burma. Downing Street has indicated that it will listen to the proposal only if it is made by the Burmans, and our informants confess that they are endeavoring without much promise of success to get these gentlemen to endorse separatism.

In Burma we find the Chinese community as important, in proportion to its much smaller numbers, as in Malaya, but not so much affected by influences from the ancestral Land. Its mem-

bers are progressive and trusted, the Minister of Education of the present cabinet being a Chinese. Home Rule has been a happily innocuous experiment. Municipal councils are elected in the lower and more progressive districts. A legislative council with advisory powers is elected on a basis of racial and occupational grouping, with property and cultural restrictions. In harmony with Burmese tradition, there is no discrimination of sex. Two ministers (Agricultural and Education) are appointed by the governor to represent the majority party in the council and sit in advisory capacity with the directly appointed Ministers of Home Affairs and Finance who with the governor form the supreme executive board. The Burman's meager interest in these British experiments, however, is shown by a 15 percent vote of the electorate last election. British uplift among the backwoods tribes and the costly program for freeing their slaves attract more attention than parliamentary evolution.

The Hot-bed of India Politics

From easy-going but not easily influenced Burma we cross the shallow bay, thread our way

through the maze of the Sunderban jungles and up the Hoogli River to swarming, bustling Calcutta. The elections are on. They remind us of Chicago. Posters, demonstrations, parades, automobiles carrying criers with megaphones, *swamis* exploiting the attention due a holy man, are all engaged in decrying that candidate or party and boosting this one. We narrowly escape a riot or two, promptly although not always gently or wisely suppressed by the British and native police. Newsboys bluster us into buying all sorts of sheets libeling and satirizing their enemies. High caste women pass in motor cars to vote for their sons, but how they or anyone else can get into the demagogue-besieged polling booths is a mystery to us. The Responsivists are endeavoring to get power by proffering to face inevitable conditions and work with the British rulers. The "bitter-enders," parading the picture of their "sainted leader," the late C. R. Das, seem to attract the most attention. Between the two extremes are half a dozen "Babu" parties of varying shades, out for what's in it, and in addition there are the internationalists, communists and nihilists.

Bengal is a seething political pot. The British look on in pretended detached superiority—in

Calcutta they are more caste-careful than even the Brahmins—but in fact they are watching with furtive and ill-concealed anxiety. A Scotch host of ours tells us over the drinks what difficult and insatiable devils these Bengalis are, adding candidly that if “we were in their place we would be twice as bad.” This is the candor which makes us like the Englishman in India, whether he be soldier, civil servant or business man.

We go up to Allahabad, where most party headquarters are. There, in the offices of the political papers, we find that even those who profess to favor and work with British rule really hope to get themselves into position to throw the British out. And the British, one and all, tell us that they expect to get out—and go on preparing to stay.

The Indian Nationalist Congress meets and is attended by delegates of all parties, although the Swarajists are loudly accused of running away with the meeting.

A Legislature of Kings

We are just in time to attend the Chamber of Princes at Delhi on the gracious invitation of the secretary on Political Affairs. This unique

legislative body combines the pageantry of oriental power with Roberts' "Rules of Order." Under the grave Viceroy, Lord Irwin, sit the members in their cloth of gold and jewels, everyone a sovereign in his own right and in addition a millionaire (only the cream of the seven hundred maharajahs and chiefs can belong) and fritter away their time passing insincere compliments. As they drive up in bejeweled Rolls-Royces (one in a solid silver chassis) we think of their subjects, the most destitute people we have seen. The vapid ceremonial strikes us as an unnecessary waste of the busy viceroy's time—especially after we have heard, a little further along on our journey, the succinct prophecy of Gandhi that "ten minutes after the British Raj has stepped out of the way there will not be one of these pampered swine left." Their protection in sybarism and capricious autocracy over one-third the area and one-fifth the population of India seems the most vulnerable point of British rule in the country. Here we have the British conscience overbearing what would be actual British interest, the white invaders having pledged perpetuation to their fathers through whose fickle alliance the Union Jack was hoisted over the land.

We note evidence of the independent spirit of

Asia even in connection with the princely legislature. The maharajahs who really "count"—the ones most desired in attendance by the Raj, blandly ignore the invitation to grace the chamber with their presences.

"A Little Naked Man"

We bolt, also, after two days of sugar-coated soufflé, and strike south across the Indian desert to the *ashram*¹ of a little naked man, whose one word bears more weight than the entire proceedings of the bejeweled senate. As we strike out at dawn behind a pacing bullock up the river from Ahmedabad station to Sabermati village we find ourselves in the midst of fellow pilgrims of every faction, creed and nationality. The entire enrollment of one boys' school goes out in clean white robes to pass under review of the *Mahatma*.² The breath-taking side of this movement is its program of revolt against western culture—we will come back and give it a chapter: here we take a quick view of this unique personality's place in the general "Revolt of Asia."

He breaks his morning "meditation," which we

¹*Ashram*, "retreat."

²*Mahatma*, "Noble Soul."

discover to be mostly intense study, to chat with us, and the conversation is concluded during his regular afternoon hour at his symbolic spinning-wheel, when he sees anyone. A procession, mostly of peasants, merely wishing to gaze on the face of a holy man, passes through his rough study. But others are there: a great Indian historian whose works are published authoritatively in London—whom we took at first sight for a rough-clad coolie—and a Moslem scholar, and the conversation goes on in cultured English which almost makes us ashamed to speak.

“I am taking the field this week after two years of imprisonment and three of retirement”—the humble leader lifts his piercing eyes from his revolving wheel and speaks. “The increases of Swaraj, my party, throughout India, although I held aloof from campaigning, are my indorsement by my people. I will lead them forward, now, to use of the ultimate weapon, if necessary: mass civil disobedience.” “What is that?” we ask. He replies succinctly: “Every regulation our rulers make, save only those of moral connotation, we will find ten thousand people to break with fasting and prayer.”

We gasp: “Can that succeed?” “In all history it has never failed,” he replies calmly. “You of

the West have been taught that it is violent power which wins. The truth is that it is passive resistance which has always won." We ask for an illustration. He replies: "The victory of the Christian Church over the Roman Empire. Non-resistance is invincible. As long as we do not let our fight drop to the plane of violence, we can not lose. . . . We need a plurality party composed of all our creeds and races. We are getting it, in spite of the lazy common dismissal of our program as hopelessly idealistic.—See, this man here with me is a high Moslem scholar, and we trust one another. Perhaps you have gained an inkling of the remarkable breakdown of caste taking place over India. As soon as we show unity, the British will step out—they will not resist—they are sensible people. I might paraphrase the words of a British protagonist of the commoners' struggle in England: 'If we Indians could only spit in unison, we would form a puddle big enough to drown 300,000 Englishmen!' " Why Gandhi must have Home Rule and will accept no parliamentary compromise will appear when we go back to him for explanation of his "cultural revolt."

We begin the hot, monotonous journey back across the desert. A Scotch civil servant, veteran

of eighteen years, with whom we discuss Gandhi comments: "A grand old fellow. But his wad is shot. He is discredited. Young India will never come back to his idealism. And besides, his health is very precarious.—Didn't you find it so?" We did not. Too obviously, the wish is father to the comforting thought in each case. We feel that no great part of young India will ever adopt the sainthood with which Gandhi wishes to equip his soldiers of Home Rule. But that the Mahatma, in his fifties, having just passed through experiences which have brought him to intellectual maturity, and who commands a many-sided organization ramifying through India, has suddenly ceased to be the most inspiring personality in the world today, or that, should he die, his spirit would fail to "go marching on" in even more effective leadership than during life, strikes us as sweeping talk.

"What," we ask the genial Scotchman, "have you to combat 'Mass Civil Disobedience'?"

He lifts his head and smiles self-assuredly. "Machine guns!"

Comments run through our minds that we don't take the trouble to express, while our fellow-traveler continues: "It's time these chaps were put back in their places. When I came here

they would get out of the street and salaam when a white man passed. Now they won't step out of the way if you are in a hurry to get by them. My cook and waterboy combined used to cost me four rupees ¹ a month. The beggars demand thirty now!" A little later he is telling with prideful self-justification how a combine of his fellows has forced his own salary up. He exhibits a thumbless hand: "This is what I got out of a recent riot."

"Oh," we exclaim, "was it slashed off?"

He spits. "No, the nigger's teeth gave me bloodpoisoning!"

We put him down as certainly an anachronism. When he has left, a cultured young officer of the educational department comes aboard. We relate the part about "getting off the street." He looks at us naïvely. "Why shouldn't they? After all, aren't we a superior race?" We drop the subject.

Much later it comes up again. "If we weren't superior we wouldn't be ruling them," he justifies himself uncertainly. "And if they shall quash your rule, or worse, they will have demonstrated that they are the superior race?" we ask. He turns and looks out of the window.

¹ A rupee is about one-third of a U. S. dollar.

Down at Madras, and again up on the Afghan border, we fall in with military men. We learn that the Indian army has its own commissions, which always leave the native incomparably beneath the young Englishman in both authority and pay, regardless of ability and service of the former. We are told of secret instructions that officers' wives must not stray farther than ten minutes walk from the officers' club, and of the transforming of these clubs into armed fortresses. We learn of the largest concentrations of tanks in history, reinforced by air-force on the Afghan border, and of intention to strike decisively at the Afghan menace upon its next vernal outbreak by a march on Kabul. There come reports that the threat is answered by the building of an Afghan air force with Russian aid. We hear of a recent Russian military occupation of a land islet in the Pamirs on the Indian border dislodged only after a most anxious campaign of diplomacy. News of the incident was suppressed through fear of the effect in India. We run into a little Sikh mutiny in the Punjab and learn that these troops, the best trained and once the most trusted of native forces, watchdogs of British empire throughout Pacific Asia, are now the least reliable. We are told that Indian troops are no longer trusted to

do any "job" alone. India, we sum up, as the dreary wastes of Baluchistan stretch behind us, is only a little behind China in the Revolt.

Persia Adopts Our Own Weapons to Fight Us

Contacts with Persian merchants in every city since Rangoon, and Persian students in Indian universities have prepared us for the new spirit of that land as we take off by motor car from the railhead, Duzdab. "Modernization" is the watchword under the new regime. Railroads and electric light projects are more talked than seen under construction, but we sense that Persia is adopting the strategy of Japan before the Russo-Japanese war: borrowing the weapons of the West to withstand us. Foreign advisers—Americans preferred—are being courted so that they can be dispensed with. A pride of nationalism lights sallow faces as they talk to us of a new Persia, able to exploit its own natural resources, standing on its dignity among nations. They tell us that they like Americans, but their faces darken as they bring up the \$170,000 indemnity they are paying for the death of an American consul at the hands of a mob whose religious prejudices he had offended. "Would a Persian

consul killed by irresponsible elements in America be worth as much?" a student asks. "At least," we assured him, "a portion is going back for education of chaps like you in America." He asks at once how to matriculate. It is after we leave Persia that we learn Congress has not only made out the State Department a liar by going back on its agreement, but, which seems to come closer home to our egoism, has put us, who tried to be ambassadors of good will, in that position too. We observe cynically, as news also reaches us of the rejection of the Treaty of Lausanne, that repudiations of our government by our government to a few more Asiatic nations is all that is needed to cause Asia to lose all faith in our government.

The Lazy Dissatisfaction of Iraq

We emerge from Persia, after a well-earned experience in jolted bones and mud-encrusted skin, at Mahamrah, port of the prosperous Anglo-Persian oil company. The most modern exploitation goes on side by side with the fanatical human sacrifices of the Shiah sect. We happen to have struck the rainy season. A motor-boat takes us up the Shat el Arab to Basrah, where macadamized military roads lie like a

spider web over impassable mud. The Arab population appear to us the hungriest looking people on earth. A train slower than the one through Arkansas takes us past Abraham's home and Nebuchadnezzar's palace along swaying tracks laid on the rain-softened desert to Bagdad. We hear how oil, giving one-third of its royalties to irrigation works, may yet bring back the now dreariest country on earth to the wealth of Babylonian days, provided the British are left unmolested in suzerainty. But everywhere the Arab voices lazy dissatisfaction with the political situation under Britain. He doesn't like King Feisul, crowned as his sovereign upon a throne of beer cases covered with carpets. His mullahs dislike the Scotch honesty of the administration of Moslem religious and philanthropic bequests, formerly in their hands. On general principles the Arab is, like the traditional Irishman, "agin" government. And we wonder if the Indian civil and railway servants in his midst, to whom he also objects as robbing him of jobs, are conducing to the firmness of the British Empire in Iraq. We hear a faint reaction from the fierce Wahabis and their independence movement in Arabia proper. In Bagdad an immense hunger for education seems to have taken young Moslems.

Christians and Jews and we are dragged in to address boys whose faces glow as they hear of sister peoples of Asia struggling to self-assertion. Russia is their inspiration, Turkey their model, and "the Imperialist Powers" their antipathy.

We leave the opportunistically created kingdom thankfully, making the mistake of observing to the modernized Arab who relieves us of ten dollars for going out, that we feel the money well spent, but that the ten taken for coming in was a total loss, whereupon he puts some initials on our passports which make us much trouble at various desert stations as we plough through the mud toward Damascus.

Sacred Whiskers

After we cross the Euphrates we go cautiously, all lights out at night, for the Druse warriors are still a peril. One night we stop by the camp of a chief who refuses to smoke our tobacco. We take the hint, and sputter off before daylight, pursued by yelling half-clad herdsmen. "We despise those chaps on the rivers," one has told us. "They are no sons of Ishmael. When we hate the white man, we fight him." Here is the revolt in the open. And it started, this fellow related, over the shaving of half the sacred beard off

the faces of several Druse braves. Can we call that a cultural incitation?

We slather out of Arabian mud onto the firm highways of Damascus basin, and the huge old stunted grape vines look like trees of paradise after the past six hundred miles of desolation. The barbed-wire defences of the roads, opened for us to pass, the ruined outskirts of the city and debris of the great mart and mosque impress us. Through ruthlessness alone did the white man here succeed in maintaining his power. A camaraderie seems to have grown up between the urban Moslems of this detached region and their rulers. Damascus, full of cafes and slick moustaches, appears very Frenchified. We climb over the steep ridge and come down on the Mediterranean shore, where a Christian population repudiates any need of foreign "guidance." In Beirut American University we find teachers struggling to remain popular and yet keep students from getting them into trouble with exuberant songs, slogans and banners of nationalism.

The Touchy Turk

We drive up to Aleppo and plunge into Asia Minor. A tarboosh or fez that we had picked up

south of the line is promptly confiscated, with warning of a jail sentence. This new Turkey believes a little pathetically that clothes make the man. We are asked how long, in spite of physically demonstrated modernism and military power, we arrogant westerners are going to insist upon designating Turks as barbarians. Turkey, as Japan, but without Japanese courtesy, is nursing the revolt against implied inferiority, which must follow inevitably the success of the political revolt. The same resentment, we guess, is behind much of the passionate hatred in Russia of our institutions. In Turkey as in Japan the United States is now regarded as the most haughty upholder of social discriminations, and our Senate's rejection of the Lausanne treaty is popularly set down to the feeling that we are "better than thou." They would die to humble us. We leave with the scornful words of Latif Hanoum in our ears: "Americans, even more than other westerners, must be either terribly stubborn or hopelessly stupid. I believe you are both."

The Supersensitive Egyptian

We drive southward again, on through the embryo nationalism of the Zionist communities—

such as remain. A native Syrian, thinking we are advocates of the Zionist cause, raves at us in Jerusalem new town for interfering in "his" country. We entrain for Port Said. Here we give up motor transport—rather gladly—for rail, first to Tel Aviv, that bustling, gaudy little offshoot of New York's Ghetto, and on to Port Said. South of Gaza, in the sand, we are introduced to "modern" Egypt. A dapper little physician, all French in turnout save his tarboosh, prances up and says, "You look sick. I guess I'll have to put you in quarantine." When we show resentment of his elephantine and egotistic humor he becomes highly insulted. "I'll show you whose country you are in!" he says. "I detained even the Polish consul the other day!" He struts off with our passports.

Enquiry from fellow passengers elicits the fact that officially there exists an epidemic of malaria on this border. A case hasn't been known for three years but the Egyptian quarantine force contrive to hold their jobs. They give every entrant a notice to report to the police every twenty-four hours for health examination while in Egypt and warn him of severe penalties, but the traveler who takes it seriously is advised at the first police headquarters to tear it up. The

customs at the crossing of Suez Canal charge duties on our portable typewriters and kodaks. On our long journey we have become accustomed to being robbed and deceived at every turn but in Egypt the process is the least restrained and genteel that we have yet met. It is easy to like the coarse, fun-loving Arab-dressed fellahin who crowd on the trains but the Egyptian "intellectual," too often vain, crafty, supersensitive, sexually depraved, strikes us as the most impossible human being on earth. He is the product of and reaction from a series of foreign invasions since Ptolemy and centuries of native tyranny. He wears a chip on both shoulders.

We find Egypt economically depressed because of the drop in cotton and a Greek merchant tells us that the consequent lowness of spirit is the only thing which prevents active political rebellion. "The only way to keep these people in order is to keep them poor," confirms a high class Jewish professional man. We find the Egyptian sullen against the stranger in his midst who conducts all his trade and industry, against the king of his own blood who has been set up over him, and particularly against that hated British garrison in the citadel at Cairo which refuses him permission to enter his own national fortress and in

entrenched aloofness restrains the fanaticism of the million inhabitants below. Egypt is like a sullen hound watching a man who has thrashed it, for opportunity to bite his throat in two while he sleeps. Lest it bring us more such experiences, we are glad that our long trek is over.

The Movements Tie Up

Our cursory observation has shown evidences of the Revolt taking place in every country of the Asiatic seaboard. Close investigation would bring out many more. But have we seen any tendency toward coordination of the movement? We recall that in Japan highest honors were being given to visiting Siamese princes and in Siam we heard the strange story of a Japanese company seeking a concession to dig a canal across the narrowest portion of the Malay peninsula—only thirty miles, a scheme which would shorten the sea route between Europe and Pacific Asia one thousand miles, and incidentally would reduce Singapore from a focal point of communication between east and west to the business center of a small side eddy. We remember a “Pan-Asian” conference in Nagasaki ruined by an attempt to make it communistic, but signifi-

cant in spite of its failure. The Indian National Congress passed resolutions of sympathy with the Chinese Nationalist movement, and condemned the using of Indian troops in Pacific Asia. We met Indian propagandists and their publications in Japan and China, and we heard echoes of cultural sympathy aroused by the visit of the poet Tagore to Pacific Asia several years ago.

The Central National Solidarity Committee in the Philippines was financing Filipino missions to Asiatic lands by popular subscriptions.

Mahatma Gandhi informed us that he would accept the invitation of student bodies connected with the Chinese Nationalist movement to visit China shortly. His object would be to preach non-violence and establish a common basis of struggle against the imperialist west. We discovered that Japanese had a commercial exposition in Turkey and that Chinese students were going there in significant numbers to study the secret of Turkish success in throwing off the hegemony of the Powers. One of China's most brilliant diplomats, Dr. Alfred Sze, well known in Washington, has been in Turkey not only attentive to opening relations between the New Asiatic republics, but in particular observant of

original methods in oriental dealings with the west. News of confidential conferences comes to show that the friendship between Angora and Moscow is consistently kept green, and Turkey gets publicity using the irenic diplomacy of Russia toward her more approachable neighbors to north and east.

We heard that a treaty was being negotiated between the Chinese Nationalist government and the Afghan Ameer for mutual assistance against British menace. Both are united in looking toward Russia, which loses no chances to make herself a center for all Asia. In this connection we recall too the triple alliance of Russia, Turkey and Afghanistan, and, on the cultural side, the new educational opportunities attracting Asiatics to meet on common ground in Moscow.

The Japanese government's official sponsorship of the India-made film of Buddha's life, "The Light of Asia," (ordered to be shown in all Japanese schools) and its success in all other East Asian countries, appeared to us significant of new cultural intercourse. Right here, by the way, we may remark Asia's "Movie" revolt. Japan, China, Siam and India have begun to make their own films, and we saw Chinese audiences pay twice the admission charged for the

most alluring Hollywood attraction for an opportunity to see their own actors portray dramas of their own environment.

The One End of Common Action

The synthesis has begun, it will continue until the white man is completely forced out of his special privileges in Asia and compelled to admit by deed as well as word the racial, social, moral and cultural equality of the Asian peoples. It will go no further than that, for that is the one question on which the diverse peoples of Asia are interested in common action.

CHAPTER IV

CHINA BECOMES THE SPEARHEAD

OF all this revolt against white domination which we have seen stirring into action throughout Asia, the actual thrust, the spearhead of the movement, we find in China, once symbol of docility and pacifism throughout the nations. The masses of China have become leavened with a hostility to foreign control that has transformed within the past few years an inert people that submitted to be pawns in foreign rivalries for possession of their country, into a nation fighting for its freedom and to end all kinds of foreign privileges, no matter how long established. All classes of Chinese now demand not only the end of settlements, controls, immunities and tax exemptions enjoyed by foreign interests through limitation of the national sovereignty, but they display a "really unaccountable" impatience and irascibility over negotiations by which foreign powers aim to provide these things "ultimately."

China wants them now, and China has arrived at a mood of readiness to fight to get them now.

Spread amply before an observant eye is a situation in China which leads one to ask whether China may not now at last be in position to obtain a long-lost freedom—in spite of all disorganization to the white man's world, and upset of white men's calculations which such liberation connotes. The situation is not a compound of unprecedented actions and tendencies—few things are new in China's history, or in the long and eventful course of her contact with the foreigner. What is new is the united effect now produced, the footing on which China faces the modern world. It is a favorable footing, and the nation is fully aware of it, determined to exploit it to the limit. The stays, then, of this newborn confidence, heart and soul as it is of a resistance that soon or late we must face in every country in Asia—are matters for our close accounting.

The white man in difficulty in China years ago, had recourse to that master key for closed doors, the gunboat policy. The bombardment of the official residency of a seaport city, followed by landing of a few marines to take command of official residency and official person too, if possible, effectually overawed a people trained to

obey any force that usurped, even temporarily, the insignia of sovereignty. So the British got their first foothold at Canton. In a country sectionally unconscious and calloused toward woes overtaking a neighbor province, this method was ideal. Peking evinced only mild resentment when the British took Hongkong and surrounded Canton and the southern and Yangtze ports with the perpetual embarrassment and humiliation of successive occupations. The expedition of 1860 that took Peking was again but an expedient of terrorism—the same gunboat policy slightly extended.

The Punitive Expedition Becomes Obsolete

Yet observe how this weapon has lost in efficacy. Fifteen foreign gunboats lay in the Yangtze about Hankow at the time of its occupation. What did, or could they do to prevent a Chinese mob from overrunning and seizing the British concession? Kiukiang, farther downstream, witnessed a parallel event. By these deeds, the foreign settlements at Foochow, Amoy, Swatow, Hangchow, Nanking, and a half dozen other points in China found themselves projected into the no-man's-land of unguarded and untenable outpost—unless some new means

of defence could be improvised. And no means it seemed under the conditions, could avail, short of effective occupation of the whole country.

An expeditionary land army was sent to Shanghai by the British, forming the majority of some 25,000 of foreign troops there gathered by different powers—the largest overseas troop movement since the Great War. The second port in tonnage of the world, and the richest foreign settlement in Asia called for some determined defence. The use of the army was unmistakable recognition that the gunboat policy had had its day as a solvent for crises of the sort—and the utility of a great land force to maintain the *status quo* must remain doubtful.

The “Power of Disruption” in China

The second element of the new situation accounts in part for the first-mentioned. It is that now it is impossible to overawe China by direct display of force against a center of constituted authority. China is a particularly poor field for employing such hostile tactics when by constant attrition in civil wars no center of power remains through subjugation of which a grip might be gotten on the nation.

But this is an accident of the situation—not the permanent or necessary reality. The reality is that there has arisen now a common public opinion—in every camp, in every party, in every section and among every class in China—thoroughly imbued with anti-foreign animus. The mobs at Hankow, Kiukiang, and other cities, the demonstrations at Shanghai and Canton, the students' movements at Peking, were incidents all to its development. You can no longer interfere with any segment of China—however disunited, or mayhap even embattled against the rest—without uniting the whole against you. Foreigners in China, meeting this spirit interpreted in terms of definite personal hostility, had to evacuate parts of the Yangtze, abandoning schools and even settlements for fear of consequences similar to the Boxer rising.

This is no "Boxer Uprising"

No one can observe the Chinese situation at first hand, however, and feel that this disquieting analogy is either fair or accurate as regards the latest revolt, which aims not against the persons of foreigners, but against the privileges and powers by which they maintained an unequal status in China.

With all the incitations arising amid domestic war, bandit irregularities and labor struggles it is worth-while to record that not a single non-combatant foreigner was killed during the spread of the Nationalist movement from Tibet to the gates of Shanghai. Rough methods were used in some cases to dislodge them where their presence was considered prejudicial to the success of the Chinese cause. But in what other country of the world would a people, especially so largely illiterate and poor, show such restraint? Imagine Americans throwing off a seventy-five years' acquiescence to the existence of a Chinese self-constituted superior caste who had come to dominate their finances, customs, and shipping, had appropriated the strategic bits of territory the length of, say, the Gulf and Mississippi River, had made this nation an international laughing-stock and aggravated unconscionably internal factionalism therein? In China, even under the Nationalist government, there has been a deal of extortion, of inability to preserve order, of postponement of problems of administration, evils from which Chinese as well as foreigners have suffered. So, we recall, if we get far away enough from Shanghai to cool down, it was in America, 1776-90. Considered judgment credits

the Chinese with preserving remarkably, even in this greatest ferment of their long history, the innate orderliness and reasonableness for which they have been noted.

The movement is backed, not by a corrupt court and an organization of irresponsible and ignorant terrorists as in the Boxer fiasco, but by the considered consensus of a very large mass of the Chinese, now, in a sense inconceivable in 1899, intelligent, and aware both of the reasons for China's humiliation at foreign hands and of their power to end that shame.

Unity of Feeling Faces Foreigners

Where the foreigners move, therefore, they encounter a determination and a unison of resistance that bring to the "old China hand" surprise and consternation. In the military phase they are left aghast at such total disregard of their prestige as was shown in the famous Wanh sien affair. I had arrived in China two or three days previously, and saw enforced thereby a reversal of all foreign calculations which led to much that followed.

A dispute long existed between foreign steamers and river boatmen in controlling traffic

on the upper Yangtze. Two years previously, at this identical town, a British lieutenant had trained the two guns of his "mosquito boat" upon the chief magistrate's yamen, and forced that official to disperse the pickets of the boatmen's union, pay an indemnity for the death of an American merchant ship's officer, and walk in the funeral as a special mark of humiliation. This time a much larger expedition likewise trained its guns, but was told defiantly to fire, and upon firing had its fire destructively returned by Chinese soldiers. Wanhsien was pretty well shot to pieces in the encounter. It was a veritable Bunker Hill so far as the Chinese were concerned, for though the British subsequently bombarded the defenceless town, with a resultant toll of hundreds of Chinese casualties, they apologized on the demand of the Peking government and submitted to a compromise which indemnified the Chinese victims.

A Gunboat no Good Where it Can't See

The Nationalists were then besieging Hankow, having spread propaganda all the way from Canton that the heyday of the foreigner was over in China. Their leaders, Chang Kai-

shek, T. V. Soong, and the Russian Adviser Borodin, of whom this story must tell more later, had almost consummated the design which the Cantonese had entertained for twelve years, that of bringing the Yangtze valley under authority of the Kuomintang, and of controlling the center as well as the whole south of China in the name of their drastic program of rights recovery. Turning to the Cantonese as champions against foreign ferocity the middle and upper Yangtze regions repudiated the conservative dictator Wu Pei-fu, altering the entire strategic position, both political and military, almost over night, and leaving the prospects for foreign power more precarious than at any time in many years.

The buffer which the comparatively friendly Wu Pei-fu had interposed against the extremists was swept away as direct result of the "gunboat policy" applied at Wanh sien. No wonder the Chinese scholar, Hu Shih, leader in intellectual revolt against foreign culture in China, said a few days later, "what use are foreign gunboats in China against an enemy no longer in sight?" The Hankow mob taking possession of the British territory, with gunboats lying supinely offshore, was the complete answer.

This demonstrated fruitlessness of the gun-

boat policy, and this rise of mass opinion in China are not limited in their effect to that country. The fact that they have so materially affected the Chinese crisis entrains results throughout Asia. The weapons which Chinese hands first seized develop utility with the logic of events for India, the South Seas, the Philippines and the middle and nearer East. The methods proved by one are vigilantly adopted by others.

China Proves "The Economic Weapon"

A third element that altered the Chinese situation far more than estimated from conventional foreign viewpoints was the drastic and thoroughly modernized application of China's oldest and most unfailing weapon—the boycott. Hankow fell only after the workers, southern sympathizers, had tied up defensive operations by a series of concerted strikes within the city. In spite of medievalistic decapitation of strike propagandists just off the electric car tracks of Shanghai, the same thing began there, once the southerners were near enough to be helped by it. But the boycott displayed its really portentous power when turned against the enormous re-

sources of the Hongkong shipping, in the great strike of 1925-26. This latest of a series of battles and skirmishes in which ever the same combatants lined up, was an all but life-and-death struggle between the mercantile marine power of the British and the forces of labor and nationalism led by the Canton government in south China. It developed into a social struggle in which the house servants of all the British and to lesser degree of the rest of the foreign community, joined forces to make the foreign "bandits" depend absolutely on themselves for the services that make life possible to the foreigner in the Far East. I was in Hongkong when the British hotels were charging \$8.50 gold per day for a room, and the occupant could carry his own luggage and do his own chamber-work—in a land where plumbing is but very incompletely installed.

The comfort due to burdens borne on the broad backs of coolies had made the east seem an ideal place to live for thousands of ease-loving foreigners. When "amahs" and "boys" too went on strike the lure of it rather faded, and to the harassed masters life seemed suddenly hard and primitive.

All this is part of the modern boycott, Chinese

style. It was seen at Hankow—even refugees fleeing from the place could get no help with their baggage; aid was interdicted by the labor guilds. The boycott, primarily a political weapon, had the economic phase in Hongkong, representing a demand that labor supply be through recognized Chinese unions. Yet ever more or less conscious, there is the aim of national dignity and freedom.

The result was humiliation to the British in Hongkong such as the colony had never known. The British governor at the start forcibly closed the seamen's guildhall, and affixed his seal. By the terms of settlement he released their leaders, officially broke the seal, and went in to feast with them. Victory was not doubtful to the most skeptical. Their disposition to make the best of a bad situation gains for the British respect as fighters. Yet it remains clear that the economic situation now faced in China has passed beyond their control.

And Last, Military Force

The fourth factor making up a new world in China is the military. The Chinese forces, disorganized and disunited, though they be, would

coalesce in complete harmony to face any foreign invasion. There is a potential force of over 1,500,000, of which fully 300,000, well equipped and trained and supplied with all modern accoutrements of war, are equal to meeting even western armies on a near-even footing. The efficient southern army was developed within a few years, under tutelage of Chinese trained in Japan and high Russian officers, placed in charge of an intensive officers' training school near Canton. It proved sufficient for duties by no means small—a campaign of eight hundred miles over difficult mountains from Canton to Hankow, passing large rivers, and onward for a total of fifteen hundred miles to conquer more than half China, keeping lines of communication meanwhile through once hostile territory behind the front.

The military game in China went through many phases after the Great War. Many armies of ex-bandits lived upon the country without mercy and made the name *soldier* a perpetual curse. On the other hand, new armies, those of the nominally Christian Feng Yu-hsiang for instance, and most of the southerners, paid their way everywhere. They needed public opinion to back them--and it was an unfailing propa-

ganda of good will, their principle of leaving the country better, except for actual battlefields, wherever they lodged in it. In this they had antecedents in the earlier Manchus—who, reported Navarrete, went so far as to decapitate a soldier for having short-changed a villager by a half penny.

But the aspect of Chinese military power that most profoundly affects the present crisis, is that no matter which particular faction wins in the civil wars, the winner will be a nationalist perforce. Nationalism has been infused into all the armies, to such extent, for instance, that Chang Tso-lin, spokesman of the conservative north, demanded return of foreign concessions at Shanghai just as belligerently as the most radical in the south. It is fatuous longer to hold the comforting prejudice that the Chinese amid domestic strife are unable to attend to anti-foreign grudges as well. The Nationalists phrased China's demands, and it soon became clear that others differ only as to the detail of which party shall govern while they are enforced.

Unanimity is manifested occasions by the score. Early in 1927 Dr. Alfred Sze, accredited to the United States from the north, bluntly told an American audience:

“The Chinese people are convinced that it is entirely a futile attempt, to procure for themselves the new and just order by patiently acquiescing in the old order of diplomacy. The world may be assured that China will not rest until her independence and territorial integrity shall become realities. She has encountered procrastination with generous forbearance, but wants no more of it. She sees no reason why she should not as well recover her rights now as at any other time, and stands ready to make such sacrifices as may be required in order that the full satisfaction of her demands may be secured.” Parallel utterances might be quoted from others of the Peking emissaries—not at all to be regarded as radicals.

The southern Nationalists are even less diplomatic in coming to the point. As T. V. Soong, young Harvard graduate, financial manager of the army and treasury administrator of the Southern government put it to me while I was at Canton, foreigners are quite wrong in affecting to consider how much of China's rights they can afford to restore. The question is, now that China has proved she can be mistress in her own house any moment she wishes, how much shall she generously allow the foreigners to re-

tain of the privileges illegally assumed here in the past?

The immediacy of the demand came from the conviction spread among all classes that just because of the prevalence of foreign dictation their government was no longer able to command respect. They satirize results of Customs and Extraterritoriality conferences, however well-intentioned and reasonable, for they still have enough in them of foreign control to be wholly out of key with the new tone of Chinese thought.

China accepts no further probation; has concluded that until foreign occupation is itself on probation, and its term set by her sole will and judgment, the effort for national freedom can only follow courses often, and most ineffectually, followed before. First the Manchu throne, then the Republic, fell because through truckling to foreigners they lost popular respect. Money and prestige are essential to a government, and the foreign negotiators unwittingly deadlock progress on both these counts when stipulating that foreigners will yield only when China is "ready" for such endowments. But when a child asserts himself to claim the liberties of an adult, it is best to acquiesce—especially if you can't whip him. China will have no more wardship.

China's Entry Insures the Revolt Success

There is an arrogance to the self-constituted foreign guardianship of China which we, were the positions reversed, would be first to resent. It implies a claim of racial superiority in type and in culture, and in pertinaciously resisting that implication the Chinese take a position thoroughly understood in all Asia. Asia is sick to death of receiving favors from the white man's hand, of being "civilized" and "uplifted" by his agents. This feeling in China transcends all politics—and the demand for action *now* is not a surprise to those who sensed its deepening force.

"China—there sleeps a giant; do not wake him," we may paraphrase Napoleon. It is destiny that China lead Asia in the revolt now sweeping the continent. She has the largest and most industrious population, the most widely diffused intelligence, the greatest pride of race, the richest material resources. Her equipment is both material and spiritual. Her economic structure excels in all Asia. Where Japan had already proved herself and joined the great powers, China, undertaking her advance anew just when Asia began to seethe with the ferment of nationalism, offered a "lead" more easy to grasp

to peoples more backward in the same long struggle. It is a critical conflict with the white man, and China naturally leads. Her revolt is opportune; her reasonable mood, bound by no fanaticism against other religions or violent race hatred against other peoples, makes her a pivot of sympathy and intellectual fellowship in Asia. Her people, level-headed, are the least likely to kill their cause by going off on a tangent.

The Revolt against the white man, therefore, now possessed of the resources and intelligence of China, is past its decisive crisis. With the rise of China a new era for all the Asian peoples, and the change of our relation as a race to the greatest and oldest of continents, is determined.

CHAPTER V

HOW THE WHITE MAN CAME TO DOMINATE

HAVING witnessed the wide-sweeping reverse swing of the pendulum against white dominance in Asia today, especially as shown in the revolt in China, it is now time to turn back from the present, surcharged with the motion of impending and fundamental change to examine, first the broad contacts between the races which culminated in the "white man's world," and second, the successive steps which have recently brought his supremacy to the verge of collapse.

We are compelled to resort to Wellsian generalization as to beginnings. The one question upon which the human creature is perhaps even more ignorant than where he is going is where he came from. We have the testimony of Ellsworth Huntington that we are almost totally ignorant as yet of even the meaning of "race." Differentiations into racial stocks are approximate and uncertain. The one principle upon which all ethnologists seem to agree is, that any people,

wherever found, must certainly have come from somewhere else. As a columnist said, alluding to evolution, accepted views of race origin are rather "suspicions" than theories. The hypothesis of Henry Fairfield Osborn of the American Museum of Natural History and of his herculean field worker, Roy Chapman Andrews—with whom I'm proud to claim a Central Asian acquaintance—will serve to begin our story as well as any.

It is, that human culture, as well as dinosaurs, began on that vast central Asian steppe including Mongolia and Turkestan. Now semi-arid, with stretches of sand and gravel (very like the American state of Wyoming) it was once a lush lake-country. The great human migrations went out of this region, the "Western Heaven" or Garden of Eden of Chinese tradition, as the climate became dryer. One drift, by the same hypothesis, went west, and in the valleys of the Ganges, the Tigris-Euphrates and the Nile, in Hellas, in Anatolia, on the Minoan coasts and in Etruria, the mother civilizations of our western world were born. "Westward the course of empire"—from Babylon to Rome, then, after fresh infusion of barbarian blood, through Europe to America. So naturally we Ameri-

cans, by this artificial interpretation of history, regard ourselves as the acme of human progress.

“Eastward the Course of Empire”

What paste-and-scissor compilers of general histories readily forget is the great development likewise taking place to the eastward. Some of the foremothers and forefathers (the mothers foremost according to old Chinese evidence) preferred the sunrise trail. Happening upon the upper Yellow River valley they evolved the unique Chinese civilization. In a rich and empty land, the importance of the warrior was minimized. It was less effort to scratch in a little seed among one's own last year's stubble (as they do until now in Kansu) than to rob the fields of neighbors. Whereas, from the very nature of problems to be met, the good fighter was the most indispensable member of society and hence patrician in Rome, samurai in Japan, citizen in Sparta, in old China he was relegated to the fifth, or outcaste rank. Classed as most important was the producer of ideas, the scholar; next in rank, the producer of food and raw materials; third, the man who made raw materials into new form—the artizan; and fourth, the distributor,

the trader. Though very rich, the wind-deposited loess soil lying in a three-hundred foot blanket over the three northwestern provinces of China is very treacherous. It has no backbone of rock. I have seen an uncurbed rivulet become a "grand canyon" in a few days. It is such washes that make the Yellow River yellow, and raised the great north China plain out of the Yellow Sea, building out the foreshore at the rate of a fifth of a mile a year. The primitive loess dwellers could save their fields and cave homes only through great terracing and hydraulic works, which required early group cooperation. The early heroes of Chinese legend were not great warriors but great engineers. Thus organization and group responsibility were built into Chinese civilization to unique degree.

Non-militarist, cooperative, this early people of Cathay had a third basic characteristic—non-religiousness, a gentlemanly worldliness rather than unworldliness, and faith in accumulated experience rather than in supernatural fiat.

This loose, patriarchal-democratic commonwealth was welded into a nation by Chin the First Emperor, a semi-alien with non-Chinese ideas of conquest and the builder of the great wall as of many other great works, about 250 B.C.

Meanwhile, kinsmen of the Chinese had progressed on to Japan, clashing for a thousand years of fierce struggle with a previous white-skinned people, the Ainu, now absorbed except for a remnant in Hokkaido. The resultant society was distinctly military. But from 500 A.D. onward, by way of Korea, came to Japan an invasion of Chinese culture, winged with the spiritual impetus of Buddhism which had crossed the Himalayas from India about the time of Christ. The barbarous Japanese endeavored to swallow whole this dazzling three-thousand-year matured civilization, and at the same time preserve their martial ideals.

India developed the world's one great tropical civilization, in characteristics as well as geography lying midway between east and west. Indian and Chinese culture combined in south-eastern Asia.

One or more waves of the early eastward migration swept over the Pacific to America, sporadically developing into civilizations or tribal societies ruthlessly overwhelmed by the white men when they went forth to exploit the world. America became the battle ground of East and West, but there the American Indian, the least fortified easterner, met the most highly equipped

westerner, was vanquished, and supplanted. The line of contact was pushed to the Asian shore of the Pacific, and there remains.

The Beginnings of East-West Contact

In centuries near the beginning of our era, the greatest civilizations, east and west, were crystallized in two great empires, the Roman and the Han (*not* Hun) of China. Each knew and respected the other. Embassies of trade and diplomacy passed back and forth, Chinese silk and Mediterranean products were exchanged. There are evidences that Chinese soldiers of the Dragon and legions of the Eagle shook dice with one another on the shores of the Caspian sea. East and West at that time recognized the military and cultural attainments of one another as commanding equality of respect, in spite of diversity. Although "the earth" was as boundless a concept to the ancients as "the universe" is to us (each civilization believing itself to exist in the middle, but admitting the existence of other worlds beyond) yet considerable real geographical knowledge existed. Two hundred years before Christ, Eratosthenes measured with surprising approximation the girth of the planet

by comparison of midsummer shadows in upper and lower Egypt.

Chinese explorers, some of them royal, "pierced the void" to the west, bringing back the Persian grape and other trophies. The Mediterranean world began to reach out toward China. The Nestorian Christians proselytized and founded monasteries near the Chinese capital from the sixth to the ninth centuries, maintaining communications between Sianfu and Damascus. Manicheism, the great Persian heresy, spread eastward to China and westward to Rome, carrying with it Greek art influences which created the distinct Graeco-Chinese school of sculpture and painting, astonishing specimens of which have been unearthed in recent years in the western territories of China.

The Barbarian Push Ends it

But these linking-up movements lapsed because a great separative darkness had settled down over the western world. Roman civilization had been drowned under the Germanic flood, and where knowledge did persist, as in Constantinople, people were too busy with their immediate troubles to retain any exact knowledge of any

world outside. Classical mention of China and the Sinbad tales of Arab merchants trading with Canton, became woven into a fantastic myth. Inhabitants of the eastern world ceased to be real to the European mind. Fundamental knowledge of geography was lost. People in the "dark" ages again thought the earth flat, and that they lived atop it, alone worthy to be designated "human beings." A distorted faith joined with ignorant conceit. "Christendom," was ideally glorified, and "Heathenesse," as its black antithesis, an object of un-Christlike hostility, and scorn.

As Tatars, Turks, Huns and Teutons indiscriminately pushed against one another and the south, China met the same shock as did Rome. It was barbarism against civilization in Asia as in Europe. China, however, was better equipped to withstand. The Great Wall, and its garrisons proved the wisdom of its builder by actually deflecting much of the alien flood westward, causing Rome to feel the heavier impact. In two hundred years Rome was inundated and its institutions obliterated. China did not entirely go under until in the twelfth-century conquest by Kublai Khan, and during that nine hundred years of holding off and gradually absorbing

her attackers, they were refined by Chinese culture to such degree that the final conquest did not mean, as in the West, a long, painful period of struggle back to a destroyed standard of culture.

The Origin and End of the "Yellow Peril"

This final great irruption of the "barbarian push," flaring westward through Russia into central Europe as well as driving southward upon China, was, dramatically enough, what abruptly awakened self-centered Europe to the existence of the other half of the world. The military machine perfected by Genghis Khan swept through feudal Russia and as far as Vienna. No resistance offered could check it. Not the chivalry of Europe, but the decision of the Mongol commander to go home and attend the funeral of the dead Khan (and share in the inheritance) saved Christendom from the same iron heel which left such terrible scars of oppression on the soul of the Slav.

This was the origin of the "Yellow Peril" scare, a fright which now seems almost a congenital instinct in the westerner, and is vivid in expressions of Napoleon, Kaiser Wilhelm, and

William Randolph Hearst. It is a boggy at which some journalists tremble in bed every night, apparently—and collect shekels aplenty purveying the conjured terror to their readers. The peril was real enough while the Mongols lasted. But today they are as nearly extinct as the American Indian. It is utter confusion of facts both historical and psychological to group them with the Chinese and Japanese who suffered jointly with us, and who saved our world by blunting the edge of militant barbarism with Chinese culture. China went further—under the rulership of the Mongol's cousins the Manchus, Lamaism was deliberately subsidized in Mongolia, and drawing all the men into monasteries, depopulated the country.

The Mongol succession passed from Genghis through Ogdoi and Mangu to Kublai. The last was so fascinated with China that he dropped the western campaign altogether and ended, content to be Emperor of Cathay, patron of her literature and art. A conquest of the civilization he conquered, no more did the barbarian menace world progress. Twice did Kublai invade Japan—but, favored as was England against the Spanish Armada, the islanders meted to the Mongols the only crushing defeat of their history.

Offshoots of the family of Genghis established sway over Persia, Mesopotamia and India, and the realm of this family reaching from the Pacific to Austria and from frozen Siberia to Ceylon, was many times larger in extent than that of Alexander, Caesar or Napoleon—the greatest the world ever saw.

The Yellow Peril Renews East-West Contact

They were destructive. They did however originate advances in military method, and owed to them and to numbers, their success. Their cavalry was a marvel, and to a small extent they used firearms. Of higher culture, they carried from China to Europe the printing press,¹ the physical agent of the Renaissance. And in Europe, sharply aroused to mistrust her security and superiority by the force of the Khans, began a rebirth of art, literature and philosophy, and an age of discovery and science. Feudalism gave way before nationalism, and the seaboard nations, inventors aiding them with improved firearms, set out therewith to make this a white man's world.

Scholars, as well as inventions and armies,

¹ Carter: *Invention of Printing and Its Spread Westward*; Columbia University.

passed between east and west at this time. The Pope, under the impression that Genghis was a scion of the mythical Christian Asiatic monarch, "Prester John," sent a mission with an offer to adopt him into the Church, whereupon the great Mongol "butcher," with a wit which somewhat humanizes him, offered most chivalrously to adopt the Pope.

The cultured Kublai gave much more encouragement to Europeans, and according to Remusat, "many monks, Italians, French, Flemings, were charged with diplomatic missions to the Great Khan. Mongols of distinction came to Rome, Paris, and London. A Franciscan of Naples (John de Monte Corvino sent by Pope Nicholas IV in 1292 and given a church site in the Imperial City by Kublai) was Archbishop of Peking." John de Plano Carpini and William de Rubruk, friend of Roger Bacon, who went for Louis IX of France, were doughty ecclesiastical ambassadors of relations between East and West.

A Story-Teller Sends the West out to Conquer.

The greatest was Marco Polo, a Venetian of a family engaged in trade with the Crimea. His

father and uncle returned from a first trip to the court of the Great Khan with an invitation to the Pope to send a hundred learned missionaries, who might mollify the customs of his savage subjects. They found Marco, a lad of fifteen, born probably just after their departure. The hundred daring missionaries were not found—the pacifying message that was asked of Christianity in vain was later found in Lamaistic Buddhism. But to bear their excuses and hasten again to a land of opportunity, the Polos set forth and the motherless boy who gave their family its fame eagerly went along. They were gone twenty-five years. Young Marco got personal notice from the Great Khan by his facility in acquiring languages needed at the court and an ability to observe and record incidentals of interest, which distinguished him from the native emissaries—who attended to business but saw nothing novel in their surroundings. Here and there, as far as Cambodia at least, he was sent on missions. Meanwhile father and uncle were gathering wealth nearer the court.

For a while Marco himself governed in the wealthy city of Yangchow, center of the salt trade. The three prospered, but longed for home, and the approaching death of the aged

Kublai presaged no good to them with the inevitable dissensions about the succession. The Great Kahn was reluctant and almost angry in resisting their departure. We might never have heard Marco's story, had the Khan not yielded finally to the plea of an embassy from the dependent Khan of Persia, desiring the aid of experienced navigators in conducting back a princess who was to be the bride of their master. They fulfilled their charge in the course of a terrible three years journey, and returned to Venice in 1295, when Marco was about forty. Clad in rough Tatar garb, changed by years and hardship, they were not recognized at first. But relatives owned them gladly when they saw the jewels they carried—concealed in folds of their coarse-looking garments. Citizens thronged to court them and to listen, yet even then we might not have had their story if Marco had not been captured as in his own galley he led a disastrous assault upon the fleet of Genoa, and had he not had as companion in captivity a literary man, Rusta of Pisa. For though many plagued him to tell his story, there were few to believe it, and only one who cared to take the trouble to have him get his notes and set it down from dictation. He was released in a few years, married when he returned to Venice,

as his father had also, and died after some twenty years as an honored counsellor of the city.

In addition to "Polo" his family got a new surname—"Millions"—in allusion, perhaps half mocking, half respectful, to the frequency of this unfamiliar number in his narratives. Urged on his deathbed to retract with concern for his soul any lies he had told, he replied he had not told half the truth. But for a century and more his record was popularly assigned to the genus in which we place the tales of Mandeville and Munchausen. At any rate, there could be no doubt of the wealth brought back—and a recollection of that together with his story was part of the ferment that turned the excess energies of the Renaissance into the channel of exploration, and lured on adventurous spirits like Vasco da Gama and Columbus and the Cabots to seek the fabled land where an adventurer might grow wealthy, hobnobbing with emperors and governing cities. They went both east and west, for Eratosthenes's theory of an earth both round and rather small was again current among the educated. Thus blindly they set about to make it a white man's world.

The Christian adventurers approached their "heathen" hosts with fulsome respect—until they

had measured their strength. The voyagers were as surprised as their victims to discover that they had weapons of destruction the Oriental could not withstand. Their incipient feeling of racial superiority grew by leaps and bounds.

Early Discoverers and Their Unwilling Hosts

They were ruthless in their rivalry with one another. From the beginning, mutual throat-cutting, not "the concert of the Powers" characterized the "white push" on Asia. Each nation considered the eastern world its peculiar find and property, and was convinced of its monopolistic right to take and exploit the heathen nations.

And from the beginning, Oriental nations cleverly used that rivalry in combatting the onslaught. The Portuguese, then the French, then the British, supplanted one another on the coasts of India. The Portuguese, then the Dutch, finally the British, had Malacca as their base of operations on the west coast of the Malay peninsula. The Dutch got Batavia by a trade with the British, which the latter have regretted ever since.

The Portuguese pioneered the way to Canton between 1516 and 1531. Chinese mandarins lent

them a point of land, Macao, on which to refit, over which they established sovereignty three and a half centuries later, with the backing of Great Britain. Having monopoly of the Canton trade they desperately fought attempts of the Dutch, Spanish, French, and British, to establish themselves. Ultimately they were forced to ally with the British, surviving as a caste of clerks in British firms. English and Dutch united in the early seventeenth century to prey on the Spanish. Dutch, French, and English were rivals over Formosa.

The Pope had endeavored to avoid a clash between his children by drawing a line on a largely imaginative map of the world and decreeing all heathen nations to the west of it to Spain and all on the east to Portugal. It proved oil on the fire: arousing keener controversy between the two beneficiaries and inspiring Holland and Great Britain to redoubled efforts to share in the spoils. Magellan sailed out to strengthen Spanish contentions and perished fighting for the Cross and for his adopted flag in the Sulu Archipelago. Spain was the pioneer in attacking Asia by the trans-Pacific route, adding the Philippines to the Viceroyalty of Mexico.

That the Asiatics might feel content to go on

running their own countries without the boon of being "discovered" was a notion the pioneers of white culture would not harbor. They were as naïve egotists as the world ever saw.

The Oriental Sizes Up the "Red Barbarian"

The egotism of the white adventurer was matched by the hauteur of the civilized Oriental. He thought these strangers on his shores were, save for superior equipment, like the other savages who came trading or raiding from time to time. Their unconventional entry, their mixture of servility and militancy—anything to get a foothold—and later their open buccaneering confirmed native prejudice. "During the reign of Chingtih," says a Chinese annalist, "foreigners from the West, who said that they had tribute, abruptly entered Canton river, and by their tremendously loud guns, shook the place far and near. This was reported to the Court, and an order returned to drive them away immediately and stop their trade. About this time also the Hollanders, who in ancient times inhabited a wild territory and had no intercourse with China (when Diocletian traded embassies with the Son of Heaven, Holland *was* a wilderness!) came to

Macao in two or three large ships. Their clothes and hair were red, their bodies tall. They had blue eyes (as the traditional Chinese devil) sunk deep in their heads. Their feet were one cubit and two tenths long, and they frightened the people by their strange appearance." At this important time, instead of a Marco Polo and a Monte Corvino, gentlemen appreciative of culture different from their own, came a brutal Simon de Andrada and untemperizing missionaries. Followed pirates: Cavendish, Drake and Lancaster and others of their kidney, seizing under pious pretexts every Chinese ship in sight. For a time the words *pirate* and *Englishman* were synonymous in the Chinese tongue. Europe's approach to Asia was tactless, to say the least.

Pirate, Trader, Missionary: Then Imperialist

Three types of mind were originally involved in the European push on Asia. First, the pirate, pure and simple, seeking merely a ship-load of booty and a safe run home. Second, the trader, seeking to establish permanent relations for profit. Third, the religious propagandist seeking to show spectacular gains for his organiza-

tion. Within all of these groups, even of the same nationality, there were bitter rivalries—most notoriously among the last. The great Manchu emperor, Kang Hsi, had to take special precautions to keep Jesuits and Franciscans apart in China for fear of their doing bodily harm to one another. The forty-nine sects of Protestantism working in China continued to “jar” until Chinese feeling drove them during the past century into a semblance of cooperation.

The three motives were absurdly intermingled. Then came imperialism, working through them all. The buccaneer became the commander of the punitive expedition. The trader became the instrument of occupation. The missionary became the advance agent of his government’s expansion. It was in good conscience. He really felt that he was advancing Christ by advancing Christendom (his particular national brand) just as his modern successor usually feels that sanitary plumbing, Ford cars and linen collars are integral parts of his gospel.

Portuguese vessels found Japan from the middle of the sixteenth century on, bringing varied cargoes of firearms, opium and missionaries. The nation was ready for a new religion, being sick of Buddhist monks who denied their

master by bloody forays upon one another and the countryside. Furthermore, feudal lords saw possibility of foreign support against enemies in the bitter struggle then taking place in Japan. Francis Xavier and his immediate successors gained several hundred thousand converts in fifty years, and Japan promised to become the first Christian nation of the Orient. Then Franciscan Spaniards came in to compete with the Jesuit Portuguese and were discovered in a plot to add Japan to the Philippine possessions. Iyeyasu Tokugawa united the feudal states into a nation held under a strict caste discipline which the democratic teaching of one God and one Mass for all, threatened to disintegrate. Christians, he believed, backed his enemies. The Tokugawa dynasty of shoguns decided to exterminate Christianity and foreign influence together, drove the last Christian resisters off a cliff into Nagasaki bay, compelled every man and woman and child in Japan to register in some Buddhist temple and publicly trample on the cross once each year, and made it a capital offense for a foreigner to come within two miles of the shore or for a Japanese to leave. Japan shut herself out of the conflict between East and West for two hundred years. She "got away with it" because

China was attracting the full attention of the rising European "Powers." As soon as the prosecution of their interests demanded relations with her, one of them, the United States of America, brought her out of her chosen isolation at the point of guns.

John Bull Arrives

The activities of Portuguese, Dutch, and Spanish, had not made a dent in China's sovereignty, their outbursts along the coast being looked upon at the disdainful court somewhat as stone-throwing escapades of ill-mannered small boys. The French until later made their political and trading interests secondary to cultural influence in the sponsorship of all Roman Catholic missionaries, of whatever nationality, in China. It was the British, arriving late on the scene, that established the white man's world in Asia.

The East India Company was the first effective British force. Founded at the beginning of the seventeenth century, it was so petty and haphazard in its operations on the coasts of India and of Pacific Asia in the first half century that it was the laughing stock of rival powers. With

the breakup of the Mogul Empire in India, it found its feet. By leaguings with this, that, and the other, rebellious Hindu prince, and extending inland upon the heels of Clive's victories over the French and their allies, it created the British Empire in India. From its new base it reached out for commercial monopoly at Canton, battenings upon the sale of Indian opium there, and continuing a habit of hauteur contracted in dealing with a subject people. A wealthy hong, or guild, of native merchants was built up to handle the Chinese end of the business, Chinese officials taking capricious levies through them by way of tariff and port revenue, and holding them responsible for the conduct of the foreigners on Chinese soil. A district was set aside for residences, warehouses, and wharves of these foreign traders—the embryo of the “concessions.”

British dominance of commerce was not threatened until the rise of the American clipper ship trade at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The reaction to the enterprising Yankee's capture of half the Canton business was a general demand by British merchants for privilege of free trade outside the company monopoly. Politics in India and at home assisted their plea, and in 1834 the British king revoked the power-

ful company's charter, placing administration of his Oriental empire under his government and guaranteeing direct protection to any British merchant. This was naturally followed by appointment of diplomatic emissaries to China, and their attempt to establish direct relations with the mandarinat and court of the Son of Heaven. The Chinese emperor, particularly touchy, being himself of an alien dynasty, refused to receive the "red barbarian" without the kowtow, sign of an inferior nation. The viceroy at Canton likewise insisted that his Britannic Majesty's consul must deal through the hong. As the controversy with the westerners grew, and further, as a protest against the use of Chinese waters as a fighting ground for the British against French and American opponents, a definite policy of squeezing down foreign trade was adopted by the Chinese authority. There were economic reasons as well—the mandarinat had always deprecated any development of trade to a degree that might threaten the self-dependence of the nation, and silver was going out in exchange for opium so rapidly that the currency system was threatened.

A first class power today is granted unquestioned the right to limit trade by anti-dumping

or anti-luxury laws, but China's attempt in that direction was bitterly opposed as unpermissible.

War for Trade, Superior Status Follows

Philip Guedalla in his *Palmerston* says that "the gay soldiers of the queen marched into one war after another with Palmerston guiding them from Egypt to Turkey, from India to China, where an ancient race exasperated England into yet another war because the inhabitants of China are Chinese, a singular fact which has so often baffled European statesmanship. . . .

"These quietists preferred their isolation and repelled the commercial embraces of the west with courtesy, which deepened into firmness and then into violence. A lively British superintendent at Canton, irked by his almost menial position, took a lofty tone, produced a squadron off the port and insisted upon the rights of the traders. His cause was only slightly marred by the favorite article of their commerce—he did not blush to state it—opium. Thus began the first movement of the China war, earliest of those expeditions—half punitive and half marauding—which marked the onward march of culture in lands reluctant to receive it."

Great Britain fought in 1842 with the other nations benevolently neutral, and it was merely a series of sallies and skirmishes along the coast, but the Manchu dynasty, already in decay, faced serious internal troubles, and asked for terms. Upon the Treaty of Nanking the whole fabric of the white man's domination in Pacific Asia was built. "Extraterritoriality," the principle that every national should be controlled by his own authorities, long observed as a matter of convenience, became a treaty "capitulation." The entering wedge of foreign control of Chinese customs was driven through the clause binding China to a small uniform tariff. The glorious principle that China must pay for everything the foreigner spent in whipping her into acquiescence to his will was established through the heavy indemnity for the war and for the seized British opium.

Ports were declared open for trade and areas in them designated for foreign residence which grew into "concessions" in a dozen ports and the Shanghai settlement.

Daniel Webster despatched Caleb Cushing and a year later China gave the United States for nothing everything that Great Britain had won by a war. France and the rest followed suit.

Canton was not reconciled to the Son of Heaven's so ready capitulation. The Chinese found ways to void the treaty. The British decided they would have to make a stronger demonstration of military supremacy. The Indian Mutiny delayed their plans but in 1858 the British, better established than ever in India, turned in force again toward China. This time the French joined. American commanders and consuls on the spot pledged to join, but the Washington government stopped them, although Captain Tatnal, with his famous "Blood is thicker than water" dictum, had actually rendered aid in the attack on Taku. The war was finished in 1860 by the first European occupation of Peking. Lord Elgin blew up the summer palace—there was disgraceful looting. China signed treaties strengthening British hold on the customs. As before, the American plenipotentiary, Ward, was granted freely what the other nations had extracted by force. The famous "most favored nation" clause guaranteeing America every benefit that might accrue to the most favored nation was here invented. It was a sort of face-saving for China. The British said "America crawls behind British guns."

The Origin of Customs Control

The foreign powers had taken advantage of the fanatical Taiping revolt which had torn China in two at the Yangtze valley. At Shanghai, cut off by the rebels, foreign agents began collecting the customs duties for the Chinese viceroy. This grew into a British-controlled Maritime Customs organization throughout China. The inspector-general was still, however, the servant of the Chinese government. In 1900 came the uprising of the Society of Righteous Fists, nicknamed Boxers. Insistence by the powers on the same privileges for merchants in Chinese territory which had been given specifically to missionaries only, decided many Chinese, including the Empress Dowager, to throw all foreigners out and exterminate their influence. The Powers occupied Peking for the second time. They learned then that to occupy all China would be a perfectly impossible task, and were glad to invite the Empress Dowager back on condition of a heavy indemnity. She, not they, was able to insure the safety of foreigners. They also learned that cooperation between the various Powers against China over any extended length of time is beyond the capacity

of human nature. To underwrite the indemnity the Powers virtually "took over" the Maritime Customs organization. Its British Inspector-General gradually absorbed responsibility for all other important foreign obligations, and during the disturbed years of the Republic became high dictator of internal loan liquidation. Attempts were made to establish similar systems for salt, wine and tobacco revenues. Collections were deposited largely in the British Hongkong-Shanghai Banking Corporation, on a no-interest arrangement. That bank was enabled to become a mainstay of the Bank of England. China was virtually under foreign financial dictatorship.

The Height of the White Man's Grandeur

The black ships of Admiral Perry and the persistence of the American, Townsend and the Britisher, Sir Harry Parkes, forced Japan into treaty relations between 1853 and 1860. Japan was signed up to the same capitulations of sovereignty—extraterritoriality and foreign customs control—that had been established in China. The same precedent was followed in later treaties with Siam, Persia and Turkey. The white man walked as a god, above law. He

was more secure in exploitation than the native, yet he paid no taxes.

In his "sacred cities" there were parks, into which no native was allowed to come. His clubs excluded the native, however high born or well educated. His person was sacrosanct. Brigands might capture and loot the town he was in—they took care not to harm him. He could pass at will through contending armies—carrying any information he might wish. He could shelter any native political criminal and assist in any plot and remain inviolate. He could exert himself at will to tear down native custom, religion and industry, and still be protected according to treaty stipulations.

In March, 1923, some brigands violated the traditional sanctity of the foreigner and kidnaped a number from a train, holding them for ransom on top of a rock pinnacle. A Shanghai friend of mine was among the captives. Diplomatic pressure finally procured him an award of three hundred dollars a day for the time he was detained. During the time of his detention a Chinese breadwinner was killed on the streets of Shanghai by a white man's automobile. The "Mixed Court," a foreign-controlled body that presumptuously judges Chinese within the set-

tlement boundaries, awarded the family of the deceased twenty-five dollars damages.

It was the "White man's world."

But already the pendulum was swinging back.

CHAPTER VI

HOW THE WHITE MAN HAS LOST DOMINION

DEFINITE developments for which the white man is himself largely responsible have brought about the end of his world lordship.

The first of these I would mention is the creation of a new Asian intelligentsia through western education. This has been largely provided by zealous western religionists and philanthropists. Boys and girls were trained in their own lands and abroad to ideals of self-assertion, self-rule, individualism and democracy, and drilled in the conception that the measure of man is his ability to compel respect for his rights. A class grew up, enlarging in geometric ratio with every generation, that treasured these beliefs. It wore European dress, spoke perfect English or French, read John Stuart Mill, Thomas Jefferson, Voltaire, Edmund Burke, and Tolstoi, and kept asking why the foreigner who taught the ideals of political and social equality seemed so little inclined to grant them in practice when he came to their country.

Preaching Equality—Practising Dominion

Chinese masters of engineering wondered why they were paid one third the salary of a white engineer on the same job. Hindu graduates of Oxford resented being put under white high school boys in the Indian Civil Service. Superior officers of the Indian army found it necessary to take orders from beardless lieutenants, just out from England. Young Asiatics studied western politics, diplomacy and history, and acquainted themselves with the weak spots of arrogant Europe: psychological, social and political. A class was prepared in Asia which was not only goaded into hatred of the white man, but equipped to "get behind his guard."

Thus did the white man cut the ground from under himself in Asia. But there was no way to prevent it. The policy of the Dutch in discouraging modern education and mission activity in the East Indies was represented as a great success—until the communist uprising. It but created an obstinate demand to have those things which the white man considered only himself good enough to enjoy.

Along with this new mental equipment, the white man gave Asia—largely for reasons of

profit, partly for reasons of altruism, the benefit of his modern inventions, his own weapons, to use against himself. The place of modern military methods and arms, of railways, motor transport, telegraphs, and posts in the Revolt of Asia is too obvious to need exegesis here.

Sentiment and Policy Restrain Imperialism

As a second factor making for the end of the white man's world in Asia we might mention the policy of the United States. While America gradually became the greatest of western nations, her diplomacy and the sentiment of her people more and more worked at cross purposes to white empire across the Pacific. This development, the result of a very human combination of selfish and altruistic motives, will be traced in the chapter on America and the Revolt. Suffice it to say here that the "Open Door Policy" has made America the defender of China's territorial integrity, and her political idealism, although perhaps more a commodity for export than for home consumption, is the greatest inspirer of Asian nationalism.

After the influence of American policy we should list the effect of a certain magnanimous

phase of British diplomacy, and the very consequential idealism checking British imperialism from within at the present day. The magnanimity may be the child of opportunism: that admitted, let us give it credit for its effects. Great Britain first admitted the justice of Japan's restless demand for abolition of infringements upon her national dignity. Britain backed Japan through a long diplomatic battle with other nations until extraterritoriality and finally the last foreign grasp on the customs revenue were abolished (1912). Of course Britain "used" Japan's new power and prestige, a consideration we may leave for another chapter.

Great Britain first offered China the "right" to levy increase in tariff duties in return for abolition of interior transit taxes—a paltry looking concession today, but at the time regarded as a most generous proposal. In Siam the British did not wait for other powers to consent to modification of extraterritoriality before giving it up themselves—an action that forestalled a Siamese flirtation with the French on their other side—and yet containing a real element of bonhomie.

British diplomacy has always shown adaptiveness to conditions. It is ever able to send out an ultimatum one day and compromise on it the

next, or suddenly to make friends with an enemy whom an hour earlier the interests of God, King, and morality demanded should be fought to a finish.

The sentimental but unstable sympathy of Lloyd George and other Sunday-supplement contributor politicians for Asia, must be classed under the same head of questionable magnanimity with that of the Foreign Office. Lacking the dignity of the latter, it is yet all grist to New Asia's mill.

This practical side to the British nature makes the struggle of the new Asiatic nations much shorter—provided they first convince England that it would be too costly to oppose them. The sudden social rise of Eugene Chen, a spokesman for the Chinese Nationalists, from a chap to whom no respectable Englishman would speak to a gentleman besought of plenipotentiaries, is a case in point among a multitude,—including individuals like the no-longer-despised Indian Mr. Gandhi, the “sainted” Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the Wahabi Sherif of Mecca, Ibn Saud, and the leaders of Bolshevik Russia.

There is another and quite undiplomatic spirit of magnanimity in Great Britain today, which is having an even more tremendous effect in

bringing an end to Empire. It is the perfectly honest, overly-sentimental idealism of the British Labor Party. It is an idealism that has largely come out of Moscow. Whatever one's opinion may be as to the sincerity of its Russian authors, it is having an astounding effect when ship-builders in Glasgow can be induced to make common cause in the name of labor with sampanmen on the Upper Yangtze. Every sampan that is put out of business by the competition of steam shipping means that much more work for Glasgow. And yet: there was a skirmish in the long war between the steam shipping and the native boatmen's guilds (composed of some of the bravest and hardest men on earth, fighting to maintain their dangerous hereditary occupation of navigating the gorges) at Wanh sien. Two sampans were sunk by a British ship in resisting the effort of Chinese soldiers to board it. Boatmen and soldiers joined in retaliation. Before enough details had reached us in Shanghai to base an opinion as to the blame for the trouble, there was word that the British Labor Party headquarters had warned the Foreign Office to go to no drastic length in dealing with it.

The Labor Party opposes every show of "imperialism." Over the heads of the British author-

ities, it conducts a fervently sympathetic correspondence with Eugene Chen, while those same authorities are trying to overawe him by a show of force back of their negotiations. Meetings and demonstrations all over the British Isles emphasize the protest of Labor against an expedition to China. Their open threat to sabotage any attempt at war, draws from a cabinet minister the ugly threat of a firing squad and a blank wall in retort.

It is conceded that the Labor Party can paralyze British industry. As "the king's opposition," or in the saddle leading the majority, its idealism can go far toward ruining the ability to bear "the white man's burden" of the nation which most naïvely accepted that delightful theory.

The World War Ends White Prestige

A third cause of white downfall was both cultural and political in effect. It was Asia's reaction to the (white man's) World War. Asiatics had come to concede a moral as well as physical superiority to the white man. On this, as well as the bluff of his armed force, his influence rested. The conduct of white powers toward one another

tore into fragments the colored man's respect. It was not so much the fact that white nations were fighting one another. Asia could understand that, although Confucian China and Buddhist South Asia were inclined to look upon the struggle as an expression of primordial savagery not yet bred out of a youthfully petulant people, rather than as a heroic conflict over principles. It was not so much the belligerency as the hypocrisy of the westerner manifested in the war and in the ensuing diplomatic struggles, that "killed" him in Asia. Knowing her own great sin to be guile, Asia had imagined the westerner's great virtue to be brutal frankness.

Asiatics were deluged with conflicting propaganda, obviously lies. Their countries were torn with plots to get them and their resources into the white man's bloody orgy on one side or the other. They knew that the inducements held out to them were hypocritical, that Great Britain and France had never treated them with any more love of justice or any less belief that might makes right, than had Germany. They knew that every check held out to bribe them would come back from the bank of the future marked "payment stopped" if the victors should find themselves able to "get away with it."

The white man received his greatest blow in China when British, French and American ministers said to a subservient Peking government, after the battle was over, and every produceable "principle" had triumphed: "You have the Germans now. Germany can no longer protect them. Regardless of any consideration of right or humanity you could take all German property and ship all Germans and Austrians back to Europe. We would not object, in fact we will lend ships for the purpose. And you can confiscate the German share in the Boxer indemnity and the customs organization, although we mutually guaranteed it."

Now when British and others say to the Chinese Nationalist, "You are breaking troth. You take advantage of us just because we are 'down,'" the Chinese can well reply: "We learned the trick from you."

The atrocities that Asiatics heard of in the lurid propaganda of both sides disabused them of any tendency to believe in the superior humaneness of the white man. Incidents seen in Asia, like the Amritsar massacre of 1919, confirmed their disillusion.

Asia took practical advantage of the distraction regnant in the west. China abolished the

extraterritorial privileges of Germans and Austrians, eliminated them from the customs control and cancelled debts due them. Siam took over her railways from both British and Germans. India secured an advance in legislative representation. As an after-effect, Turkey became a new nation. Egypt was inspired to demand and get self-determination. Korea, proclaiming the same Wilsonian "point" as her watchword, secured at least cultural preservation. Japan attained full recognition as a Great Power.

Russia Shifts from West to East

The last main factor in the overthrow of western dominance to be mentioned is Russia's ostracism from Europe, from the white group, and consequent alignment with the Asiatic family. This too, might be classed as a result of the World War—its greatest ultimate result—if it were not so momentous as to demand a separate listing. However, it is a development beginning far back of 1914,—one almost inevitable from the racial composition, history, and geographical situation of the Russian nation. It was brought to its head through after-effects of the war: rivalry with Great Britain was a heritage of the

Czars. It was intensified in the period of open hostilities with the west preceding the consolidation of the Communist supremacy and assimilated to a ground of principle: "proletarian dictatorship" against "capitalism."

Russia, the greatest "white" nation in extent, resources, and population, has definitely switched sides. Her activities in Asia are not mere flanking skirmishes to annoy the hated powers of Europe. The western peoples find it difficult to understand that Russia has actively and irrevocably thrown in her lot with the Asian peoples, and is not so much engaged in destructive efforts against the influence of the Powers in the eastern hemisphere, as in building up effective allies for her future world policy. Meanwhile her pose as the liberator of Asia is a great easement of her "inferiority complex" induced by self-comparison with the wealthier "imperialistic" nations and by the "holier-than-thou" attitude met in America.

The result is a complete shift in relative potency between the western and Asiatic groups. This momentous turning-point was first made evident to a surprised world when the new Turkish Republic in 1922 threw off foreign influence, cancelled the special privileges of Europeans and

Americans in Turkey, and challenged the Powers to bring on their armies if they did not assent. Most of us expected that Mustapha Kemal would spend his last days quietly in some St. Helena. Instead, he dominated the Lausanne Conference, where the diplomats of the West, better informed than their public, acknowledged with such face-saving as they could contrive, the arrival of a new order. A main reason was, that Russia stood behind Turkey. Inspired by the knowledge that this great power to the north was working against the British empire, and by Turkey's example, the Egyptian intelligentsia pressed forward to independence and nationhood. The feeling that Russia had come over to the Asiatic side strengthened the hands of the Indian nationalists and frightened their British rulers into granting the ten year parliamentary experiment terminating in 1929. The same Russia inspired the creation of the Persian nationalist party, protected it in infancy, and enabled it to put a new Shah on the throne and within a short time drive out the British economic and military control¹ established in Persia just after the World War.

Even more direct was the Russian influence in Afghanistan. Following the Great War, that

country was practically a British protectorate. Then the new Russia captured the imagination of the Ameer. In direct disobedience to British commands he opened relations with his northern neighbor. He met British punitive measures with war, driving every Briton and vestige of British influence from Afghanistan, and invading the Punjab, from which he was beaten back to the border only with the greatest difficulty. Since then the warlike Afghans have been a regular vernal danger to the Indian Empire and have provided a base for plots and propaganda which Britain is driven desperate to check.

From Threatening Russia Turns to Abetting

In China, now the most important nation in Asia's Revolt, the effect of Russia's "shift" is particularly evident. Without it, not for fifty years more could China have cast off her yoke of subservience to the Powers. Between the British-French sack of Peking in 1860 and the Boxer uprising (1900) Russia led in the competitive attack of the white Powers upon Chinese sovereignty. Her boldness inspired the open European policy of quartering China like a melon, which British diplomacy tactfully disguised with

the phrase "Sphere of influence." In 1895, backed by Germany and France, Russia compelled Japan to give back Port Arthur, won with bloodshed, to defeated China—and seized it herself. Germany followed with seizure of Tsingtao, a step in plans embracing all Shantung. England then took Weihaiwei and Kowloon. France took Kwangchowwan. Italy essayed to take a port in Chekiang province, but unsupported by the Powers, was backed out by the stalwart old Empress Dowager, just returned to the helm of China's foundering ship of state.

Russia contributed the largest and most destructive contingent to the Allied punitive expedition against the Boxers. The Russian aggressiveness brought Japan, fearful of her own safety, and backed by jealous England, onto the scene to check Russian imperialism and substitute her own. For the Japanese effort to end Chinese sovereignty, culminating in 1919, Russia was really the inspiration.

Now note how drastic a change came over the situation due to Russia's transfer to the side of China, against her former partners in aggression. The moves by which the difficult somersault was accomplished and the motives involved will be

subject of a later chapter. Some results need mention here. With a Russian army flanking Manchuria, Japan found it discreet to remain decidedly and almost benevolently neutral toward the Nationalist campaign from the south against Peking, and carefully aloof from any European move in opposition. Chang Tso-lin, the only important internal opponent, was compelled from the same motive to keep his main force ineffective in the north as the Nationalists advanced. A Russian Volunteer Fleet, in service of the Chinese Nationalists, nullified the British control in the China seas, and arms and propaganda entered Chinese ports in defiance of the British customs authorities there. From Russia comes the training in military technic which makes the Nationalist armies unafraid of the white soldier, and the skill in propaganda uniting the country fervently behind the program of ending the white man's prerogatives, and promoting use of the "economic weapon"—boycott and strike—the most difficult strategy of all for the Powers to combat. Russia pledges active military aid in the event that the Powers resort to force, and then her agents promote an entente between Afghanistan and Canton and the rebellious elements in India, French Indo-China, and

elsewhere throughout Asia that makes it dangerous for the Powers to initiate really drastic action.

A little group in Russia, possessed half by idealism, half by a mania for power, and driving their huge nation to serve their purposes, thus becomes the agent of destiny in bringing the eventful era of domination by the white race to its end.

CHAPTER VII

RUSSIA IN THE REVOLT

THE thought that a great "white" nation should line up on the side of the Asiatic peoples to bring to its end the dominance of the white race in the world may shock us. A passionate prejudice against the Bolshevik government may cause us to put its pro-Asiatic policy down as pure vindictiveness. But when these hasty reactions have passed, and we set out to study this great development from the standpoint of culture, history, and the struggle of nations, we find it just as logical and inevitable as all the great movements which have marked turning points in the life of humanity.

Russia is Essentially Asiatic

Russia's alignment with the Asiatic peoples has been made easy by her cultural background. A large proportion of her population is true Asiatic; notably the Mongol Buriats and Cossacks,

the Tatars of Kazan on the Volga, the Moslems of Turkistan, Zungaria, and the Caspian region. Since the period of Mongol rule, Tatar blood has been strongly infused into the Slav and Germanic Russians of the west.

A feeling strong in the Slav world was expressed by the Croatian peasant leader M. Raditch before the Zagret at Belgrade. Referring to the rise of China he said that while Great Britain and the United States formed a maritime system supported by Europe, Russia with China formed a continental unit which would be the center of the world and might be joined by India. "We belong to the West by history and culture," he concluded, "but to the East by sentiment. We shall be tied to the West until the Russian system reaches the banks of the Danube."

While the intellectual Jew who is such a factor in present-day Russia seems in mentality to be pretty much of a European, the large Jewish peasantry, as well as the Semitic Moslem about the Black Sea, is decidedly Oriental in habit as well as origin.

The Russian peasant and even proletarian city dweller exists on much the same standard as the Asiatic. The mujik with his "shirt tails out" is a cultural kinsman of the Chinese in the coolie

coat. Both live on a dirt floor, break the ground with a wooden plow, and eat cabbage and grain. The Chinese keeps his fire under the raised portion of the floor, the Russian puts his in the wall. The Chinese has much more of civilization behind him and of the code of the gentleman in him, but both have kindly humor, hospitality and the cruelty that comes out of squalor when aroused. Their attitude toward woman—the unfailing criterion of a culture—is much the same. She is given just what her personal ability enables her to take of prestige and leisure, but no allowance is made for her physical handicap—there is no chivalry. Save among “intellectuals” sex is not played with, merely indulged—there is little romance. I have passed back and forth over the long border between Russia and her Asian neighbors and not known, from the life of the people, when I was out of one and in the other.

One outstanding feature of society, group co-operation, is common to Russia and the Asian nations. The village commune in the country and artizans and trade guilds in the city have always constituted the foundation fabric of Chinese life. The Russian “cooperative” for buying and selling is a natural adaptation of the same ten-

dency. The ancient Soviet (patriarchially governing committee) and commune (village organization) existed ready to hand for the ultra-modern organizers of Russia, and figure so largely in their system that the terms have become distasteful synonyms for Bolshevism to the anti-Marxian world.

Two outstanding examples exist of the fundamental kinship between the Russians and Chinese. In 1658 the Manchu Emperor Kang Hsi captured the garrison of the Russian outpost, Albazin, on the Amur River. Liking the carriage of the soldiers he installed them in the northeast quarter of Peking as favored banner-men. They thoroughly amalgamated with the Chinese—the only traces being an occasional pair of blue eyes and the large membership of the Russian Catholic cathedral in that quarter. Their religion lasted longer than anything else. The second example is modern. The spread of Bolshevik power to the Pacific drove at least twenty thousand Russians of opposing factions into China. They have adopted Chinese standards of living—competing even in coolie labor. They have become Chinese citizens. In Manchuria they drive the busses on which we ride, in Shantung they form a division in the *tupan's* army, in

Shanghai they run the public utilities. They intermarry freely with Chinese and Japanese, and although they carry over a feeling of race solidarity we see no evidence of the shrinking aloofness of the Anglo-Saxon's race prejudice.

Russia's Eastward Course of Empire

Russia's relation to Asia is the normal culmination of her history and geographical expansion. The first connection of her people with Far Asia came when both were under the heel of the Mongol conqueror in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Mongol rule and conquest were destructive and tyrannical in Persia, Mesopotamia and Austria, but nowhere more brutal than among the Slavs. Ogdai, successor to Kublai, boasted that he left not a city standing between the Urals and the Carpathians. This horrible oppression, perpetuating itself for several centuries in many small Mongol principalities, left a mark on the Russian character, visible to this day:

Gradually the Mongol power disintegrated, and the Russians, expelling it, pushed toward the East whence had come their conquerors. Yermak, a robber chief of part Mongol blood himself, led the way with an expedition financed by

the merchant Strogonoffs, crossing the Urals in 1581 and naming the vast plains that lay before him Siberia. The story of Russian occupation of an icy half continent twice as wide as North America is a saga out-doing in some respects the contemporary exploits of the American pioneers. In 1620 as the Pilgrim Fathers landed in Massachusetts, the Russians were establishing themselves on the banks of the wide Yenesei. A war with the Buriats brought them to Lake Baikal. Their outposts were pushed to the Lena, then, by a route north of the mountain range protecting Manchuria, through to the frozen Pacific. Dog-team communication was established and furs travelled six thousand miles to Moscow in two months. Ignatiev sailed eastward in 1646, the first Russian to navigate the unknown waters. It was nearly a hundred years later that Gvoslev sighted the American continent. In 1741 two of Admiral Bering's men explored a strip of Alaskan coast. The fur traders were close on the heels of this great explorer. Wide-awake Catherine the Great established claim on the basis of his work, to Alaska, also declaring the Pacific north of 41 degrees a Russian lake, to be entered only by permission. The President of the but recently organized United States, John Quincy

Adams, immediately and stoutly contested the claim, initiating an American-Russian rivalry in the Pacific which may revive in the near future. An American policy was undertaken which resulted in the purchase of Alaska.

From Siberia into China

The real lure of the Russian adventurers had been China, not the Pacific. They tried again, this time heading south from Lake Baikal, and drifting down the Amur River. The gentleman-merchant, Kabaroff, spent his fortune on the venture, leaving as his memorial the city of Khabarovsk and a bronze cross on a hill inscribed "Love is a greater force than arms." By the middle of the century Russians were in conflict with the Manchu monarchy, just then establishing itself in China. In 1689 one of the most "international" of treaties ever made: negotiated by a Dutchman and a Portuguese acting for the Manchu Emperor of China, with a representative of the Russian Czar, fixed the boundary between the two nations at the Amur River. It is called the longest-lived treaty in history. For 160 years it held without amendment and peace existed between the neighbors. Russian embassies

repeatedly visited the court of China, not all with success. Trade sprang up. A Russian market was established in Peking, ultimately becoming, through association with things foreign, the site of the modern Legation Quarters. The market was followed by the Russian Church. A Russo-Chinese Language School was also founded in the Chinese capital, to train diplomats and priests.

While the Men of the West: Portugese, Dutch, French, and English, came knocking at the rear door of China down at Canton, to the Chinese official and popular mind the Russians were in a different class, racially, geographically and culturally. They were regarded with the jealousy which a man feels toward a kinsman, not the fear and hatred which he feels to a stranger. This was strongly evident when the French and British drove against Peking in 1860. The Russians were the only white people allowed to remain in the capital. After its fall, the Russian plenipotentiary pretended to act as go-between in getting the foreign troops out. As reward he procured six-hundred miles of coast line from the mouth of the Amur to the northern end of Korea. Thus Russia obtained a semi-warm water frontage on the Pacific, and Man-

churia lost its Pacific shore, creating many new problems, and greatly stimulating Russian ambition for East Asian empire.

The next logical step was the Trans-Siberian railway project, begun in the eighties.

When Japan fought China out of Korea and took in addition the Manchurian peninsula of Liaotung, Russia led a coalition which, with no justification except self-interest, interfered and compelled its return to China. Within a few months Port Arthur at the tip of the peninsula had become a Russian naval base and a railroad was being built from the Trans-Siberian in the north directly across Manchuria to this strategic basin and its neighboring warm water port of Darien. The Manchu statesman Li Hung-chang complacently acquiesced in these aggressions, evidencing an entirely different feeling toward Russia than toward the nations that come from the West.

China's inclination before the Russian advance profoundly frightened Japan, who, at the very dawn of her new nationhood in the middle of the nineteenth century had found herself in conflict with Russia over the sovereignty of the northern islands in her own archipelago. The difference in the spirit of the two peoples is emphasized by

the fact that Japanese in thirteen hundred years of historical existence, had not "spread" through their own island chain, while Russians in two hundred and fifty had overrun six thousand miles of territory and established settlements on Japan's doorstep. Yet some unhistorical persons represent the Japanese as imperialistic!

Led by a small group of western-trained militarists and madly imitating the white world, Japan did take a "flier" into the imperial game. It crashed in 1919. We are concerned here with its effects on Russia.

Assisted and spurred on by Great Britain—Japan took the "offensive defensive" against Russia in 1904–5. The immediate provocation was Russian intrigue in Korea. Russia lost her fleet, and a new sea power arose through Admiral Togo's victories.

The New "Enlightened Imperialism"

Russia's advance was checked but not halted. Japan's daring attempt to carry forward the absorption of North China succeeded to the extent of economic entrenchment in south Manchuria, and then faced by the jealous opposition of the Powers, by the boycott in China and by the dis-

satisfaction of the anti-militarist tax-payer at home, it was reluctantly relinquished.

By this time Russia's Czarist regime had collapsed. Russia's new rulers, once they got on their feet, came back at Asia with a new type of "imperialism," as strange as their theories of internal state structure, to a world inured to witnessing, as between nations.

"—the ancient rule sufficeth them, the simple plan
That they should take who have the power
And they should keep who can"

It was as selfish, perhaps, as the old. But it was and is the most enlightened type of selfishness yet seen in international affairs. For that reason the entire imperialistic world must change tactics to follow it. But Russia will retain for a long generation the advantage accruing to her as its initiator.

I was in Peking, editing a newspaper subsidized by the Chinese Foreign Office (claiming to be the continuation of the oldest newspaper on earth, the Official Gazette, 875 A.D.) when arrived a many months delayed telegram which was Soviet Russia's first official communication to

China. It was an offer to give up every special privilege enjoyed by Russians in China and to withdraw without compensation from every territorial and economic concession extracted from China by the old regime. I shall never forget the mingled attitude of delight, incredulity and suspicion with which it was perused by Chinese officials. The American, British and French diplomatic representatives immediately warned them that Russia was not a nation with which one could have any dealings—that this must be a trap. The Chinese did not reply. In fact, under the influence of the western Powers and the old Russian Legation, they declined to permit the entrance of a Soviet representative.

So Russian agents came in the guise of newspapermen, to spy out the way. Remarkable chaps they were, as they came into my office with “despatches” that must have arrived by telepathy rather than telegraphy; their hail-fellow-well-met naïveté, the best point in their favor. In three months they were speaking Chinese. They mingled with every class, they showed a social democracy toward the Chinese which the average white man who had won the war considered would make him a bit too “common.” With the Russians of the proletariat revolution on the scene,

the Chinese soon felt once again how much more like themselves were these northerners than the superior gentlemen from the West.

After Hodoroff, Yourin, Shatoff and their fellow scribes had won space in the Chinese newspapers, Abraham Adolph Jaffe, the Soviet's cleverest diplomat, arrived on the scene. Warned by the "friendly Powers," Peking did not receive him officially, but this time it did not refuse him entrance. He wasted no time on the western-controlled Foreign Office. He lectured in the University of Peking, which had added a reputation for patriotism to that for liberalism since the student revolution which expelled Japanese influence in 1919. The student class and intelligentsia saw the ideal side of the Russian movement as a liberation of the mind from the yoke of entrenched beliefs, and of peoples from class and imperial exploitation.

Jaffe went to Shanghai and met Dr. Sun Yat-sen, then in one of his many temporary exiles from Canton. He had struggled for years to establish his ideas of progressive party leadership. British Hongkong had sided with his enemies and he had just made a futile appeal to America for military trainers and advisers.

Jaffe offered him men and methods. He con-

vinced Dr. Sun that the "rule of the best" could most likely be established through a one-party control of the state, such as existed in Russia. He strengthened Sun's "pan-Asianism," and converted him to fervent anti-imperialism. Russia, he showed, had called the bluff of the Powers, fought off the entire world and driven every imperialistic influence out of her borders. China could do the same, for the Powers were a "paper tiger." Russia would support China as she was supporting Turkey.

Russia Builds up the Nationalist Party in China

When Dr. Sun got back into Canton he reorganized the National Party (Kuomintang) on the Bolshevik model—without the communism. It was to be the autocracy of the responsible, who were to prove their qualification by sacrifice and fidelity to principle. There would be a latitude of democracy within the party, but it would tolerate no opposition party. It was to stand on three planks: Elimination of foreign domination and prerogatives (China for the Chinese), mobilization of the nation under a unified central government, and the development of socialized industry for the benefit of the whole people. In

a word: nationalism, with a strong socialistic tinge.

Michael Borodin came out of Russia to advise on propaganda. Locals of the ancient Chinese secret societies were made locals of the New National Party.

Sixty Russian tacticians came to train young Chinese officers in the new cadet school. The students were chosen through competitive examination by Kuomintang locals from the best young men of their communities and trained as thoroughly in the creed of the party and the art of propagandizing their soldiers and civilians in occupied territory as in military matters. Some Russian arms arrived, a very little Russian financial support.

The Peking government couldn't hang back much longer. The "Christian General," Feng Yu-hsiang was becoming convinced that Russia was the God-given crutch to aid China onto her feet. Great Britain's attempts to hinder became inconsistent after she had made her own compact with Russia. Russian insistence on autonomy for Mongolia and equal control in the portion of the Trans-Siberian railway running through Chinese territory (until the Chinese should refund its cost)—the first altruistic telegram from

Moscow had offered to give up even this—held matters a little while in abeyance. On May 31, however, the first “equal and reciprocal” treaty between China and a white power was signed. (The moderate Russian requirements in Manchuria and Mongolia might not be said to deprive it of that character. Yet in practice the autonomy of Mongolia has been under Russian instead of the Chinese protection provided for.)

It was thus Russia that first put into actual effect what the United States had discussed as an eventual development with the friendly Powers at the Washington Conference. The “lead” in Chinese affairs definitely went to Russia. With China in treaty relations, Russia reapproached Japan. America gave force to the gesture by offending Japan with the immigration act of July 1924. In January following the Soviet-Japanese relations were reestablished.

Just as the “Revolt against Imperialism” in China was gathering force, came extreme provocation in the Shanghai and Canton shootings of May-June, 1925. Russia’s guidance came to the fore in the counsel to the Nationalist Party and student unions to center their attack upon Great Britain. The Chinese had spontaneously retali-

ated with a nation-wide boycott, applied to all foreigners. The Russians demonstrated to Chinese leaders that Great Britain was the backbone of western aggression. Every serious war of western Powers against China had been led by her, every disastrous infringement of sovereignty exacted first by her. She was the one Power who having gained an advantage never let herself be tricked or edged out of it. What she got she kept, and steadily extended. Let the drive be centered on the British, they said. Let enmity against the Japanese be forgotten, the Americans treated, for the time being, with especial favor. Once British prestige was beaten down, the entire structure of foreign domination would collapse.

The Chinese patriots proved the soundness of these counsels in the formidable and disastrous boycott on Hongkong and British trade throughout South China, one of the most damaging injuries to British prestige that has ever been seen in the Orient.

Thus Russia followed her destiny toward Asia—not under the banner of the old imperialism but that of the new idealism. Or, if that word in connection with the Soviet seem inadmissible, one may call it “enlightened imperialism.” It

is a new type of "soldier-pawn" that sweeps up and places in check the sacrosanct occupants of a "king row" on the chessboard of international intrigue. The players of the Russian Foreign Commissary have been quicker than rival statesmen to see that a new age demands a new game, although a few modern statesmen elsewhere, notably in England, are getting the idea. Russia's international policy for Asia harmonizes with her proclaimed idealism for the commoner at home. The difference between rights enjoyed by an English and an Indian subject of Great Britain, or the difference found in application between "government derived from the consent of the governed" as seen in the United States and that seen in the Philippines or Nicaragua, affords a contrast with Russia's policy for "the backward peoples" and much to Russia's advantage.

Is Russia's benevolence going to prove sincere? I think so, chiefly because it will have small opportunity to be otherwise. Once she has assisted the Asiatic peoples to nationhood, she will have to deal fairly lest they turn upon her. Her leaders believe they will be able to keep Asia's friendship, and even more—affection. Our only criterion at this time is Moscow's treatment of the "minority races" within Russia. They have

their own little republics, such as the Tatar Republic of Kazan, and seem to receive the most liberal treatment, and to appreciate it. This, be it noted, is to be said of racial but not of political minorities. It has so happened that racial minorities can be liberally treated within the rigid Soviet System, while political minorities still remain without the pale.

A Fraternity of the Snubbed

Social feeling is a further and very strong factor sending Russia with a proffered hand to the Asian peoples today. Let us fall back on that favorite explanation of conduct of the modern psychologists: inferiority complex. Russians, ostracized out of Europe for political and economical reasons and out of America for puritanical reasons as well, find a mental kinship with Japanese suffering from snubs to their racial pride administered by the United States and the British Dominions, or Indians openly regarded by their rulers as an inferior race, or Filipinos told that they are not out of their age of tutelage. The same instinct which brought the French revolutionists, regarded as untouchable king-killers by the aristocratic con-

temporary world, to the sentimental championship of every under-people within their ken, operates today in Russia. And, feeling that Russia has suffered like experiences of invasion, exploitation and arrogant treatment at the hands of the imperial Powers, the "second-rate" countries of Asia—even of Latin America, turn to her as to a savior. Russia's leaders have both the inclination to attract them, and tact in the methods required. Assuredly the full diplomatic relations she has opened with Mexico, for instance, are no accident.

The Feud which Affects the Hemispheres

From these more ideal considerations, let us descend to Machiavellian practicality to discover what other factors motivate Russia's drift toward Asia. We feel the evil power of the implacable feud between Russia and Great Britain—the feud which promises to end only when empires end. It has dictated much of the modern history of Europe and now promises to shape history in Asia. It has become almost pathological in the two nations, being perpetuated by generations which are almost unconscious of the genetic influence moving them.

It began back in the mists—probably when Peter the Great went to Holland to study the construction of a navy and returning, built his towering Admiralty Building as an emblem of the power destined for Russia on the sea. It broke out in British interference in Russia's attempts to reach southern waters through Turkey in the early nineteenth century. It reached one of its greatest climaxes in Britain's intervention in the Crimean War of 1853. It was renewed in this direction in Britain's hostile aloofness during the Russo-Turkish war of 1870, which netted the British Empire the island of Cyprus.

Up until the latest phase of the struggle Great Britain appears in the role of the persistent aggressor, but her opportunities were larger. In 1904 Great Britain attacked Russia from two sides. She backed Germany in procuring the ten-year pact for peaceful penetration of Poland, and gave every support short of involving herself, to Japan in the Russo-Japanese war. Russia lost her fleet because Great Britain closed the Suez canal to it, compelling it to add the distance around Africa to the length of a sail to action already longest in history, and giving the Japanese navy another month to get ready. Attacked before it could reach the home

base of Vladivostok for refitting, it was utterly unequipped for battle. President Roosevelt, consciously or unconsciously affected by the American prejudice against Russian power on the Pacific "hanging over" since the days of John Quincy Adams, morally intervened to bring peace at a time when Japan's military fortune was in the ascendancy. Count Witte went, instructed by his Czar to prolong negotiations so as to give Russia a breathing space, but under no conditions to make peace. He laid down terms he was sure the Japanese could not accept due to feeling in their own country. The Japanese accepted, he had to sign, and went home to be disgraced by his master for the "success" of his mission. It was not a great Japanese victory—in a few months it might not have been a victory at all. At the beginning of the war two trans-Siberian trains a week brought men and supplies to the front. Upon its close twenty trains were arriving per day, and a half million men lay camped at Harbin waiting to go into action.

The scene of the feud shifted to south-western Asia. Russia built military railroads through Turkestan to the border of Afghanistan. Great Britain countered by advancing into Afghani-

stan and forcing a protectorate on the Ameer, whereby his foreign affairs were controlled by the British and he got arms and subsidies to ward off Russian aggression. Great Britain declared final sovereignty over the worthless broken plateau of Baluchistan, and built a railroad through it and some distance into Persia, at Duzdab, before the engineers were reminded from several quarters that they had failed to notice the boundary line. Russia, established herself in northern Persia by the most palpable trick of the old imperialism: sending in subjects to get into trouble and then soldiers to rescue them. The British then set up a "sphere of influence" in the south half of the country.

The Czar was forced to come to terms with his enemy England over the menace of a penetrating Germany on the other side. The pact over Poland was up in 1914 and Russia gave notice of non-renewal. This time Great Britain was on her side, for temporarily Germany had become more "necessary to be checked" than Russia. German industry and finance could not consent to discontinue their fruitful advance into Poland and the Kaiser saw circles being drawn around his place in the sun. Result: the World War. There were in addition some lesser motives and

“extenuating circumstances,” of course. There are in every crime.

England's Last Great Imperial Scheme

Russia's collapse in the war and her conversion to a militant social theory hateful to her temporary allies seemed heaven-sent to Great Britain's imperial program. Here was an opportunity to eliminate not only the immediate enemy, Germany, but the much more fundamental enemy Russia in the same war and all under the one banner of decency, democracy and liberty. The extent to which Lloyd George's government proceeded with its bold campaign amazes us now when we look back upon it. At the time little was said in Europe and less in America, nor, as a matter of fact, is the “grand concept” of it appreciated to this day outside of Asia.

Toward the end of the war, and particularly as America came in, British troops were more and more moved out of France into the near East. “Our ally Russia must be strengthened,” covered the scheme with a sufficient mantle of propriety. Turkey collapsed, surrendered and received a guarantee of territorial integrity. It

was soon necessary, however, to protect her from Bolshevism by naval forces in the Black Sea and military penetration from Mesopotamia to the Caspian. Greece was encouraged to attack her, and she was given opportunity to ask protection against them. British forces found it desirable to protect the Caspian oil region between Batum and Baku from Bolshevism. The "Trans-Caucasian" government was established. In the ensuing disturbances much of the oil burned up. Persia seemed to need protection too. Extensive new grants were obtained for the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Russian influence was eliminated, finances and army came under British control. The "Trans-Caspian" government, another desirable slice out of Russian territory, was set up to protest Persian and Afghanistan.

Regardless of Chinese protests British influence was pushed into Tibet, to Russia's west. A high commissioner advised the Living Buddha and British officers drilled an army for him. British border authorities dictated who might and might not visit that aloof land: "forbidden" no longer by the ancient prejudice of the most superstitious nation on earth but by the modern intrigue of the most enlightened. Even into Chinese Turkestan, in the heart of Asia, did

Britain push her outposts, in the endeavor to cut Russia off from her Oriental neighbors. Offices of spying and intrigue were established under the guise of Consulates—recognized by nobody and representing no British residential community.

At the time Bolshevism had hardly as yet established itself at Moscow. British imperialism did more to put Lenin & Co. on their feet than the idealism of Marx. Not content with ringing her old enemy around, Great Britain sponsored invasions from the Black Sea under Wrangel, Denekin and Udenitch; from the Pacific under Kolchak, Semenoff and Ungern; from Turkestan under various petty adventurers, and also from the north, with fitful support from France, Italy and America. They were hardly disinterested bits of assistance although for the benefit of the sentimental American public the invaders were represented as patriots struggling to save their country. The Siberian expedition—one of the most discreditable ventures in which America was ever involved—was “played up” as a rescue expedition for some brave Czech soldiers who had got into Asia and stood in peril of Bolshevik revenge. The price required of Denekin for assistance was recognition of the transfer of the Caucasian

region to British control which he was too good a Russian to grant before delay had ruined his chances of success.

Russia Introduces a New Game

All Russia rallied to the only leaders in sight and made surprisingly short shrift of the thinly disguised British attack within their own boundaries. The invaders were driven beyond the border. But what then? How would the new Russian power go on to combat the British menace outside her boundaries?

Here the Soviet statesmen showed themselves an age in advance of their European rivals. Instead of matching aggression by aggression and perpetuating the Czarist method of using the weaker Asian countries as a battleground to be appropriated by the victor in the contest, they set to work to build these countries into intelligent and integral although independent, forces of defence. Russians inspired the young intelligentsia in Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, China and India to make their peoples into nations after the formula which had worked so well in their own loosely-knit and "backward" country: one-party government, or the oligarchy of the

self-responsible—the true definition of Bolshevism.

While the “imperialist” world has alternately laughed and fulminated at “Bolshevik propaganda” in Asia, and has covered its own unwillingness to keep up with the times by pretending that Russia’s activities are planned merely to annoy and embarrass the “capitalist” world, the Soviet has proceeded steadily with its program to inspire and assist half the members of the human race to the mastery of their own destiny. Approve it or not—it is the most portentous piece of enlightened international philanthropy since France helped to make America a nation.

The prime policy of Peter the Great and the long dynasty which ruled until 1917 was to lead Russia out of Asia into Europe, politically, socially and culturally; in industrial and maritime development. The throne succeeded in Europeanizing the nobility and a small intellectual class. The mass of the people remained Asiatic, in manners, institutions and the features of an agricultural, as opposed to an industrial society.

Today rulers who more truly represent the Russian mind are leading their nation back to Asia. Europe has driven Russia into the Asiatic

world. She brings to it a political and social influence militantly European, which mingles with the very Asian "live and let live" quality of her "new imperialism."

Russia's revision of the rules of the international game and change of partners create the most dangerous crisis in their history for the Western Powers.

CHAPTER VIII

THE REVOLT AND THE BRITISH EMPIRE

THE Revolt of Asia, so far as affected by Russia, is a natural reaction to Great Britain's ambitious imperialism of 1917-1922. The preceding chapter sketched the growth of British power along Russia's Asiatic border, closing with the new policy by which Russia turned the tables. Allusion to some of the same events is inseparable from the topic of this chapter, and we will emphasize rather here the "end game," in which the old master has declined to resign, but yet appears as the prospective loser.

When the British have not consciously gone out after Empire, the gods seem to have thrown it into their laps. When they would make a scheme and bend a world to it, everything has gone wrong.

The British Scheme Goes Bad

Nemesis first overtook them in Egypt, with the resentment aroused at their impressing Egyptian

men and resources into the Palestinian campaign against Turkey. The Egyptians had been promised that they would not be compelled to war against their co-religionists, but in stress of need, discounting possibility of later retaliation, thousands of the *fellahin* were condemned to a period of misery that often meant death, laboring at the defense works in the drouth-haunted region of the Canal.

Then, after the War, the whole nation was affected by the manifest disposition to postpone application of self-determination to Egypt. The nominal suzerainty of Turkey had been abolished in 1914, and independence had come,—which was just as nominal,—under the British supervision which had been maintained over the tributary Khedive and his subjects ever since a massacre of foreigners in Alexandria back in the '80's.

Perhaps before now, some reader has taken a glance at the page head, and remarked "Since when is Egypt a part of Asia?" Fairly unanswerable. But just as most maps of Asia show a border of Africa, so a bit of Africa is needed to complete this political picture.

Were French empire here our special theme, we would have to include Morocco.

Egyptians saw the Hedjaz, next door as it

were, in Arabia, accorded the noble status of a kingdom. They wanted as much, with their fair pretensions to greater advance, in civilization and especially since the War began, in prosperity. Although so far they had kept the peace, relying on pleasant talk in official circles about their future, they found themselves excluded from what even the factious Nationalists of India were gaining, who had been a thorn to the British all through the War.

The British government first tried repression, and then, as an explosion evidently impended, conciliation. Lord Milner, tardy emissary of compromise at the end of 1919, could find no one to listen to him. When he warned the Mufti, or national primate of Islam, that if his country would not compromise, Great Britain still had the power to crush it, he was told that "a guaranty of force is not eternal." The British proposed an alliance between the nations as a mutual accommodation. The Egyptian representative would not admit military occupation, so the proposal failed.

But by 1922 the British decided it would be wise formally to terminate the protectorate which they set up under threat of Turk invasion in 1914. Egyptian independence was then

granted, limited by stipulations on the order of those exacted by the United States in the Greater Antilles and by a garrison having more official status than ours in Nicaragua. The complete independence won by Turkey (backed by Russia) remains a desired goal. The British did away with the capitulations (extraterritoriality) but our own United States refused to recognize this. Yet at any rate Balfour's dictum: "the supremacy of Egypt, the Sudan, and the Canal, forms one organic whole. British supremacy is going to be maintained," had been successfully controverted. Egyptian rights to the Sudan remain disputed.

British Forebodings

Looking farther East during post-war stress, Lord Sydenham remarked: "I cannot help viewing the situation with anxiety. Central Asia may remain for years a source of danger. If India escapes, Persia may become involved. While if Lenin's agents can control the Caspian, the Northern Provinces may come under the curse. The disastrous delay in the settlement of Turkey has provided opportunities for intrigues between Enver and the Moscow tyrants, which

are only beginning to bear fruit. China may be too vast and too disjointed to become a field for Bolshevik action, but there are possibilities of fomenting anti-Western agitation in that chaotic Republic."

His presage was more certain than he knew. India to him as a representative of the British Empire was the center of interest and he added "The strength and stability of British rule in India have proved throughout the Far East a bulwark against reaction and a shining example of peaceful progress. Now that it is being steadily and stealthily undermined, the danger of a cataclysm, far exceeding any the history of Asia records, looms darkly before us."

Since developments which he foresaw with such anxiety have continued, one hopes he may have erred in identifying so closely the salvation of humanity with the hold of Britain in Asia. But that feeling is one that inspired the desperate struggle to prevent it from falling away.

A similar view was that of Sir Francis Younghusband, whose expedition to Lhasa resulted in the informal protectorate of Britain over Tibet: "It is maddening to think that after all the sacrifices we have made, our whole position in Asia should now be in jeopardy. Two things can be

clearly seen. First, Bolshevism is dead set on smashing our empire in Asia. Secondly, the Mohammedan world is ablaze, because Mohammedans believe Christians want to smash Islam."

The military and diplomatic threat of the Bolsheviks might be viewed as part heritage of the secular Russo-British feud and part the consistent drive for world proletarian revolution, but more, it was a simple immediate reply to armed hostilities carried on so informally that their extent was scarcely known to the Western public responsible for them.

The Crusade Against Bolshevism

Revolutionary atrocities and excesses evoked horror in England and called forth a conservative official repudiation of socialist theories which the nation on the whole was nearer accepting than was any other in the world—under various guises. This repudiation was consistent with refusal to recognize the fact of Bolshevik predominance in Russia, and led to hostilities and attempted alignment of counter balancing powers to resist. France was actively engaged to the same purpose. America, too, cooperated.

It was really the story of a hundred years be-

fore, when the French Revolution was the victim and democracy the discredited theory at issue. Theories and "slogans" may serve to move armies, but it would be giving them too much weight in this case to suppose that in the councils of state the decision to endorse or to quash them was made entirely without reference to sordid facts—such as, for instance, that Bolshevism represented a loss to Americans by its blithe repudiations and confiscations, of about \$600,000,000 and of roughly ten times as much to France. For Great Britain, the leader, the first concern was empire.

An often fatally easy device to guard the frontiers of an empire is to extend them. So Rome reached, so Britain was reaching, even before the War, a limit where available force was insufficient for the long frontier. The inward demand for expansion was becoming sated and quiescent, and the spoils of the Great War surfeited it to the point of distress. Then to meet the peril of communism, extending by hook or crook in all directions, the old device of the "*cordon sanitaire*" was tried.

But the "iron ring" never joined up. It fared rather as one of straw. The little "White" republics along the Baltic survived. But in spite

of all Britain could do to consolidate the "White" regime in the little republics of Transcaucasia, the "Red" propaganda against the rule of the propertied and the intelligentsia was successful, and they fell before the Soviet armies and became Soviet republics in 1920 and 1921. Farewell to British chances to hold the oil fields of Baku! The drive was onward toward India. In connection with these campaigns Radek said that a dozen trained propagandists were often worth a division of troops.

Neighboring Persia, which had suffered as one of the least-noticed battlefields of the War, was tied to England by a treaty that involved acceptance of British advisers and a loan of \$10,000,000 as a means of fortification against Russia. It was made clear that Russia would not tolerate a Persia thus in hostile alliance.

"Enlightened Imperialism" in Persia

Lloyd George, seeing how dear the cost of persecuting Russia had become and pressed by the growing political force of Labor in Britain, had removed the blockade against Russia. It was not possible to maintain Persia and so the

alliance was cancelled by consent and the British troops withdrew, taking the *faineant* Shah along.

But the Northern Bear did not come down to satisfy his historic thirst for a drink of the open sea as some expected. The Russian invasion stopped. The Russians presented the Persians with an amazing document paralleling their offer to China, at about the same time. It provided diplomatic relations, restoration of certain territory to Persia, annulment of all previous Russian concessions, cession of the Russian Discount and Loan Bank of Teheran to the Persian Government, and cancellation of all the Persian debt to Russia. No negotiations were necessary to induce the Persians to sign it. Even the important British oil concessions in the southwest were left unimpaired—perhaps discreetly. If Britain continued to “see *red*” in the moves which deposed the Kajars in favor of the modern and very nationalist Shah Pahlevi the “menace” was slow indeed to develop. Latterly, despite Russian kindness the influence from the north has been somewhat eclipsed by that of the United States—personified by the economic mission under Col. Millspaugh which with enthusiastic cooperation from the Persians continues the in-

interrupted work of Shuster in reorganizing the national finance and communications.

The tables were turned. Cynics might observe that Russia could afford considerable generosity after the way she repudiated debts of her own, but it was clear that from an Asiatic viewpoint Britain had been forced by Russian "Enlightened Imperialism" into a completely untenable moral position and her military prestige greatly impaired.

The Turnover in Afghanistan

England met the baffling new tactics next in Afghanistan, border state of jealously guarded India. The Soviet Republic concluded a treaty of mutual neutrality and amity with Afghanistan in 1920. The treaty of like purpose between Afghanistan and India had long included a subsidy to the Amir. Now Lord Islington, under-secretary for India, was moved to tell the House of Commons: "The Amir has sent an envoy to the Bolshevik government. How can we expect peace if a ruler of his temperament is left free to ally himself with the various exasperated enemies of Great Britain who are to be found through the Far East today? I would like to

hear that something has been done to secure our interests."

Something was done. The Amir was threatened with punishment if he did not repudiate the mission. Instead, he attacked the British, drove their influence entirely out of his country, and invaded the Punjab, from which he was pushed back to his borders only with difficulty. In the new status then arranged the subsidy from India was abolished, and an embargo on arms established on that side. Again England had to give ground, for the reply on behalf of the independent Orient was an alliance for both offense and defense between the Soviet Republic, Turkey and Afghanistan, and a \$500,000 annual subsidy to the Amir on the part of the Soviet. As a partial offset to this factor of Afghan dependence upon the north, it was thought best to lift the embargo so that the Afghans might also get arms from Britain.

The reverses to British fortunes from the Mediterranean to the Pamirs, deeply affected India. Demands and demonstrations were met, as usual, with repressive measures, more drastic than any that were dared in Egypt. Some recalled Star Chamber days. There were executions and floggings and crawlings. They cli-

maxed in the massacre of five hundred and wounding of fifteen hundred unarmed Moslems who had met at Amritsar to pray for their cause in disobedience to a British order.

India Blazes into Nationalism

All India took fire. The Indian Nationalist Congress met in deep mourning, Moslems and Hindus together, all sects and castes, to plan that the blood of their countrymen should not have been shed in vain. The spiritual power of Gandhi's movement showed itself in the Swaraj devotees who, prepared by prayer and fasting, went wave upon silent wave against British forces to have their legs broken by thrusting rifle butts. The most dignified rebuke was that from the aged poet Rabindranath Tagore, who returned his crown honors to Viceroy Chelmsford, taking on himself "all consequences in giving voice to the protest" of his countrymen and asking demission from the knighthood, now to him "a badge of shame."

The Viceroy asked Parliament for immediate action to conciliate the people and save British rule in India. "What lies behind and below the whole of the political difficulties in India is a

spirit of Nationalism, a spirit bred in the soil, nurtured by our methods and examples, and spreading rapidly through all ranks and classes of Indian society. . . . The government of India is not being dragged at the tail of a revolutionary movement by a negligible group of professional agitators," he said.

The Parliamentary Experiment

The result was experimental establishment (against the corps prejudice of "98% of the British Civil Servants") of the "Diarchy" or system of divided authority in the provinces under British administration. The government of the entire empire was also modified to include three chambers of legislative action. In two of these, the Assembly and Council of State, a majority of the members are elected by the people, and most of the rest appointed from among them by the government with deference to rights of minorities, personal fitness, and reigning policy. The franchise is limited to about eight percent of the population on the basis of educational and property qualifications.

Then there is the "Chamber of Princes" a curious mechanism for increasing national unity

through the actual sovereigns or Rajahs of the seven hundred native states. Some of the serene highnesses do not deign to attend its sessions. The less potent, as scaled by the fewer "guns" assigned for their salute in the standard category of precedence, are not invited personally. Backed as it is by the government, it is a little more lively an institution than the "House of Governors" once promoted in the United States, not long ago,—which is very little praise.

The whole scheme is an experiment, and is definitely subject to alteration either liberal or reactionary as the situation may seem to require, at ten-year intervals, the first of which was set to expire in 1929. Provincial executive counsellors in certain affairs, like education and agriculture, were made responsible by terms of this act, to the local, electorate-dominated legislatures. Others were appointed still by the British governors, and the governors were still endowed with absolute veto power and right to dismiss the parliaments, whereby they might nullify the popular will at discretion. In the Delhi government, absolute power persists in the Viceroy and his veto or promulgation of an act, contrary to the majority expression of the legislatures, is only limited by the supreme power of the Secretary of

State for India in London. As the avowed object of Imperial policy is to fit India if possible, and as soon as possible, for autonomous membership in the commonwealth of the British Empire it is not likely that these arbitrary powers will be used except with utmost regard for Indian feelings and interests.

The complaint still made that Indian wealth is drained away to England at the rate of \$150,000,000 a year is largely in reference to the interest charges on British investments. The fact that in spite of her poverty India obtains more than half the world's annual production of gold and a third of the silver, and largely devotes it to the extravagance of hoarding and ornamentation, suggests that Indians might soon be able to keep this wealth within the country by investing in their own welfare projects, and industries.

How It Is Working

It is thought that the adoption of the gold standard together with the increased use of paper which is projected for inauguration in 1931, will effectively influence against the melting down of gold merely to provide treasure troves for future generations.

Such is the plan of enlightened rule which Great Britain has put forth in India. Gandhi, being more concerned over the destruction of Indian culture than "taxation without representation," and regarding the Diarchy as a scheme for eternally fastening the alien upon Indian life, sponsored "non-cooperation." Swarajists ran for office, were elected, and then declined to serve. It was an effectual narcotic to the plan. Non-cooperation was being carried into the economic realm (if Indians all refused to work for white men the latter would obviously have to give up) when violence broke out in the tea fields and the Mahatma called a halt. He went to jail; then into retirement; he has again taken the field. Meanwhile other factions arose, largely out of Swaraj: Nationalists, Responsivists, who take the opposite tack, and several smaller parties. Thus the plan has worked better or at least more—of late.

The unofficial National Congress continues to meet yearly. It is dominated by the Swaraj party, and, as feeling against the British has become less excited other political factions, and the Moslems, have taken less part in it. Nevertheless its resolutions become more and more radical and self-confident. The session of De-

cember-January, 1926-27, declined to modify its position on noncooperation, demanded reform in the native states, and recommended participation in a Pan-Asian Democratic Federation to extend from Turkey to China, besides opposing the use of Indian troops in China. The Indian government is expected by Britons to accomplish the task of avoiding on the one hand, suppression of the nationalistic movement which would cause united and active rebellion throughout India, and, on the other, to forestall the growth of bold peaceful revolution under their eyes.

Britons both among those sympathetic and those hostile to the Indian home rule idea are divided on the wisdom of continuing the Diarchy experiment. Lord Ronaldshay states that it shows more and more a need for conscious adaptation away from Western models in the interest of preserving British integrity and efficiency in a form of more distinctly Indian character.

Great Britain's Crucial Test

The crucial test of Great Britain's ability to meet the new Asia must come in India, just as America's must come in the Philippines. Her government's task is doubly hard, as it has the

dominions to please, and they are prejudiced, as Australia or Canada, or actually oppressive through economic rivalry, as the Union of South Africa. There was active protest in the Indian press against the Maharajah of Burdwan's statement at the Imperial Conference of 1927 that the India he represented there "seemed like a chorus girl among prima donnas." It voiced the danger of India's interest being sacrificed to please the dominions, who, in the present day, have to be treated like prima donnas, it is true.

Yet is not Great Britain's "new Imperialism" invented in connection with the dominions the wisest policy with which she can counter the "enlightened imperialism" of Russia in Asia? The British waited too long in Egypt and lost the friendly trust which might have been theirs instead of today's sullen glances at their garrison and the controversy over responsibility for protection of Suez. Foreign Minister Chamberlain, at least, seems determined that this shall not happen in China. Yet he is hampered by the imperial attitude represented by Winston Churchill, so that the Labor *Herald* puts it: "Great Britain wags the tail at one end and snarls at the other. Which end shall the Chinese credit?" In England there is no clean break with

diplomatic tradition as in Russia, and the policy of "repression first and if that goes badly, then conciliation" may convince Asia that Great Britain is not "practical," but merely weak.

Obstacles to Liberalism

There are two difficulties in the application of this "new imperialism" to Great Britain's colored subjects. One is the determination of colonial Britons to maintain social and economic superiority over the native. Press items such as this are common in India: "The European residents of Coonoor emphatically protest against the appointment of an Indian Civil Surgeon to the Government of Madras." Here is the test of the British Raj as to whether it exists for the governed or the governors—or, to put it more strongly, whether it is to be a government or a job-providing institution for white Britons. No need now to discuss what it *has* been. It must meet the test of the present. If it cannot control the cupidity and prejudices of its own race it must perish.

The second is the gap between the aspiration and the ability of the native to rule himself. It gets most of the attention from white protagon-

ists, just as the first consideration gets most from native demagogues. But there is with most of us a period between the age of majority and the age of discretion and competency, and when a people reach the mental stage at which they "would rather have a government like hell and have it their own than one like heaven under aliens" and the physical stake at which they are able to nullify outside control and put their guardian controller's governors at wits end, it is better to graduate them from wardship into friendship and hope for the best. India does not hold out an utterly hopeless prospect. Gandhi's idealism takes a very practical turn in its attack upon caste and creed prejudices. These are absurd and deplorable enough today, but one who knew the old India where a Brahmin would die of thirst before accepting water from an inferior is amazed to see Indians of all castes eating, playing chess or football, going to the theatre and working together. Plenty of fanaticism still exists among the mass: throwing of pigs into mosques, slaughtering of holy cows or swamis with Moslem knives, mass riots; but a new attitude is gaining rapidly among the intelligentsia, and it is the intelligentsia who count—who probably made caste in the beginning. No force ever

generated in Indian history has done as much as the flaming spirit of Gandhi toward this humanitarian end. Hindus and Moslems are uniting with a hundred other sects and races as *Indians* under Swaraj (Home Rule). A Moslem fanatic recently murdered a Hindu saint and patriot in Delhi. The British said: "See!" But hundreds of contrite Moslems marched in his funeral procession. That was different.

Prospects of Native Rule

Gandhi's attitude toward internecine strife may not appeal to us, but it is the view of Indians in general, and it seems that we must accept it. He looks at it from the cultural rather than the humanitarian or individual viewpoint. "The British have protected the peace, it is true," he said to me, "but they have prevented the necessary struggle whereby each of the varied elements in Indian life must find its place. They did India harm, perhaps, stepping in to check political evolution at a time when the Moslem empire was going into dissolution. Had there not been interference a Hindu power would have arisen and had its considerable term of stability. There

would have been more looting, perhaps, than under the English—but at least the loot would have stayed in the country. Of course there is the hope that the British will prove to have done us a great service in keeping the peace until the struggle can be transmuted from the physical on to the mental plane. I would work toward that eventuality.”

In his zeal for the preservation of the culture which he loves and his fear for its destruction, Mahatma Gandhi would favor measures for the abolition of British schools. There is an excuse for his attitude. As a Colonel Goodman said, in opening a little school at Badiahola (while his wife aided the ceremonial by hoisting the Union Jack), “the Government of India opens elementary schools with a twofold purpose: education, and instillment of the spirit of the Empire, with loyalty to the British throne.” Gandhi recognizes a kind of impressionability in his people which he deplors. He cited an instance, an Indian whom he had seen, a dark skinned duplication of a Scotch sea captain—even to gesture, inflection, and “ornaments” of speech. In this his people are a contrast to the Chinese, who are characteristically refractory in their solid personal dignity to any adoption of occidental traits. Separa-

tion now, he believes, might save in India native excellencies of personality which are worth developing as part of her contribution to world culture, and which are in peril as long as British predominate.

As we soliloquized upon occasion of our preliminary survey, there is little chance that the India of the future will be entirely Gandhi's, and we noted a basis upon which even his attitude on quantity production might be modified. In their efforts to adapt themselves to industrialism Indians have the counsel of Westerners who themselves are in strong sympathy with their laborers. Mr. Tom Shaw, head of the International Textile Workers' delegation to India, advised his dark-skinned fellow workmen not to try to halt industry, but to take it into their own hands. "Workers of the world, unite!" was his slogan. "We come to India not as superior men preaching to those below, but as men who have themselves known the crash and whistle of the loom. You are in a better position than were your fellow workers when they started. The march of industrialism cannot be stopped, but through sacrifice and organization, you, as well as we, can achieve the working class ideal of full political freedom and a decent living. We ask

you to help us in driving dirt, disease and degradation out of the world. We want intensive international union with workers all over the world regardless of creed, color or belief." Perhaps between the extremes of Gandhi and Tom Shaw, India will work out a practical and yet humanitarian industrial program.

It seems "up to" the British and other whites there to take the risk involved in India's control of her own destiny. Either that, or the risk of intense disorder, bloodshed and ultimate defeat. If the will and the formula can be found for doing it quickly, the British may, as may the Americans in the Philippines, still contrive to retain legal hold in some manner. But after all, it is the moral hold and not the legal which is going to matter in the coming age. Far more valuable to Great Britain will be a grateful, friendly India with no political strings at all tying her to the empire than a sullen, averse boycotting vassal India. This is true in the political world and yet more true in the world of commerce. If the British can save their trade and industry, they will have saved all the empire that any nation can hope to maintain in this new era.

Several years ago Lord Sydenham set forth his fears that loss of India would have a bad

effect on developments in Pacific Asia. It has come about the other way around. But England's fashion of meeting the Revolt in China may be taken as a guide to policy in the region of her much heavier involvement.

The Empire Passes in Pacific Asia

That great imponderable, British Prestige, of which men once spoke with awed voices, went out of existence when Hongkong was brought to its knees by striking coolies and boycotting hongts. The Empire in Pacific Asia came to its end when a mob, followed by Cantonese regulars, dispossessed the British of their concession at Hankow, and the northern war-lord, Marshal Chamg Tso-lin, "fired" the British Inspector-General of Customs in Peking. The new status was tacitly recognized in the British note to the Powers of Christmas day, 1926. What is there left to save?

"Napoleon said we are a nation of shopkeepers," Sir Austen Chamberlain is quoted. "So far as China is concerned, we are. Our prime concern is to save our trade." "We are not likely to get into a war with China," said Mr. Amery, Minister of Colonies. "One does not shoot his customer."

British investment in China is computed to be two and one-half billion dollars. "We are a trading nation, whose interests in China are purely commercial," says *News of the World* (London).

"When our business with the Far East is flourishing, the homes of Britain prosper proportionately. When it languishes, they feel the pinch more or less. In 1923 the value of imports from Great Britain to China was approximately £20,000,000. In 1924 they were worth about a million more, and in 1925 five millions less. To these figures must be added the value of our trade with the mainland carried on through Hongkong. In 1923 the total value of the Hongkong imports to China was £40,000,000, of which a very large proportion was British goods. In 1924 there was a slight drop. But in 1925 disturbed conditions produced a bad slump, the total import trade falling by about £10,000,000.

"These figures suffice to show that our trade with China is a matter of firstclass concern to the workers of Great Britain. In so far as the anti-foreign agitation depresses our trade, they are obliged to pay the piper. To make matters worse, the Americans and Japanese have, in recent years, been making rapid progress in our

old-time preserves. The Americans seem to have suffered a check from the general unrest, the imports in 1924 being valued at £31,000,000 against £23,000,000 in 1925. The Japanese, on the other hand, continue to make gigantic strides forward. Thus, their import trade, amounting to £35,000,000 in 1923, had in 1925 grown to £50,000,000.

“No attempt to compare Great Britain’s position in the Far East with that of her rivals is, however, complete which does not do justice to the services of our mercantile marine, both as regards coastwise traffic and general transport. Of all the tonnage entering Chinese ports in 1925, 12 per cent. was British, 8 per cent. Japanese, and 3 per cent. American. Whatever its value to us, it must be added to the millions already mentioned as the fruit of our dealings with China.

“A remarkable feature of the shipping statistics is their expansion despite the chaotic state of Chinese politics. This in itself is a convincing proof of the immense potentialities of the Chinese market. In that market the industry and genius of generations of Britishers have given us a rich inheritance. Its continued enjoyment implies no hostility to the natural desire of the Chinese for full political and economic enfranchisement. On

the contrary, we are in China, firstly and lastly, to trade."

The Reaction on India

When Great Britain thought she could get more trade from China by fighting, she undertook the "Opium" War. An equal consideration for trade will prevent her from fighting. One must swallow pride if that is a necessary precedent to the swallowing of food. Will she be as wise in India, Malaya, Mesopotamia and the rest of her Asian Empire?

"The abandoning of British rights in China will put the question of possession of these colonies on the carpet, doubtless within a few months," is the consensus of crown officers and business men reported in the *New York Sun*.

"The congress at Baku in 1922 laid the foundation of Russia's Asiatic policy, when Zinoviev stated to the members that their Asiatic policy should be an awakening of nationalism in that part of the world in order to free them from the English yoke. Russia has followed up this policy with remarkable consistency, and the present events in China are nothing but a consequence of that policy. Agents have been spreading propa-

ganda throughout the country and frequently have pointed out to the Chinese leaders that determined efforts against the British will be as successful as Mustapha Kemal's."

If the British Government goes too far in the line of concessions to the Chinese Nationalists, the Bolshevik agents who are already active among the Indian Nationalists will exploit the British surrender to China for all it is worth, and while the situation in India, where there are 70,000 white troops, is very much different than in China, the Government should look forward to endless trouble there.

All Alone in Game

"We are in a difficult position because we are all alone in this game. The United States has no vital interest in China, and Japan is following its own policy, which is a desire to see all the white race out of China in order to be able to pursue unhandicapped its own policy there," said the same informant. "We are unable to obtain Japanese cooperation now. We are consequently forced to send troops, which we did not desire to send, to the Far East. But if we bow now before the Nationalist tide, as the circumstances

seem to indicate, I do not know what will happen next year in India."

Can British Trade Survive Without Empire?

"God always provides a way for the British Empire," said a whimsical member of the Secretariat in Delhi to me. "When we have to leave here—We still have Africa left." Enlightened imperialism—putting the native first—has been adopted as a policy in interior Africa. But Africa will eventually follow Asia into revolt unless Egypt and the Soudan are reconciled and the white man's renewed effort in South Africa to reduce African and Asiatic to slavery is not checked.

If China means much in the life of every Britisher India means much more. Trade with this possession still totals more than that with any of the white dominions. It overtops every national item of British commerce save that of the United States. No railway crosses the six-thousand-mile-long British border between Persia and Indo-China, but 119 million dollars worth of trade passes over it yearly on the backs of men and animals. The products carried between Bhamo,

Burma, and Yunnanfu in China are worth annually eight million dollars.

Can Great Britain keep this trade in her hands and yet stand out against native nationalist aspirations? China has answered convincingly, no; and India is on the point of emphasizing the reply. How much will she keep if she drops her political advantage and puts her manufacturers and traders on a basis of unfavored competition? These are the serious questions the answers to which shall determine the future of the British people.

Before the World War Great Britain was the world's banker, and this gave her a large advantage in trade, for the financier of enterprises was usually able to dictate that equipment therefor be bought in his country. This advantage has largely been lost to America. Can British industry compete in the open field of the future with American, German and Japanese?

Most students of production shake their heads. The long enjoyment of markets protected for British industry by British governments, made favorable by imperial prestige, has made British industry sluggish. Its administration is second rate in efficiency. This can be quickly changed, but its labor is willful. Unless Great Britain

can overcome the go-easy spirit, the union restriction of output, the moral laxness related to the dole, its prosperity may not survive the end of Empire.

But if it can make its vassals into nations, grappling them to it with steel hoops of friendship in place of the iron bonds of militarism, if it can quicken its executives and inspirit its laborers, it will have assured unto itself the same glorious place in the new era of enlightened imperialism that it enjoyed in the now closing age of political domination.

CHAPTER IX

COMPANIONS IN REVOLT

JAPAN and Turkey—who would have thought, a few years ago, of linking their names together as exhibiting a common policy to end the white man's domination in Asia? They lay at the opposite extremities of my long trip across the Asiatic continent, facing on opposite seas; in race, religion, social tradition and historic development as far apart in mental mileage as in geography. Yet all Asia links Japan and Turkey to-day as pioneers in the revolt that the rest of the continent is destined to follow. They have been successful, each in its own way, in winning freedom at home and respectful attention among the counsels of the powers. They have challenged the western Powers in war. They have forced the proud alien domiciled in their borders to be governed according to their laws. They have restrained the schools and missions sent to elevate their culture within such narrow bounds

that those efforts, in spite of the good they have brought, have remained almost wholly exotic. In other words, they have taken control of their own destinies.

Now these two nations, as was inevitable, are drawing together. While in Turkey I saw a party of Japanese business men, representing all the large chambers of commerce in the Mikado's Empire, setting out for home again after an extensive journey through the principal Turkish cities. They had come to win a new market for Japanese goods, a market particularly adapted for them as the growth of the new Turkey expands the wants and stimulates the purchasing power of the Near East. Already, I found by consulting the statistics, Japan supplies such staples as cotton cloth to Turkey in quantities that makes her a dangerous competitor with the white man. She sells more unbleached cotton cloths in Turkey than we Americans do—one eighth, in 1924, of the country's total supply; and although her sales to Turkey are small—a little over \$1,500,000 a year—they are already about one-third of Turkey's imports from the United States.

With this contact between the outermost edges of Asia come other things, typified by the perma-

ment exposition of articles of Japanese workmanship opened at Constantinople in 1926. This little Japanese world's fair on the Bosphorus will probably be continued permanently, not merely for Turkish visitors but for buyers who congregate at the Turkish metropolis from throughout the Near East. In fact, as the Constantinople correspondent of the *Matin* was alert to visualize upon rejection of the Lausanne Treaty by the United States Senate: "One thing is certain: if the economic activity of the United States suffers by the situation created by the rejection of this treaty, it will be the rival activity of Japan that will replace that of the United States in Turkey, and throughout the Near East."

The Warlike Nations of the Fringes

It was only in 1920 that Japan and Turkey for the first time exchanged ambassadors. But since then Japan has sent her emissaries, private and official, to be thoroughly *en rapport* with the successful revolt of Mustapha Kemal against his ancestors' capitulations. These capitulations, in law and in spirit, are now ended. Turkey is no longer the "sick man" of Europe,

but the champion of western Asia, just as Japan is the champion of eastern Asia. In Turkey as in Japan, there are no longer any little sheltered areas of the white man's power, or special exemptions from jurisdiction. Japan won an undistinguished victory in the Great War and Turkey apparently suffered a shattering defeat, but they both now stand forth as the first acknowledged victors in the long struggle between the white race and the resurgent races of Asia in which the War, so far as they were concerned, was but a stage.

The analogy between Japan and Turkey might easily be pressed beyond the bounds within which it actually affects the Asiatic situation. It is my purpose merely to show the common qualities of these two modes of revolt as I observed them. For though Japan and Turkey have acted differently under the force of a very different chain of circumstances there is a broad kinship in their method of defiance. Both these nations, unlike China and India, have been all through their history warlike races. They have achieved and maintained their independence from the white man primarily by the edge of the sword. They have adopted the white man's improved method of killing to their own national emer-

gencies. They have each proved in their own way that non-European races can hold their own against European races by force of arms as well as in the more peaceful arts of civilization.

Asiatic nations as different as Japan and Turkey are for the first time coming to understand each other's relationship to something like a common cause. The point is that in securing the freedom of the Turkish nation the armies which held back the Allies at Gallipoli and cleared Asia Minor of the Greeks were on a parity in effect, if not in numbers, with the Japanese armies which overthrew the designs of Czarist Russia in Manchuria and made their nation one of the great powers of the world. The effect in both cases was liberation from the threat of European overlordship, and sympathetic echos throughout Asia.

Kindred Feeling of Resentment

You will find still in both countries, however, a general distrust and resentment toward Europe, to which widely different causes have contributed. As you travel through Japan you will find all classes of Japanese quite astonishingly stirred whenever the subject of the social super-

iority of the white race enters—as it usually does somehow—in the field of your conversation. It is a resentment on which Japan is perfectly willing to bide her time, but it is there, and every American resident of Japan is made unpleasantly conscious of it at the most inopportune moments. In Turkey an equivalent resentment exists, shared by all intelligent and leading Turks. It is a little more difficult to define, but it goes back to the asserted moral superiority of Europe, an assertion which has kept the epithet, “the unspeakable Turk,” for instance, as a cloak for some of the most hypocritical policy which the European powers have pursued in any quarter of the world. I do not say that either of these affectations of superiority are not sincerely held and have not some basis in truth. We must not forget, however, that a world is coming into existence in Asia where we are going to hear for the first time the other side of the story, and be forced to see our assertions of superiority subjected to other tests than our physical power to maintain them.

Another element in which both Turkey and Japan have shown common symptoms of responding to leadership in Asia is the definite attempts both have made from time to time to

arouse the subject peoples bound to them by kinship of race or religion. In Japan there are already the active seeds of a Pan-Asiatic movement. It has been mostly jingoistic in temper and has little effect on any of the practical policies of the country's very level headed leaders at the present time. But you hear of it constantly. It works through Buddhism as a religious focus, and the wide-spreading influence of Japanese trade gives it a physical machinery and the foreshadowing of a formidable financial backing. In the years just before the war Pan-Asianism was much more heard of in public in Japan than it is now. But the organizations which fomented it still exist and still promote a silent and continuous propaganda in many parts of Asia. It must never be forgotten as a potential weapon that may be used whenever Japan decides that it may be worth her while to play for bigger stakes in the white man's world.

In Turkey likewise, with the decline of the political importance of the Caliphate, we hear less and less of the rallying-nucleus offered by Turkish leaders for a Jihad against Christendom. But the impulse, promoted by the most warlike of the Moslem peoples, to arouse their religious

brethren whether in the Riff in western Africa or among our own Moro wards in the Philippines, is a constant factor in the great game of Asiatic politics. All the Moslem peoples of Asia have responded with surprisingly ardent sympathy to Turkey's establishment of her freedom. The government of Mustapha Kemal has been anti-clerical and has aroused an animosity among more faithful Mohammedans by its secular tendencies. But the association is not forgotten which made Turkey for so many centuries the guardian of the Holy Places of Mohammedanism, and the kinship of free Turkey is not going to diminish as a disturbing factor among the Mohammedan subject people of Egypt, India, Iraq, the Dutch East Indies and the very independent Moslem minority in China.

The Turk is an accomplished diplomat, and fully fitted to play his part in the leadership of the new Asia. He has advantaged himself from alliances with England, with France and with Germany as they best served the interest of his country, just as Japan made eager alliance with England. This brings us to a new aspect of the question, the matter of Asiatic alliances. Hitherto, Asiatic peoples have had many treaty relationships with Europe, but they have had scarcely

any with one another. We will have to widen the scope of our picture to do justice to the scene, for Japan and Turkey, in their symbolic leadership at the extremities of the continent, serve to introduce us to this much larger phase of comparisons in revolt. It brings us face to face with the conscious nationalism of Asia which is changing, as Japan and Turkey have already changed, from dependence on the white man's world to an interdependence purely Asiatic, in the course of which Asiatic peoples are drawing closer together than at any previous time in their long history.

Asiatic Comradeship not all Russia's Fostering

I found all the way from Yokohama to Stamboul that there is one factor in pan-Asiaism that most white men are content to view as the main cause, but which, upon more intent examination, appears in its truer light as but a powerful irritant to much more fundamental and native causes all over the continent. This widely spoken-of and admitted influence is the great power of Russia. Undoubtedly, Russia has a hand in every malcontent movement in Asia. As we saw in a previous chapter, her new Asiatic

alignment, born out of the great war, has forced her to seek a defensive balance against the west by playing a wholly new role: that of conciliator of Asiatic states along her vast borders and instigator of revolt among all peoples seeking to throw off a political and economic domination that Russian agents have taught Asia to call imperialism. Russia now has amicable treaties and full diplomatic standing with China, Turkey and Japan; she has a friendly footing with Persia and Afghanistan. Her influence is profoundly felt in India, Burma, Mongolia and Tibet, and reaches even to the Dutch East Indies as demonstrated in the ominous "communist" uprisings in Sumatra and Java.

This influence reaches out in novel ways. For the first time, for instance, pourparlers have taken place for treaty arrangements between countries so far apart in political space and time as Afghanistan and China. The negotiations which have so far been held concern no practical cooperation that is now conceivable; that they have at this day and age been seriously embarked upon is what is startling.

The Indian Nationalist Congress's resolution of sympathy with China may be discounted as due to Russian "steering." But it is not Russian

influence—rather a desire to escape from it—which prompts Chinese diplomats to visit An-
gora, as did the Ambassador to America, Dr.
Sze, during 1926, and impels Chinese students
at their own expense to go there to study Turkish
political and social developments. I found in
China already at that time a fair number of
leaders in the service of the Peking government
as well as of the Nationalist Party who had in-
vestigated Turkey's case against the capitula-
tions and the other limitations on Ottoman sov-
ereignty, and the successful methods by which
their repudiation was enforced.

Nor is it Russian influence that at length
induced the foremost leader of Indian national-
ism, Manhatma M. K. Gandhi, to undertake a
mission to China. "I do not believe I can con-
vince the Chinese that they should abandon force
as their best means of revolt from the tyranny
of western civilization," he said to me telling of
his plan. "But I can at least explain thoroughly
to them the means we have found successful in
India. I can at least speak to them as an Indian
to show them that ours is a common cause, and
that we should combine in the armory of our
rebellion all methods that now are working suc-
cessfully toward ultimate liberation of Asia for

the joint benefit of all the Asiatic peoples." No one who knows Asia can deny that the real spirit of such unprecedented happening is a wholly new conception of the comradeship and interdependence of peoples among Asiatic leaders themselves.

Chinese and Indian Differences and Sympathies

No collaboration of leadership, of course, will affect the deep-grained differences between India and China. There are no two neighboring nations more fundamentally contrasting in characteristics. China, material and sophisticated, accepts the world as it is, not looking beyond the visible sky for portents and wonders. She bears cheerfully the infinite pains of her physical existence, disciplined by common sense and dealing with a charmingly reasonable selfishness, while instead of growiug blasé as tolerant nations in the west have done, she preserves in art and daily life the highest development this world has known of the "joy of living." Rightly, one who knows her people best has called them "children of the sun." This will ever be China, and the freedom she demands is liberty to express these qualities through the necessarily-

changing material conditions of civilization. India, on the other hand, occultist where China is materialist, mystic where China is skeptic, intensely other-worldly, can never lose the qualities which its climate and race tragedies have ingrained into its people, high caste and low, Moslem and Brahmin. These opposing traits showed very strongly in the reaction to the poet Tagore's lectures in China and Japan in 1922. Yet such fundamental differences, being not at all militant, do not stand in the way of common sympathy and even collaboration in freeing both from the menace of an utterly inconsiderate West. "We have no interest," said Dr. Hu Shih, the young philosopher of Chinese nationalism, "in Mr. Gandhi's spiritual reformation. But we will be glad to talk with him about how to eliminate the white man's domination from Asia and humble his conceit."

The relationship between China and South Asia is already no mere figment of idealization. The Chinese merchant colonies throughout the Siamese and Burmese cities, connected with the homeland by close political ties which are almost entirely nationalist in character, furnish a medium of communication which provides China with constant and accurate news about India. In

the Straits Settlements, the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines the Chinese are not merely numerous and powerful, but it has been largely from funds they have provided that the nationalist movement got its start and has replenished its war-chest in times of prosperity and adversity alike. The great Chinese mercantile communities of Malaysia are Cantonese in blood and more nearly unanimously nationalist in sentiment than any other group of Chinese outside their own country. When you add, as in the Philippines, the descendants of mixed blood from the early Chinese immigrants—of whom Aguinaldo and Osmena, successive leaders of their nation, are outstanding examples—it is easy to understand the ferment of revolt the Chinese alone have silently spread and are as silently cultivating along the southeastern fringes of the Asiatic continent.

Comity Grows Between China and Japan

A speculation most interesting to westerners is that as to the extent to which fraternity is prospective between China and Japan. Chinese resentment against Japan's seizure of territory in Shantung and general attack on her integrity

between 1915 and 1919 has given the impression that hostile feelings there are ineradicable.

We shall be greatly misled if our Pacific Asian history stops with the anti-Japanese boycott. The exposition of Japan's new enlightened imperialism appears in the next chapter: here we but briefly present the Chinese side of the new relations. Japan's unequivocal return of Shantung properties in accordance with the Washington Conference agreement and her careful abstention, in face of considerable provocation, from intervention in Chinese affairs, have convinced the Chinese intelligentsia that she has really changed her policy. A good deal of the old prejudice hangs over among laborers and other uneducated elements and the leaders have some difficulty in holding back blind outbursts against the Japanese. But even these circles no longer regard Japan as the overwhelming menace, and with fear banished hatred does not last. As China's vast potentialities are transformed into national force, her ability to protect herself from Japan becomes so obvious that relationship goes back to the basis which obtained for a millennium and a half—when China had about as much fear of Japan as the United States now has of Canada. Meanwhile, high feeling against the

British, and concomitantly the whole white world, tends to arouse by induction a sense of brotherhood with the one nation which is racially and culturally akin.

Japan has not committed herself as has Russia in aiding China's rights-recovery movement. But she endeavored to seize the lead in liberal policy toward China at the tariff conference of 1926, and has since consistently refused to throw herself athwart the progress of that movement. It has become notorious that regardless of incidental injury to her immediate interests she will no more cooperate to perpetuate the white man's power in China.

And a step of overwhelming import impends in which Japan and China can and will ultimately unite, a protest against the social superiority of the white race. It is significant that the Nationalists of China have grasped this and owe a great part of the friendliness with which they are regarded by the Japanese to their insistence upon it.

It was no accident of propinquity that Sun Yat-sen always enjoyed a safe asylum in Japan, and was received there on the occasion of his last visit with demonstrations of wide-spread official and popular sympathy. His fame and the aid

of his party throughout Japan rested on a real appreciation that a cardinal point in the Nationalist creed has always been, to break the power of the white man in China. With this Japan instinctively sympathizes, for the time is seen not very distant when Japan will need a powerful ally in protesting against discrimination against her emigrants which is so general in the West, and which to Japanese self esteem is an ever vivid symbol of an alleged denial by the white race of racial equality to advanced Asiatics. China has been silent a long time on the question, but it can be said with assurance that when the Nationalists come to control the country their position toward the United States and toward the dominions of the British Empire which maintain immigration restrictions putting Asiatics in an inferior class to Europeans will be identical with that of Japan; and that ultimately, it may be added, India and the other Asiatic nations will perforce voice the same protest as part of a common insistence of self-respect in Asia.

Race Pride and Material Needs Draw Japan

Economic cooperation between China and Japan is growing and becomes moreover not

merely a bond of common interest but absolutely indispensable to Japan. Japan's economic structure is based on supplies she receives from the territory of China on the mainland, notably iron and steel, the soya beans and rice that constitute so large a part of her food imports, coal and other raw minerals, and beef which figures in her diet as never before. The carrying trade to and from Chinese ports is essential in keeping up her commercial fleet. The economic empire which brings the Japanese so much in the way of profitable investment, is mostly in China. China it also must be borne in mind, is the largest market for Japan's manufactures.

Japan has received favored tariff treatment on certain of her chief exports to China in the economic agreement concluded between the two nations, in return for her initiative in assent to removal of restriction upon customs dues and in hastening the termination of extraterritoriality in China. In other words, Japan, having definitely abandoned attempts to encroach by force, has made up her mind to secure corresponding and indispensable benefits by the only means by which they can be permanently guaranteed to her in China. The community of interest between

the two nations is thus firmer in fact and in prospect, than ever in recent history.

As the interests which have divided Japan and China tend to diminish, the interests which draw them together are bound to increase, and the ultimate solidarity of Asiatic sentiment will be enlisted against the white man's Eurocentric dogma of Asia's racial inferiority. China and Japan still have many causes for contention. They will have every inducement to sink their differences so long as the arrogant social attitude of the white man touches in each of them a kindred nerve on the race question.

Like other nations, the Asiatic peoples possess a capacity for egotism that may breed rivalries and promote war among them both before and after achieving freedom. Their apprehension of the unity of the revolt in which they are all engaged has, however, undergone a remarkable development within a few years. The growing acquaintance and mutual understanding which their movements of revolt have engendered are diffusing a singleness of spirit through the continent which every student of Asia should henceforth not fail to include in his calculations.

CHAPTER X

JAPAN IN THE NEW ASIA

THE pertinent fact concerning Japan and the new Asia is that the island kingdom sincerely—almost gladly—welcomes the rise to nationhood of the continental peoples, and shows every likelihood of maintaining a friendly attitude toward their development. Once again, she proves her capacity for survival through infinite adaptability to conditions.

Two failures, bitterly disappointing in themselves, have prepared the Japanese for the quiet role which they must accept as nations grow up to overshadow them in Asia. One, the most important, is their failure as a colonizing race. The other is the collapse of their brief adventure into military conquest.

Japan Fails as a Colonizer

It is generally admitted now, even by the discouraged officials of the Colonization Bureau,

that the Japanese lack the pioneering instinct. Descended from the restless, migrating Tatars, with perhaps an infusion of seafaring Indonesian blood, they have nevertheless remained in close quarters on their islands for so many centuries that they have quite lost the lure of the far-away. Instead, exists a passionate devotion to the "Land of the Gods"—so beautiful that even these divine ancestors left heaven in preference for the Plain of Yamato. From the dawn of their civilization in the sixth century A.D. until America trained guns on them from one side and Russia from the other in the nineteenth they had scarcely pioneered their own archipelago, the Loochoos, a few hundred miles to the south being to them still a place of fabulous creatures and Hokkaido to the north "the illimitable grass land."

Along with their national adaptability to new cultural influences exists a paradoxical individual inadaptability to new environment. They are people accustomed to having things "just so," and are very upset by the crudities of pioneer existence. They are the most literal-minded, rule-of-book people on earth. Such traits don't go with the conquest of wild regions. In addition to this drawback the Japanese appear to

suffer a very decided climatic limitation. Whereas the Chinese shows himself the most climatically adaptable of all peoples, flourishing equally well from frozen Siberia to equatorial Singapore, and the white man, though fairly limited to the temperate zones, does well at all altitudes, the Japanese show no desire to maintain themselves outside of a temperate climate or a sea-level atmosphere.

It comes to this: that among people of a superior standard of living, as in California, they will flourish, due to their thrift and sobriety. But among people of lower economic standard or in new country they make no headway.

Therefore the failure of Japanese colonial expansion in Asia.

Korea, after seventeen years of Japanese rule, during which every inducement was offered to the Japanese settler, contained 450,000 Japanese out of nineteen million population. The larger proportion of these are in government-subsidized enterprise. But Korea was a fully populated land before the Japanese took it. A better criterion is Manchuria, which was practically empty when Japanese penetration began. During twenty years of Japanese economic dominance and political favor 175,000 Japanese and fifteen

million Chinese settled in the rich "grain belt" of Asia. Japanese population actually diminished during the latter years. Formosa went into Japanese ownership in 1894, at which time the Chinese were pretty well slaughtered off the island. In 1927 it contained something like four million Chinese and four hundred thousand Japanese, and was then barely beginning to pay the costs of administration. Korea still cost the Japanese treasury over seven million dollars a year, and all the economic enterprises of Japan in Manchuria were only netting the backers some five million dollars a year. The Japanese were glad enough to leave the administration of Manchuria to a Chinese satrap, if they might but maintain their industrial enterprises and avoid the political "overhead." Even militarists, given the money, would now yearn but faintly for a military conquest that might lead to expense greater than any possible returns. Virtually abandoning effort at colonization in Asia, the Colonial Bureau confines its activities to experiments in South America.

Japan's Empire Fails to Pay

To note the lessons learned by Japan in the economic incidentals of military glory is an an-

swer to those who still impute to her a lust for imperialistic expansion. Expansion by conquest has not been any more encouraging to Japan than that by migration and pioneering. It is commonly said that they "got in the game too late." It does seem that they had as much right to provide themselves a place in the sun as Great Britain, America, or the other nations of the West which they emulated. But the ambitious and cock-sure scheme of the military clique to conquer China while the western world was engaged in fratricidal strife, and ultimately to use China's man and material power in a campaign of world conquest, all went bad. First of all, the call on China to turn over her sovereignty embodied in the "Twenty-one Demands" of 1915 could not be kept secret as intended, and was resented by America and the Allied Powers of the West. Then the Chinese students succeeded in bringing about the downfall of the Chinese governing clique which had at great pains and expense been established in Peking to do the Japanese War Office's bidding. The Chinese boycott convinced the Japanese industrial world that it was headed for loss instead of gain. The prospect of accomplishing in Siberia what had failed in China appeared with the collapse of

Russian power and the rise of the universally detested Soviet, and Japan joined with gusto in the American and Allied expedition along the Trans-Siberian. Pneumonia and Russian guerilla fighters decimated the Japanese ranks, the expense of the enterprise was crushing, and finally Japanese taxpayers forced withdrawal. American diplomacy and Chinese agitation forced the disgorgement of all that had been swallowed in Shantung. Japan's imperialistic experiment proved out a dismal failure.

Excellence in Civilization Remains Aim

The result is a remarkable change of thought in Japan, proving again that it is the most willing learner among the nations. Intellectual Japanese revised their concept of the destiny of their nation. It must still excel. But in cultural achievement, rather than material glory. They see every reason to believe in such a destiny. Japan is one of the youngest and most virile nations. Culturally, she has thus far been in the imitative stage of youth, copying first China and then the West. She is just entering upon the stage of original contribution. Japan is a small country visited

by calamities and unsupplied with the sinews of Power: coal, metals, excess of food and timber. Yet she is surrounded by three of the best supplied and largest populated countries of the earth, Russia, China and the United States. Under these circumstances men of Minoru Oka's type of mind see it fitting to advocate birth control and definitely to turn activities in the direction of art and science rather than wealth and power. Younger men like Tsurumi regard such policy as defeatist and advocate blind pushing out, assuring that the wall will give way somewhere. Still they are far from imperialist in the old sense.

With expansionism abandoned, intensive industrialism is taken up as the method of caring for Japan's large population and improving the standard of living. But this requires three things in addition to the working population: a source for raw materials, a market for finished products, and capital. Asiatic Russia and China can supply the raw materials, and China, Malaysia and India the chief markets, America, alone, is able to supply the capital necessary, for she is the world's banker. Upon the extent to which she is able to utilize these factors must depend Japan's future prosperity and contentment.

New Attitude to China

Japan was the first nation, after Russia, to consciously practise the "enlightened imperialism." It has constituted a complete right about face in Japanese policy. The first evidence of it—making a virtue of necessity—was in the return of the Shantung seizures in 1922. Russia had just declared her self-abnegating policy. Japan gave the suspicious Chinese no cause for complaint.

Since then she has been consistent. She willingly gave up her little exotic postal system in China. She withdrew her garrisons from unauthorized positions. She passed up many beautiful opportunities to intervene to protect her subjects or press reparations claims, and endured Chinese campaigns of hate in calm dignity. In the conference to consider tariff autonomy, summer of 1926, she endeavored to take the lead as the champion of China, and although she did not go so far as America, she demonstrated a determination to appear liberal and maintain the good will of the Chinese.

During the events of 1925 and '26 which led to China's "revolt" she remained uniformly sympathetic, declining to be involved in puni-

tive measures. Next after Russia she showed willingness to countenance the Nationalist movement. First of "old-line Powers" she made a treaty with China, recognizing the passing of alien tariff control, February 1927. Gradually Chinese and other Asiatics are becoming convinced of her change of front.

While, after the manner of the new imperialism, she is cultivating China and other Asiatic neighbors, Japan turns to America for the capital to make possible such inoffensive development.

Financial Crisis and American Aid

Her economic problem has a direct bearing on her relation to the new Asia.

A few figures supplied by help of Japanese officials and our United States State Department trade representative, Mr. A. Bland Calder will graph the situation. The excess of imports over exports averaged during four years, after 1920 between 200 and 250 million yen,¹ with but small improvement. The unfavorable balance

¹The Japanese yen, normally about a half dollar, U. S. gold held up to par through the war and dropped about 20% after the Tokio earthquake. Foreign confidence in Japan with exchange gambling quickly restored it, but the precariousness of its position is made evident above.

piles up to a threatening amount the first six months of each year, whereupon silk shipments to America cut it down to about half before the end of the fiscal period. If American women should cease to wear Japanese silk the unfavorable balance almost doubled, would bring the financial system of the nation dangerously near to collapse. Japan's attempt to meet this deficit out of cash wealth had the consequence that her gold reserve, three billion yen in 1920, was reduced by the end of the 1926 fiscal period to 1,365,000,000 yen, of which 222 million was held abroad, mostly in New York. A yearly drain of 200 million yen in such case left but six further years for the country to go—and then the deluge, according to pessimistic statesmen like Yuko Ozaki who, however, unless I misjudge the Japanese make-up, spoke to arouse his people to sounder economy rather than from any real conviction that the "Nation of the Gods" would go on the rocks. With the gold reserve hardly able to cover note issues in circulation, Japan's bonded indebtedness increased slightly. By 1926 it was 5,130,000,000 yen (less than one third foreign held), being 85.50 yen per capita—not a spectacular amount, but heavy enough for a half industrialized nation not feeding itself.

Gentlemen of the old school stormed over the amounts spent to clothe, feed, transport, and amuse the modern Japanese, and the Kenseikai Party government sponsored official retrenchments and "thrift weeks" for the public. It remained for Mr. Tokonomi, leader of the Seiyuhonto Party, to present the first positive program, to wit, a definite bid for large American capital to enter Japanese industry. "My first effort would be to remove every obstacle and annoying restriction to American investment," he told me. "Why is it that Americans run to put money in Europe, and even in China, and yet never seem to think of their neighbor, Japan? Of course they have never failed us on highly formal government loans. But what I would invite is steady investments in industrial stocks and regular purchase of small issues of provincial and municipal bonds. Do they feel our government is unstable, or our enterprises unprofitable?"

Misunderstandings Check American Aid

I made bold to reply it was probably neither but more likely a vague feeling that American activity in Japan is not welcome and, also the old scare of war between the countries. "You

know that the latter however deplorable is real," I reminded him, "from the clauses printed on certain Japanese bonds, stating bluntly that they are not annulable in the event of war. That must have been done to reassure American investors."

"Yes," he flared, "and that is one of the most assinine things we Japanese have done. But I take it the first feeling to which you alluded can be overcome by advertising, and that the second is on the wane. I am not the official voice, but I can say for my nation as well as my party: 'We openly confess that we need foreign capital to complete our transformation into an industrial nation, and unreservedly invite Americans to supply our needs, both for private and government enterprise. If we are not afraid of American economic influence or control (such as Europe begins to complain about) you ought not to be afraid of Japanese repudiation. And every American dollar put here will make the likelihood of war more remote. Was it not British investment in the economic development of America that during the last half of the nineteenth century, finally quieted the war talk once popular between those neighbors? A banker is supposed to have a certain publicpopular responsibility, apart from his private preferences.

America has made herself the World's Banker. Now we approach the banker—not as a government, but as a going concern, as a nation. Where security is sufficient, it is as honorable—and as important to business—to borrow as to lend.' ”

Japan sees only one way out, and that is an industrialization dependent upon investment from America, and turning to Asia for raw materials. American failure to meet Japan's financial needs must drive her more into the arms of Russia. In this coming “Era of the Pacific,” America greatly needs a friendly Japan that stands upon its own feet. It is the feeling of progressive leaders that the creation of such a Japan lies within the power of American capital.

American industrial investment has made a beginning in hydro-electric development. As to the effect of its extension on the general relations of the two countries, it would seem that every dollar sent to aid industrialization there contributes first to removing the economic pressure within the islands, commonly regarded as the root of the “Japanese menace,” and secondly for all following time to make the peace of the Pacific more secure.

This is America's God-given opportunity, not to make one of the Asiatic nations its economic

vassal or even special friend but to demonstrate the practical expression which America's enlightened imperialism is prepared to take toward all Asia. For Japan will not be divorced from Asia. It can not be made into an outpost of the West in Asia, as Commodore Biddle proposed in 1843. As Continental Asia rises to political dignity and higher standards of living the cultural antipathy manifest during the past thirty years is fast disappearing. Chinese visit Tokyo to attend an exhibition of old Chinese paintings. Chinese and Japanese Chamber of Commerce delegations exchange visits. Japan puts on a commercial exhibition in Turkey and seeks concessions for its plutocracy in Persia and Siberia. She lavishly entertains Siamese princes, and shows in all her public schools the Indian-made film of the Buddha story, "Light of Asia." Politically, she takes great care not to offend China, goes cautiously in Manchuria, and exercises great restraint in controversies with Russia.

Japan, Ever Asiatic, to Link West as Friend

Her group alignment of the future is most tellingly indicated by her attitude on the old "concert of Powers" policy toward China. She has abundantly demonstrated her resolve that

regardless of how her own interests suffer in that country she will do nothing which will in any way perpetuate the domination of the white man in Asia. She feels that in the past she has played their game, and they have played her for a fool. She has turned from her old hope of association with the Anglo-Saxon Powers, feeling keenly Great Britain's readiness to drop her in order to preserve what is now a more important friendship with America and the dominions, and convinced, in Viscount Shibusawa's words, that "our neighbor across the Pacific has recently shown in her attitude toward Japan that she is not over-eager for the friendly relations we desire." As decisively as Russia, although cautiously and quietly, she has aligned herself with the new Asia. Her growing neighbors are powerful and near, she is highly dependent upon them, and she has deep cultural sympathies as well as common social cause with them. These facts must overcome local rivalries and boundary disputes.

America's line of action lies not in trying to break that alignment, but in assisting Japan to enter it as an independent upstanding nation, able to moderate its tendencies rather than be controlled by them. She will ever be keenly awake to currents from this side the Pacific.

For Japan is more responsive to the spirit of the times than any other nation. In the absence of capital and minerals and the difficulties of an isolated position, this responsiveness will preserve her. In the new era it will be a greater asset for preservation to any nation than armies and navies and resources. Due to it America may find what she will in Japan, the product of her policy.

When the world went militaristic, Japan rattled the sword too. When limitation of armaments is the spirit of the times she responds the most willingly of any Power. She has been the first nation after Russia to attune her natural urge to glory to the note of the new age. She is being followed, with now and then a discordant lapse, by Great Britain. Can America show adaptability? Can she lead in what is really the international extension of her own ideals, or will she, hardened by consciousness of her power, launch upon the last great imperialist venture of the Western peoples?

CHAPTER XI

THE CULTURAL REVOLT

THAT Asia's political revolt is certain of success, we hardly question after our survey of the situation and the history of its development. But there is in Asia an even more fundamental phase of the revolt than the political; one which will continue to affect mankind after empires, nations, alliances and other political entities of the present age have passed into limbo.

It is the conflict over ideals of existence now, for the first time in man's history, entered into consciously by both halves of the world. Affecting to the very depth man's way of living, it deserves more thought than even national aspirations, or struggles for and against equal social recognition which, viewed from Mars, must appear egotistically puerile after all. But since this book is written for us who give more time to porridge than to poetry, it must have but one chapter.

Three Expressions of Revolt

Three expressions of cultural revolt are evident in contemporary Asia. There is the out and out rebellion against Western materialism and "machine" civilization. It could exist in unadulterated form only in the Indian holy man, and finds its best expression in the Mahatma, and the Swarajists inspired by him, who would tear up every mile of railroad and stop every machine in India. Secondly there are those mostly to be found in Japan, China, Siam, Burma, and the Philippines, who see much in western life to adopt, but resent having it forced upon them *in toto*. They would ask to be given their own time and choice. Then there are the egoistic, ambitious young modernists of China, Turkey, India, Japan and elsewhere who are thoroughly converted to scientific materialist society, despise the old ideals, and would out-West the West, but who turbulently oppose any ascendancy of the Westerner through profiting by the fact "he happened to get the idea first."

Gandhi Champions the Old Culture

The Swaraj (self-rule) movement in India, led by the unique personality of the age, M. K.

Gandhi, is sincerely against the adulation of material success, of industrialism or capitalism, against centralization and standardization in thought and in things, against science concerned rather with material achievement than with application thereof to spiritual betterment of humanity, and against the idea that all things in nature exist for exploitation by man and application to his comfort. It is recognized that many Westerners hold similarly antagonistic views, just as many Asiatics are devotees of western tendencies, but these are regarded as the distinguishing characteristics of Euro-American civilization.

It is championship of his culture which underlies Gandhi's uncompromising opposition to British rule in India. He was whirling his spinning wheel (emblem both of the break down of caste—for with it even the Brahmin is to spin his own sacred cord—and of the battle of native industry against machine production) when I saw him. "Do you always spin during your hour for interviews?" I asked. "Yes," was the kindly ironic reply, "by so doing I can always feel that my time is not entirely lost. Besides, with my hands engaged so actively, is there not less danger I shall use them on someone?" I grasped the

implication of his humor—the relation between industry and non-violence in Swaraj.

“Is your attitude modifying,” I asked “along with the development of liberalism in the British rule? Are you satisfied with their program for gradual introduction of parliamentary government?”

I was astonished at the vehemence of this saintly-mannered man’s reply. He stopped spinning, his long pointed jaw set and his flaring, alert ears framed a very earnest face. “The British measures are entirely beside the point. My fight is not a matter of personalities—or even races. I have no interest in substituting the tyranny of a Babu (English-educated professional) parliament for that of a British secretariat. Both are noxious to our culture. If the British would accept our viewpoint, stay on our terms, I for one should be glad to keep them to govern us. But we cannot allow them to tear down our culture. Their parliamentary scheme promises no abatement of that tendency. Therefore I must go through with my program, even to the strategy of Mass Civil Disobedience.

“The ground was prepared for it several years ago through our preliminary non-cooperation campaign. Then the riots in the Chauri Chaura

tea fields occurred. Human nature couldn't hold in any longer. But violence is against the whole spirit of my movement—would betray and ruin it. So I had to suspend the whole program. The British government followed up my retreat by imprisoning me. For two years I was in jail, for three more I have kept in retirement. Now I go out to carry the program through to victory.

“Every injustice in history has been got rid of through mass disobedience, although historians, obsessed with the theory that it is violent force which makes destiny, have overlooked this greater force, save in the case of religious movements.

“For success in this method there are two requisites: the casting off of fear, and cooperation. More powerful minorities always rule through fear. If fear is cast off, where is their power? Overcoming fear is the key to victory, and the only way to cast out fear is through religious conviction. And, what good is national self-rule if a man have not individual self-rule? If a man cannot rule himself it is proper that he should be ruled. That is why I have gone deeper than political reform into spiritual reform. By religious or spiritual conviction I don't mean blind

faith in a ceremony or a cross or a Virgin Mary or a creed. I mean apprehension of the fact that I shall always live as truly as I live now, and that I can better my condition."

"Of course, with cooperation, any method would succeed," I ventured.

"Yes. The British say, 'show me your organization and we will turn over affairs.' So I cannot find it in my heart to hate any single Englishman, or even the British government."

"Your fight is not so much against the British Raj as against disunity among your own people?"

"Yes. But there is this: the British government fosters things, half unconsciously, which are sapping our strength. We cannot let that go on or we are lost. The land is being drained—we are being made economically helpless. British rule promotes love of, and dependence upon, Western civilization."

"Adoption of Western civilization might be the quickest way to rid yourselves of the West. Japan decided so, and now China," I suggested.

"I have just been trying to tell you," the Mahatma replied patiently, "that Westernism is a more dreaded tyrant than Westerners. In addition to my belief that it is a great delusion,

leading its devotees to destruction, I have the feeling that my people are not so well equipped as even you, to survive under it.

“Government must be secondary to culture. We must have government which will permit that our culture and way of life be paramount, that we take up our ancient handicrafts again, spin and weave and make useful and beautiful things with our hands, and that we shall stop the stench and smoke of modern industrialism that is creeping over our country before it robs us of our souls as it has done in your country. The false teaching that life consists of the multitude of possessions, or comforts, or thrills, or even achievements which a man can attain, must not have the prestige of backing by a ruling class. Let the British tear up their railroads and dismantle their factories, send their armies home and stop their system of Western education in India and above all, cease draining this country economically to feed England, then they will be welcome to stay and govern in India, for they are just judges and efficient administrators.”

“You don’t expect them to meet such terms?”

“No,” he replied sadly, “they will as likely remain English as we Indian. That is, until the great awakening comes in the West.”

"For you are headed for terrific catastrophe and misery." His voice became low and his brow furrowed. "You are wonderful people, too. You do not lack the spirit of sacrifice, the ability to forego the things of the body. Look at your North Pole adventurers—your Mount Everest climbers. Why can you not be as willing to give up bodily luxury for the sake of spiritual adventures? There is a wistfulness—a longing,—a spiritual hunger, among you American people in particular today. But no practice. Why don't you practise?"

"Perhaps, Mahatma, we don't know what to practise," I suggested. His mobile lips curled the slightest bit.

"You want to see the whole way before taking the first step. You want your spiritual undertaking insured against loss. You want to eat your cake and have it too. You will remain hungry. . . . There is no one of you but has some ideal higher than his practice—some ideal involving sacrifice. Start to work it. Spiritual growth will come, step by step. It is not a matter of creed. Any religion will start you off if you *work* it. I despise a civilization concerned only with the things of the body. I pity those of you who are being led into bitterness and des-

pair by your illusions as to what is worth while in life.

"You glory in speed, thinking not of the goal. You elevate process, rather than ultimate product. You think your souls are saved because you can invent radio. Of what elevation to man is a method of broadcasting when you have only drivel to send out? What mark of civilization is it to be able to produce a one hundred twenty page newspaper in one night when most of it is either banal or actually vicious and not two columns of it are worth preserving? What contribution to man has aeronautics made which can overbalance its use in his self-destruction? You are children playing with razors.

"You have cut yourselves badly already. Europe's frenzy for reading prophecies of its own destruction shows how badly you have been hurt. I have read your German professor's "Decline of the West," your French debater's "Twilight of the White Races" with great sadness and warning. America still seems self-confident: next time it will be America that will suffer and when she has cut herself as badly as Europe she will be in the same state of mind.

"Such of you as survive will come back to Asia for another way of life. You are already com-

ing: Count Keyserling from Germany, Romain Rolland from France, many less eloquent from England and America. If I should now allow the West in its boyishly confident rowdyism utterly to crush out our opposing system of life and ideals through political power and material influence, would I not be playing traitor not only to my own people but to you very Westerners as well?"

Here, unadulterated, is the Cultural Revolt. It is found in the same spirit elsewhere than in India: in China, even in Japan. "Progress, is a siren that infatuates men until their virility is lost. By ignoring her lure the vitality of the race is preserved," said a modern Chinese old in philosophy, yet young in years and alert. Szu Kung-tu, eighth century poet, expressed the secret of the immortality of the Chinese nation:

Violent expenditure of energy leads to decay;
Spiritual existence conduces to fullness of life.

He has many disciples, even in the age when the "Christian General" in this ancient China paints on the long Summer Palace wall: "Motion Is the Beginning of Progress. Keep on the Jump!"

"You call me a hopeless visionary," said

Gandhi. "Some of you, willing to be more kind, simply say I'm insane. You are very wise. So, doubtless, said our ancestors of the first patriarch who rose up and suggested the elimination of cannibalism. 'The human race has always eaten human flesh. It always will.' You say, 'the human race has always relied upon physical force. It always will.' It is said of moral reform of every kind. The human mind *can* be changed, if you but have patience. Moral force *can* be substituted for violence. I can wait—fifteen years, one hundred fifty, four hundred, are the same to the man of the spirit."

"But in the case of cannibalism was it not economic rather than moral arguments that brought reform—or with slavery?" I asked.

He came near bristling for a saint. "You Westerners are always trying to separate the political from the religious, the practical from the moral. There is no distinction. All things affecting man's welfare are religious. What but a moral factor is an economic factor? What is a moral factor?—Just a consensus of opinion. What difference if it come about through economic, or religious, or humane or any other conviction?"

What we call modern influences seem con-

sciously repelled by Gandhi's genius, but his campaign on the subject of caste seems Western to orthodox Hindus. He concentrates against the interdict of the "untouchables," the outcastes, which all the other castes could most easily agree to maintain. It was a refreshing shock to many when Hari, son of the intensely scrupulous Rajah Sir Pratap Singh, proclaimed on ascending the throne of Kashmir that thenceforth every caste and creed might meet reception at his court. It was a good start toward convincing his subjects and the world that the wild young "Mr. A." had come to discretion.

Modernity Has Its Part in India

Mr. Gandhi looks to this movement, for establishing a sentimental and moral unity which he holds indispensable to worthwhile independence. It gains ground by help of every western influence and widely affects the status of woman. The lines of caste are no longer so rigidly applied to marriage, with the result according to some pessimists, that money considerations are replacing social considerations. However, a recent action showed that it is still ground for a libel suit to "broadcast" that one has married his daughter to a mixed-caste man.

The feminist movement in India involves women's associations, female participation in the medical, legal and other professions, and a bold beginning in athletics. Many of the high class Hindu women have only got so far as substituting blue glass for curtains in their limousines, but a number of the young princes bring their women unveiled to public functions—a thing that would have sent shivers down the back of Jehangir. Mrs. Annie Besant has probably done more for women than for Theosophy in India. Girl's schools are numerous. "Youth weeks" are held throughout the country, involving programs of amusement, amateur theatricals, and heavy debate, such as one at Ahmedabad in which Lady Slade, daughter of an English Admiral, and disciple of Gandhi, argued for the old Indian feminine ideal of service and her Indian opponent for full "emancipation." Indian women are naturally more timid than Burmans but it was only lately one of the latter gained admission to the bar.

It would not do to suppose that Gandhi's influence will ever be so great as to close the country to adoption of western ideas. Too many are there of contrary conviction who will insist on being heard. The aged poet Tagore is all the

more credited for having participated in the spirit of both civilizations. In a contrasted sphere, that of heavy industry, the Tata Brothers Iron Company is a conspicuous success. Other examples of like talent exist and will exist, and in a future where compromise and non-uniformity will obtain as always, they will find their use.

Action Replaces Fatalism in Gandhi's Teaching

If Gandhi turns to the past, it is with a new spirit which is a distinctly Western contribution to Hinduism. Some might call it Christian, some Greek. In looking for salvation to his type of East a disillusioned Europe is not merely going into the quietist pessimism of decadence. "The conviction that I shall always live, and that I can better my condition," sums his personal philosophy. He is otherworldly, yet not, like his Hindu congeners, entirely for the next life. "The next life," he elaborates, "cannot progress beyond the goal we set for this. I preach salvation through service, worship through action. Interpreted thus, Hindu civilization is the greatest influence in the world for the improvement of the life cycle. I cannot have it destroyed."

Gandhi sees the country population of India being drawn into cities where they work under

insanitary conditions and at spiritually dwarfing tasks. On the other hand, the peasants, compelled by the climate to suspend cultivation one third of each year, are losing the incentive to improve that time in home industries through machine competition. There is resultant decadence of manual skill and moral tone. The transformation of such a society to a well balanced industrial basis would indeed be difficult. It would involve decades of painful effort and might perhaps be impossible while saving the spiritual values which he esteems highest, and would save at any cost. Perhaps the electrification of homes and the distribution of manual and machine piece-work such as Henry Ford has begun to introduce on a small scale might be a solution. But the electrification of Indian villages and homes seems a farther vision than the return to the primitive, advocated by Gandhi.

There are many prophets in the world today—mostly of gloom. But, after reflecting upon what his ideals mean, one is inclined to say that this delicately framed Indian,—unhandsome as Socrates,—son of a Maharajah's Prime Minister, graduate of Oxford, wealthy barrister of South Africa, then naked peasant and saint—is its only seer.

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Imitation Without Humiliation

From the idealism coming out of India we must turn to the second expression of cultural revolt, to be found in Asia, that of the moderate leaders who do not oppose Western culture on philosophic grounds, but object to having it forced upon their people before they can decide how best to build it into their old societies. The "practical" elements among them in China, Japan, Burma and the Philippines have been driven to the extremity of taking up the ideas of the West as rapidly as possible in order to withstand its "push." They do so in desperation, half-knowing that by the time they have overcome the Westerner—checked his penetration—the Westerner's culture will have overcome them. Yet they hope for survival of some of the old ideals to modify the national, industrial and material society they shall have been forced to create in order to resist complete mastery by the white man.

A telling example of this attitude is given by Felix Morley of the *Baltimore Sun* in his excellent survey published under the title "Our Far Eastern Assignment." He quotes first from the journal of the *American Chamber of Com-*

merce in the Philippines: "Let Congress . . . give us an actual unquestioned form of territorial government with a Governor—preferably from the western part of the United States . . . who can look at a mountain and tear its guts out for the mineral it contains."

"The unforgiveable crime of the Filipinos," comments Morley, "from this American business viewpoint, is that they have not the faintest desire to see the 'guts' torn out of their mountains, their forests or their fields in order to please our Babbits. Indeed, a fear of this ruthless, efficient, 'gut-tearing' civilization is shadowing the lives of the Filipinos and greatly contributing to the strength of the independence campaign among the educated races." The National Advisory Commission of the Independence movement is endeavoring to meet it by more considerate Philippine efforts toward economic development. In concluding, Morley says: "A Filipino doctor said to me one night as the Southern Cross gleamed over one of those menaced mountains:

"We have seen how the red Indians, the Hawaiians, and the South Sea Islanders have successively succumbed to the pressure of your business, the iron march of your industrialism. For you the Philippine question is answerable in

terms of more dollars and more national power. For us it is a matter of life and death.

“‘We are the weaker race. We do not claim that our civilization is as efficient as yours, but we do claim that American business has no right to mold our future regardless of all the conditions of our happiness, treating your pledges of the past like scraps of paper. That is why every educated Filipino supports those leaders to whom Americans like to refer slightly as our “politicians.” That is why I gladly donate ten per cent of my small salary to help maintain our Independence Mission in the United States.’”

This is what Burmese would say to the British; Chinese to exploiters of all nationalities, and many Japanese to their own Shibusawas.¹

“All Things Old Are Over Old”

Lastly we have Asia’s “modernists,” thoroughly converted to the West’s viewpoint, but refusing to allow the Westerner any preeminence in virtue of having been the one to promulgate the new ideas among them. In fact, they

¹ “The most pleasant landscape I know,” this “Westernized” Asiatic is quoted as saying some years ago, “is a forest of belching smokestacks.” He has since modified his attitude.

regard themselves as equipped to leap ahead of him in his own race.

Through appealing to the ignorant masses, estranged by poverty from all ideals past and present, young protagonists of this attitude have assured themselves leadership. They are the same group which is so cleverly engineering the political Revolt.

As a reply to the physical force of the West, the attitude appeals to all. A Mr. L. Yung, writing in a Tokyo paper in protest to a Westerner's criticisms said "Whether the world likes to believe it or not, the common decency and respect that should animate the peoples of the world is today only being extended to China because she is following out the principle of 'the villainy you teach me I will execute.'" So there is no place in the Nationalist movement for the Old Chinese pacifism. The soldier is elevated from outcast to hero, a mainstay against the irksome foreign domination.

General Feng Yu-Hsiang was first Methodist, and then "Russian" agnostic in his opposition to Confucian quietism. Posters still surviving where his armies have passed, proclaim his devotion to a new national idealism. "Die for Your Country," "Search Your Manhood—Be Masters of

Your Own," stare boldly on blank walls. A stab at the Confucian personal foibles is hid in "Pompousness Beyond Social Worth is the Pose of a Donkey."

But New China would not only scrap "unequal treaties. All customs and beliefs not supported by experiment are to go. Tradition is not to be followed, and Confucianism goes into the discard along with Christianity.

The principle of personal loyalty to patron and family, which has been the cement of Chinese society, must make way for loyalty to party creed, for patriotism and nationalism. When the Christian General Feng betrayed his superior, Marshal Wu Pei-fu, and threw his patron, President Tsao, out of the "Shadow-Pavilion," the Chinese White House, all old China held up hands in horror. But the new foreign educated leaders said: "He's right. If a man is in the way of the movement, throw him out, regardless of personal obligation."

They thus justify their attitude toward the missionaries who educated them. "Surely they will not forget our return of the Boxer indemnity and our many acts of friendship!" a member of the House Foreign Relations Committee exclaimed to me at a hearing at Washington.

But they will certainly not remember, if they feel that would trammel their program.

There is more social experimentation going on in China today, with more real serious thought about it, than in any other country on earth. Shall the new generation uphold the old ideals, adopt wholly the western ways, try to combine the two, or scrap both in an effort to create a new society based solely upon reason?

Old Conventions Attacked

Conventions dating to Confucius are in turmoil. The young of both sexes condemn the dignified old Chinese polygamy on ground of its inequality and servitude. They rebel against clan control and family communism. The old group responsibility of clan, guild and peasant commune, which has stabilized Chinese society and kept the peace even in absence of formal government, clashes on one hand with individualism and on the other with nationalism, in the new generation.

Family-arranged marriages promise to become as extinct as the pigtail. "Love marriages" through individual choice are contracted, and cards frequently come announcing trial mar-

riages, called the "Bertrand Russell Marriage," since that British social revolutionist spent two years in China advocating his views. Daughters of families with 3,000 years of genealogy go alone to the movies and parade in the marvellous parks, once imperial grounds, in Peking.

Most regretted by those who have loved the old Chinese ideals is the passing of the traditional courtesy and respect. This was based on the Confucian doctrine of the inherent dignity of man, whether coolie or mandarin. The new philosophy inculcates respect to fellowman only insofar as he is of value to the cause and prejudices of the onlooker.

From Monastery to Army

That is the mentality we meet more and more throughout awakened Asia. In Siam, for instance, pacifist Buddhism drafts all young men into monasteries for at least three months experience as priests, during which they are taught non-resistance and told the taking of life is an unforgivable sin. Then the novices are compelled to turn from the monastery directly to the army for eighteen months military training. In Turkey, the Sultan, heritor of the prophet's man-

tle, was in the way of nationalism. Sultan and Caliphate had to go. This is the spirit of the Moslem world from Algiers to Teheran.

"We are more modern than you Westerners," said a student of St. John's (a mission college) to me in Shanghai. "We are freed from all superstition, while you still have your religious-mindedness, your worship of wealth and your race prejudices. But we are getting our thought not from Russia, as you so loosely accuse us, but from a gentle, carelessly-clothed American called John Dewey, known only to intellectual circles in his own country, but to every schoolboy over here."

I talked this over with Dr. Hu Shih, thirty-eight-year-old "father of the Chinese renaissance," establisher of the new literature in the language of the people and intellectual leader of the Chinese Nationalists, as we crossed from London to New York.

How Dewey Leads the Chinese

"We are thinking," he said, "in terms of the greatest contribution to philosophical thought since Aristotle, which most of you Americans do not know is coming from your own country and

age. It is the work of the pragmatic school, from William James to the greatest teacher of mankind today—Dr. John Dewey of Columbia University.”

Dewey’s thought, as the new Asiatic intelligentsia understand it, is briefly that no system of reasoning or religion pretending to explain or chart out life is of any value whatever, but that the results of experiment alone can constitute a rule of action. Only that which is demonstrated to be beneficial can be accepted as a guide. Chinese call the philosophy “materialistic experimentalism.”

“We have attained the true scientific mind,” remarked one. “That is easier for us than for you because we have never been so religious.”

The most drastic cultural change we have brought about in Asia is the conversion of its races to nationalism. That, recalling what Europe has suffered from it, may be considered as having served them—and the world—ill enough. The Asian peoples now wait, a bit defiantly, to see whether they are to be driven into militarism. Should we force matters to that extremity, even through upholding rights regarded legal, we will have filled up the cup of the world’s misery.

CHAPTER XII

THE REVOLT AND CHRISTIANITY

How does this materialism from the West affect Christian propaganda, likewise from the West? The attitude held by Nationalist political leaders on the subject was summed up for me as follows by Dr. Wang Ching-hui, president of their party organization:

“Christianity is to stop right now, so far as it is the wedge of foreign influence driven into our country by foreign money and organization, controlled by foreign personnel and backed by foreign guns. Christianity will have the same opportunity in our new China as, say, Buddhism in your America, so far as it is a teaching relying purely on intellectual and spiritual conviction. Although I and most of my associates are scientific agnostics, we will see that it has full protection, but it must start all over again on this new basis.”

Chinese leaders do not so much object to the Ford cars, modern plumbing and button-down-

the-front trousers which missionaries have spread along with the Christian gospel. But they highly resent the influence foreign nations have exercised over Chinese officials and populace through their missionaries, the repeated infringements of the Powers on Chinese sovereignty "to protect the missionaries" and the sectarianism which the missions have tried to carry over into China.

If Dr. Wang meant a reception for Buddhism such as most Americans like to think it would receive here—acceptance by individuals and associations, tolerant rejection by the mass, the anticipation would be comparatively pleasant to the agnostic leaders. And although it would mean the end of church society visions of a "China won for Christ in this generation," it would leave a door of activity open to Westerners who would still obey Christ's parting injunction to spread his Gospel to all the world.

Meanwhile the spirit of revolt against foreign domination swings into the Christian organizations built by missionaries themselves. Anti-foreign politics is paralleled in a demand for native autonomy in the churches, sometimes embodied concretely in a way to "make the judicious grieve" among foreign workers. As stated by the Rev. A. K. Reischauer of the Presbyterian

Board, the proposal is "If missionaries are to have any voice in the management of these institutions which they founded (hospitals, schools) and which are still dependent upon funds from Mission Boards in the west, they are to have such a voice only as given to them by the Chinese Church. Missions as such are to cease functioning and merely missionaries as individuals are to have a place in this work, and this place is to be in and under the Chinese Church."

Both Catholics and Protestants see clearly that a main reason why Christianity failed to persist in China, after occasional introductions during over a millennium past, was that it was too bound by foreign associations to become an expression of native Chinese faith.

Oriental Undertake Modern Religious Leadership

Nationalist extremists and agnostics easily become prejudiced against creeds that transcend national sentiment and not only pass from land to land, but keep liaison between the citizens of one nation and another, in their organization. Such feeling has led to formation of nationalist churches, east and west, before now. Recall the "Philippine Catholic Church." It leads to em-

phasizing creeds that are national, as Shintoism, in Japan. Without decrying the incidental accent placed upon some real moral values, other idealists would still insist that there is less danger in national connections, than in sentimental chauvinism. An odd development of quasi-religious import is the tone of almost mystic reverence which has come to surround the ceremonies that celebrate the birthday of Sun Yat-sen—quite in contrast to the exuberancy upon the birthday of the Republic. His great mausoleum at Nanking is respected by northern foes as well as by southern allies. We may see here the incipience of a process that in an earlier age would lead to his apotheosis. New religions may yet arise and old ones have new birth, in the East.

As there is a resentment of our claim to a "copyright" on material civilization, so there is a growing denial of our proprietorship over Christianity.

The Independent Chinese Christian Church, strongest in Canton, but found north to Mukden, repudiates reliance on white teachers and is responsible only to its native leaders. It sends out its own missionaries to Yunnan and other far regions, and in this is encouraged by the foreign Christian organizations.

"Why," asked Mahatma Gandhi of India when I visited his headquarters, "should you self-styled whites get it into your heads that Christianity is your special largesse to distribute and interpret? You have made a mess of it yourselves. As a matter of fact, Christ was originally Asiatic, as were all founders of religions, and I think we understand Him much better than you do. We would have thanked you for bringing His gospel before us had you not mingled it so much with your Western culture, dress and machinery. We will go on and present the true Christ to India."

Gandhi has ordered the New Testament read in all Swaraj schools, for which he is being roundly condemned by old Brahmins in the Indian press.

Some progressive Buddhists are equally liberal. The venerable Lord Abbot of Zojo in Japan said in a published interview "It is a good thing for all leaders of various religions to meet often and discuss. The oftener the better." He supports the Shukyo Konwakei—an organization for Buddhist-Shinto-Christian friendship.

At the contact of modern life and Christianity native thought undergoes changes, and leaders of Buddhism in Japan hope to present

it as an edifying subject for study for men of the new age, not only to Japanese, but to westerners. External changes come with facility: Young Men's and Young Women's Buddhist Associations are prominent in Japan; Buddhist church and conference organizations have been created, and also Sunday schools, in which youngsters lustily carol what sound like good Methodist hymns—but with "Buddha" instead of "Jesus" in the chorus.

I found a new "Red Swastika Society" taking the place of the "Red Cross" in China. On its roll of patrons were prominent Chinese Christians of official, diplomatic, military and industrial circles. Turkey has her "Red Crescent" organization, with similar philanthropic objects. The possibility of anything officially related to the whole people bearing the emblem of a foreign religion is thus guarded.

The Sectaries of Irreligion

In addition to a general feeling which is more anti-foreign than anti-Christian, there exists a definite, but as yet small, anti-religious movement affiliated with that in Russia, and represented in the spirit of the young social innovators at

Canton whose personal rejection of religion has been mentioned. At its head in China is Dr. Tsai Yuan-pei, chancellor of the National University, venerated for his learning, and suspect because of yielding to Russian influences. Its strength makes the future of all religions a question. For the "Red" liberal as seen in Russia has what is apparently a religion of irreligion, still victim to the fallacy "I am right, you are wrong, therefore you must conform." It opposes in China both the ancient national tolerance, based on indifference to mystical exactitudes and that other tolerance, the flower of western liberalism, which aims at full freedom to the expression of popular culture through churches which define nothing as to the unity of states and through political organizations that define nothing as to the unity between churches,—complete separation of state and religious sanctions, yet both bent to the common welfare by one people.

There is anti-religion where "Red" Russia is heard. The peoples of South Asia, who were shown the way by Turkey when she expropriated mission properties and brought Christian institutions under rigid governmental control, are swinging into line behind the leadership of China. Characteristic incidents illustrate the spirit of

the ebullient students. They break up the Christmas service by crowding in with jeering talk, and destroy hymnbooks and Bibles. A Christian college is forced by strike methods to reinstate without trial an employee ousted on ground of theft, to agree to a guild visa upon all such actions in the future,—and to pay for the firecrackers with which the new order is celebrated.

Religion Once Excuse for Taking Liberties

Anti-Christian phases of the Revolt have a back ground of bitter experience. To go no farther back than 1860 in China, French zealots, drawing up the Chinese translation of the treaty of peace between the two nations, inserted a provision allowing missionaries to buy land in every part of the country. By “most favored nation” status, other countries at once benefited by that. Later in 1899, Peking was induced to issue a decree giving Roman bishops a parity with viceroys in court standing and prestige. The Protestants wisely recoiled from this new extreme, but that, together with the demand that commercial representatives be given the privileges all through the country which had been ceded to missionaries be-

fore, aroused a national determination to "draw the line" which brought the Boxer trouble.

It is a bit amusing to follow, the account of how the brave Rev. Samuel House, pioneer medical missionary in Siam, walked in as a sight-seer in 1849 among the Buddhists kneeling in adoration about the "footprint of Buddha," and was ejected and about to be mobbed while explaining why he could not remove his hat in such a place,—until saved by a friendly priest—and then his naïve satisfaction a couple of decades later at the changes which enabled him to do the same thing and encounter no protest.

The most modern missionaries have not shown uniform fitness to represent the western liberal ideal at its best. Sentiment in China took a distinct turn against Christianity when a college built with Boxer indemnity funds conceded by America, and hence a secular institution, was closed while its plant was turned over to the International Student Volunteer Convention led by Dr. John R. Mott. Had an association of any other religion or of agnostics asked for its use they would have been refused, maintained the anti-Christian students, and only the evident political influence of the Christian churches with the American and Chinese governments could

have got this unusual favor, which they noisily deprecated.

Christian leaders see a hand writing on the wall. They study means to cooperate in hastening the inevitable naturalization of Christianity, without sacrifice of its deeper spiritual values. In that is good hope of its survival. The Roman Church deliberately speeds the promotion of Chinese ecclesiastics. Indigenous Christianity has broad-minded leaders such as Dr. T. T. Lew, and devout supporters among the new intelligentsia and rising industrial plutocracy who will carry it through the temporary wave of feeling.

Chinese Aim to Dominate Foreign Foundations

Foreign philanthropic and educational enterprises in China are equally affected. Such non-religious undertakings as the China Medical Board, which assists many hospitals and schools and finances the Peking Union Medical Hospital, prepare wisely by virtually pushing their administration into Chinese hands. The superintendent of this "most expensive hospital in the world"¹ is now a Chinese doctor. The trend toward native control in professional circles comes with much less pain than in political, re-

ligious, or even educational. Educational institutions of no pronounced religious constitution swing more easily into line, though officials of interior-provincial outlook incline to extreme regulations—witness the difficulties of Yale-in-China. Mission colleges and schools face the greater trouble. They have submitted with more or less grace to “registration” which is a preliminary to control of their curricula by educational officials. This involves dropping of religious training from the list of required subjects. Student protest even more than official pressure, compelled it. This policy now under way in China, was established by Siam, Japan, and other nations long ago, and was enforced by Japan in Korea as a reaction against American missionary encouragement of the Korean nationalist movement.

Educational regulations of the Canton authorities in their promotion of Nationalist schools are in evident parallel to those issued in 1898 in Japan, tacit homage to a foreign if oriental pioneer. But it is safe to say that in none of the new schools will the “three sacred principles” of Dr. Sun be forgotten, “Unity of China, end of foreign impositions, industrialism made servant to happiness.”

That the Chinese will have some day a complete secular system of education is to be anticipated. The pupils of such schools in China were estimated at ten times in number those of mission schools, in 1927. There are more native universities and colleges than foreign. The native institutions have suffered great interruptions by political disturbance and lack of funds. The hostility being manifest to the foreign institutions, loss by their personnel of privileged position as foreigners, and probable diminishing of support as secularization spreads, promise to destroy their preeminence.

Yet they will have accomplished a great work—vastly disproportionate to their numbers and wealth, and eventually will receive due gratitude from a sobered-down generation. Not the least of that work will appear to have been the training of the leaders in the present Revolt. A pessimist may take that ironically; one whose vision is longer will see it as credit due.

) Future of Our Will to Serve

The future of the West's philanthropic enterprises in Asia must, like those of profit or political friendship, depend upon our ability to obtain

good will and respect. If these enterprises are in reality selfish and egotistic, operating under a pretense of love, that fact will soon be evident. The enterprises will disappear. But if they are real, they will continue to exist and to comprise an expression of our conscience-driven effort to atone for the cultural chaos we have brought upon Asia. This is implied in the scholarly answer of the *Manchester Guardian* to shipping magnate Lord Inchcape's attack on missionaries:

"We shall not win to better understanding by withdrawing the one class of Europeans who are living in China not to get but to give. They may have shown too much sympathy with movements which are ill-informed. But the present trouble has been produced by those who exploited China, and lived there careless of her people and of the great contribution they have to make to the fellowship of nations."

CHAPTER XIII

AMERICA AND THE REVOLT

GREAT BRITAIN is a little tired of the White Man's Burden. "America could and should take the lead," said a British resident of Shanghai to an American journalist, as quoted in the *Japan Advertiser* (Tokyo). "She could because she has so little at stake, and because of the Chinese attitude toward the United States. Also both Japan and Great Britain would find it easier to cooperate under American rather than any other leadership."

Let America Be the Camel

The speaker was an "old China hand." He still believed in a "strong policy." He was liberal—as a guardian who wishes to keep the estate in his own hands as long as possible is nevertheless oftentimes "liberal" to his ward. He was not in favor of Great Britain any longer running the risk of keeping the rebel ward in hand, however. "Must there be intervention in order to preserve

trade?" he continued. "Not by Great Britain. Whoever takes the initiative in intervention is forced to carry a burden. We British carried the load of the boycott eighteen months and we do not care to assume an additional one. Nor will Japan intervene—except as she can without seeming to do so and without having to bear the onus.

"That leaves your country—America. Is America to intervene?"

Uncle Sam is not particularly altruistic from the outsider's point of view, but he is very sentimental. He was persuaded that he ought to save France. He once was almost persuaded that he ought to fight the Turk; that he ought to take charge of Armenia (incidentally protecting Great Britain's grabs in the Caucasus). He was convinced that he ought to stand for civilization against perverted Russia. Now, he ought to champion the white man's prestige in an awakening Asia. He ought to protect Shanghai. Great Britain should not be expected to do it any longer. It is costing her too much.

Curiously enough, the Christian and pacifist elements in America have sometimes been on one side and sometimes on the other in these campaigns of sentiment. The non-religious pacifists

have on the whole been the more consistent. The Christian element which very much wanted us in Armenia, now vigorously exerts itself to keep us out of China. The Shanghai Briton deplores this element. "I am in China for trade, and the missionaries are the greatest hindrance thereto. The British Legation seems to deal with its missionaries as they should be dealt with, but apparently the American Legation must give heed to them. Not only that, the State Department in Washington listens to them and acts on their advice, instead of being a realist in facing this China situation. That is why America won't take the initiative that is needed."

How splendid it would be for America to withstand the nationalist movement in China (and elsewhere in the Orient, while at it), and take the boycott onto her broad shoulders, while Great Britain poses as China's true friend and wins back the business which nourishes her Empire's shriveling tentacles in Asia! For, to America, foreign trade is but the dessert on top of a square meal; to Great Britain it is the meat of life.

America's Sticklerism May Involve Her

The proposal sounds ridiculous, yet is far from impossible in eventuality. Two features of

American life make it possible. First, we haven't much—from the immediate point of view—at stake. We have no Asiatic empire to keep placated, save the Philippines, and half of us don't care about them anyway. We are not vulnerable to attack from Russia. We could do without Asiatic trade—even Asiatic friendship, and still go to the movies every night. Gasoline wouldn't go up. It's easier, even for sentimental Americans, to act upon Principle when our stalwart virtue does not put us out of pocket. Moreover, we are of such economic importance to the life of the world that trade must come to us anyhow. Take that of Russia, for example.

Second, we act on Principle, Principle with a capital P. It may be good Principle, or bad Principle or unwise Principle, but it is something to be stubborn about. Congressmen or laymen—once convince us that there is a Principle involved, and we go through to the bitter end. That is why we were such a formidable enemy of Germany when we got started. Great Britain, much older than we in the international game, talks principle and acts opportunism. She can take an immovable stand one day and retreat to another immovable stand the next. The British, as Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Eugene

Chen alike bear witness, are very sensible people. They are always fair when they have to be. They withdraw when it seems necessary. They are politic.

Not so we. We haven't budged an inch on the war debts, on the League membership question, on the Mexican controversy or on the "Open Door" in China for the sake of being politic. It must have been chiefly Great Britain—it certainly was the British Reuter's news agency—that convinced us Russia was an immoral nation, not to be dealt with. A few months later the British had resumed relations with Russia. We continued to stand by Principle.

It is for this reason that the Asian peoples liked us—when we were on their side. For the same reason they fear, and prepare against, the possibility of our becoming the most stubborn enemy of their aspirations. Asians have little real fear, I find, of aggressive American imperialism in their borders. It is a stock warning of Jingo papers in Japan, of course, but responsible Japanese leaders have about as much fear of our imperialism as ours have of theirs. Nothing like the apprehension of the "American Colossus" which exists in Latin America and Europe, possibly for good reason, is apparent in

China or south Asia. It is not our greed, but our pride and sticklerism which is feared.

The Asian leaders judge us aright. "America may become our greatest obstacle," remarked Dr. Hu Shih, the young intellectual leader who likes Americans exuberantly, with some sadness.

Let a controversy arise and become a matter of Principle: over the sanctity of treaty contracts, America's "right to regulate our own immigration as we see fit," respect for American private property, propaganda against American sovereignty in the Philippines, the killing of an American citizen or a few marines, the involvement of national honor,—and we, far more than Great Britain, are likely to find ourselves involved in uncompromising diplomatic or military battle. No American believes that we would have allowed ourselves to be whipped out of Hankow as were the British.

Controversies That Must Arise

But occasions of offense—to America as well as to Great Britain and to other Powers are certainly going to exist. They are a concomitant to be expected upon the rise of a nation to power. During and after the American revolution, Tory

property rights received no great respect. Grants and privileges given by former rulers got scant consideration. The Nationalists in south China feel themselves no more bound by the debts contracted in disregard of their protests by foreign-dominated Peking, than did the American government for repayment of the Confederate obligations. For practical reasons be it said however, the Chinese propose to pay.

During the period of turmoil attending growth into nationhood, the Asiatic nations feel no more and no less responsibility for the security of alien lives and property than did the American revolutionaries in time of stress, yet we hold struggling Asiatic governments to a principle of "strict accountability." As soon as Chinese complainants are privileged to bring their cases against foreigners into Chinese, instead, as hitherto, foreign courts, innumerable foreign-held titles are going to be questioned. The bias of the native judges will be just as great as the bias of the foreign judges has been in the past. Westerners in Japan today complain that they cannot get justice in a civil case against a native litigant. All these things are human. But they may easily conflict with American policy based on Principle.

An Englishman of the old "ruling class" said to me in passing: "If every British soldier were killed or whipped out of the country, the British government would not, I believe, be able to get popular backing for a war with China." I have conversed with American editors from socialists in Milwaukee to conservatives in New York and provincials in Iowa. Despite common opinion to the contrary, American editors know their public very well. They all agreed that what the Englishman said could not happen in Great Britain, might very conceivably happen in this country.

American "Good-fellowship"

Yet, paradoxically, while America, because of conditions psychological and economic, stands a greater risk than any other Power of clashing with the new self assertion in the Orient, our attitude and our historic relations to the Pacific Asian peoples have consistently tended to create just such an assertiveness in them as confronts us now.

Contact of the United States with China began shortly after our Republic was founded, at a time when ideas of democracy and the

equality of man were high in Yankee minds. A fraternity sprang up between the Chinese hong (guild) merchants, and these pioneers of trade, who became known as the "new" and the "friendly" people. The Portuguese, the Dutch, and particularly, the British, came via Africa, India, and Malaysia, with habits formed in successfully relegating the natives to inferiority of caste.

John Bull's arrogance and aloofness were tempered with his sense of justice (justice to individuals, though not to subjected governments) and by administrative responsibility. The Cantonese probably never were so justly governed as under young Sir Harry Parkes and his two foreign assistants during the British occupation of 1858-60. But the Britisher always put a social barrier between himself and the native, whether that person were host, or reduced to the position of subject. It was expressed concretely in the restricted areas in India and Malaya or the "Peak" at Hongkong,—which last no Chinese might mount unless in service of a white man. A few indeed, British-sired Chinese, secured mansion sites there, Chinese knighted by the Crown for great contributions as compradores to British banks and trade, or

for support of British hospitals and universities and of the Empire in general—yet only against tremendous protest.

The American spirit of fraternization, on the other hand, discovered a spirit of bonhomie to match it in the Asiatics. Good fellowship crystallized in Chinese-American and Japanese-American Associations, into some of which the British were also drawn. Perhaps its most complete expression has come of late in the "mixed" Rotary Clubs of Pacific Asian ports. Americans have likely the most ingrained racial prejudice of any people, yet this disappears quickly in those who have real contact with the Asiatic. The British have less race prejudice and more snobbery, and the latter thrives, rather than disappears, through contact.

Of all aliens domiciled in China, it is particularly the Americans who have given in to a feeling of human fellowship. The American never fails to find the Chinese a "good fellow," with a back-slapping conviviality and a sense of humor akin to his own. This has militated strongly against American collaboration in "imperialism" in the Far East. A traditional American policy of "sticking to our own hemisphere" has done more toward the same end.

America Discourages Imperialism in Asia

Generally speaking, the United States has been as imperialistic as any growing nation, on the North American continent and in adjacent waters. We need only call to mind the Louisiana purchase, the vast areas taken from Mexico, our history in Texas, Alaska, Panama and Nicaragua. But the American government has been notably obtuse to opportunities for taking territory beyond these limits. Hawaii offered herself to us for fifty years before, in need of a base in the war with Spain, we accepted. Porter, first American naval commander in the Pacific, established American sovereignty in the Marquesas during the war of 1812 only to have his action ignored by Congress. A later attempt by Savage was openly rebuked. An American free love colony settled the Bonin Islands, and Admiral Peary spent considerable effort trying to put it in shape, but Washington registered no protest when Japan declared sovereignty over the islands. Descendants of the settlers there speak both English and Japanese today, and are contented subjects of the Mikado. Admiral Peary ran up the American flag over the Luchus, between Japan and Formosa, but was promptly

ordered by President Fillmore to haul it down. His suggestion that Formosa be taken as a base of American empire in the Orient was likewise vetoed. The sole exception to this policy was the annexation of the Philippines, an anomalous act committed during a brief flare of imperialism, and which has embarrassed us ever since.

In the early nineteenth century, Yankee shipping and trade became important at Canton, and predominated at the new port of Shanghai, half the trade of which in 1852 was carried in American bottoms. American shippers were occasionally irritated into asking their government to join the British in drastic measures of retaliation for Chinese official restrictions on trade, but as a rule they held to the good old American adage "the less government, the better." "We are now on the best terms possible with the Chinese," one wrote, "Mr. Cushing (plenipotentiary sent to negotiate a treaty) cannot make us better off, and he may lose all the advantages we now hold over the English."

American diplomatic and naval officers, however, were almost invariably won to the British view. Their feelings were shown by Captain Tatnall, the U. S. naval officer who intervened in the battle of Taku to aid British evacuation,

with the to-be-famous declaration on his lips: "Blood is thicker than water."

Consul Parker went so far as to pledge American cooperation to Sir John Bowring, governor of Hongkong (and writer of militant Christian hymns) in event of hostilities. Washington repudiated the promise, and Parker resigned in chagrin. When Great Britain entered upon her second war with China in 1857 her premier, Lord Clarendon, invited the United States to join. Cass, Secretary of State to President Buchanan, replied that "True wisdom dictates moderation and discretion in attempts to open China to the world."

Japan, be it remembered, had just been "opened" at the point of American guns, although doubtless not without all due moderation and discretion.

Mingled Altruism and Selfishness

This marks the beginning of a queerly mingled American policy of altruism and selfishness. When China offered us (along with the other nations) territorial "concessions" (meaning in China, city sites for foreign residence and business at coast and river ports) we uniformly re-

fused with the single exception of a strip at Shanghai, which we promptly threw into the combined International Settlement. Yet we unfailingly demanded a full share of benefit from every infringement of her sovereignty conceded by China—save only territorial grant. The treaty of Caleb Cushing made under direction of Daniel Webster in 1844 contained the first clear-cut definition of extraterritorial prerogative. The Ward treaty of 1858 secured for America without cost what Great Britain and France had won by a hard fought war, and carefully provided that America might never lose a full share of Chinese plums by stipulating that she should always receive automatically the privileges granted in any given line to the “most favored nation”—a clause which an American contributed to the language of diplomacy. Although we refused to associate ourselves with an intimidation policy, we accepted the benefits that were derived from it. In this respect the British have been honest exploiters, while our own policy, professing concern with the interests of both sides, has suffered from many historians the reproach of disingenuousness. The very ship for instance, which carried Fletcher Webster, Daniel Webster’s son, who was secretary to

Caleb Cushing, from Boston to Calcutta, after discharging her passenger coolly came on to Canton heavily freighted with contraband opium. Americans were for years the most resourceful and persistent smugglers of the drug, with a virtual monopoly in the carrying trade from Smyrna and a large share in that from Calcutta. The reason was that it filled the need for a sure and convenient article of exchange when ginseng and furs had had their day and where miscellaneous merchandise involved the complexity of bills on London.

An important element of sentiment entered in in 1869 when Anson Burlingame, the "straight shooter of the Senate," and later minister to China, resigned his post to undertake a journey round the world as an emissary of China to obtain the consent of the principal powers to what would be called in our day, the self-determination of China. He made a sententious treaty with America, which, providing unrestricted immigration, was soon ignored. He found Gladstone in power in England and he obtained from the British government the consent to a policy of forbearance which, allied to our own policy, stiffened China's resistance and greatly enhanced China's self-respect. It was accordingly that

when the great Imperialist movement got under way in the '70's and '80's, its main direction was Africa, and Pacific Asia for almost a generation had relief from the British push.

Mixed Motives Work to China's Relief

The renewal of aggression came when the world perceived China's utter helplessness against her recently "awakened" little neighbor, Japan. Russia led the onslaught this time, closely followed by Great Britain, Germany and France. Again America appeared as a deliverer, with John Hay's circularization of the "Open Door" policy. Half altruistic, half selfish, it was a scheme for protecting American trade and investment in a China on the verge of being partitioned, with no share allotted to America, or desired. The "principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations" in China,¹ received intelligent indorsement by Great Britain from the start, for that Power naturally wanted to maintain its overwhelming preponderance in the foreign trade of all parts of China. The death of American enterprise following the Japanese annexa-

¹ Root-Takahira Agreement, 1908.

tion of Korea, and unpleasant experiences within "spheres of influence" in China, convinced the American government that American business competition could never be assured of a fair chance in Asiatic regions controlled by other nations. America became the champion of native sovereignties, and the Open Door policy was extended to mean support of the "independence and integrity of China." When Japan succeeded European Powers as the encroacher, American chivalry for "the under dog" mingled with fear of Japan and political party rivalry, in determining the official attitude.

Yet American sentiment remained essentially idealistic toward Asia, a tendency continuously strengthened through mission, Y. M. C. A. and philanthropic contact. Givers at home felt that they were spreading Liberty as well as the Gospel and workers in the field taught the ideals of the American Revolution to their yellow pupils—to such an extent that the American missionary was at various times made *persona non grata* to the British, Dutch, French, and particularly Japanese, colonial governments.

Roosevelt made a typically American gesture turning most of our share of the Boxer Indemnity to American education of Chinese youth.

The United States was largely responsible for the quick evacuation of the allied Boxer relief armies. The same government blocked levying of heavy indemnities for the nuisance caused foreign interests by the Chinese Republican revolution. Dr. Sun Yat-sen's chief moral support was for years the American public.

Recent American Idealism

Woodrow Wilson's desire to preserve Chinese integrity from Japanese financial attack led him to reverse his opposition to the "Consortium Scheme" for financing China through an international pool, definitely limited as to the extent to which it might accept Chinese sovereign rights as security. However, patriotic Chinese saw in this the greatest peril to their independence yet schemed: in the shape of a perpetual financial monopoly over their government. The students and guilds by threats prevented their officials from going in for it.

American idealism's greatest influence on Asia was through President Wilson's "Self-determination" Point, although the great president made but a woeful effort to bring Asian peoples within the realm of its application. Neverthe-

less Korea revolted under its direct inspiration, and it is still working powerfully in India, the Dutch East Indies and our own Philippines. The Washington Conference of 1922 was a compound of chivalry and "looking after number one." The integrity of China was there made a matter of contract between nine nations. American pressure forced written recognition from the powers of the ultimate necessity of granting China's demand for abolition of infringements on her sovereignty. Yet Chinese self-assertion had grown by this time to such a degree that China could protest this guardian-like agreement regarding her status made in her absence as an insult to her dignity.

American chivalry was next seen in the protest of American educators, missionaries and some business men against the drastic suppression of student demonstrations in and near foreign zones in 1925, involving the shooting of students and coolies in Shanghai, Hankow and Canton. It likewise appeared in the report of the American Justice, E. Finley Johnson, who was called to Shanghai to head the commission for fixing the blame for the Shanghai "massacre." In violent disagreement with his British and French co-members, he laid neg-

ligence at the door of the Shanghai police, and stated that "foreigners in China have failed to take into account the principles of liberty which they themselves have spread." Partly from good will, partly from egotistic impulse to culminate its previous diplomacy, the American State Department stepped forward to mollify Chinese indignation by proposing immediate meeting of the commissions provided by the Washington Conference with powers to be extended to consider "every phase of Chinese rights-recovery." France's three-year-late ratification had just made their convocation possible.

The delegates on the customs problem talked in Peking all spring; under American leadership set a date (Jan. 1, 1929) for China to assume control of her customs, and then went into a wrangle about *ad interim* measures, brought to an end upon the dispersal of the commission amid Chinese factional warfare. The extra-territorial commission never got anywhere. By this time the Chinese had progressed to a feeling that talk could give them nothing they were not able to take, and the Washington Conference became one more scrap of paper in the wide waste basket of Eastern-Western diplomacy. America's next appearance was her refusal to join or

acquiesce in the proposed blockade of Canton as retaliation for the Chinese boycott of Hong-kong. Here again were mingled treasured American principles with selfish consideration for sudden American merchant and shipping prosperity at the expense of British traders. These persons, from whose mouths food has been taken to gorge Americans, may be forgiven for seeing chiefly the latter.

American idealism continues to be a factor in the editorial sympathy of the overwhelming majority of American newspapers with Asiatic nationalist aims. It expresses itself in a Porter resolution calling on the President to negotiate new treaties with China on a "basis of reciprocity and equality," and declaring severance from the "concert of powers" policy. It exists in the purest form, unadulterated by considerations of practical diplomacy in the utterances of Senator Borah.

Sentiment and Principle Conflict

Its most telling result is realized by the discouraged American community in China and American diplomats trying to protect their properties, the fact that over the question of

the white man's prerogatives the American people will never support, nor their Congress ever authorize, a war against the Chinese people. Let it come to a question of Principle, as I have said, and the result might be different. "We are not going to fight any four hundred million people," Secretary Kellogg guesses—but not because they are four hundred million. Rather, because our sentiment has always been with their aspirations. And the hands of Asia's young leaders are thus strengthened, even though they may make sport of American diplomacy and deplore it as "post-mortem first aid."

While, then, the reaction of Great Britain, Japan and the European Powers toward the Revolt of Asia is largely being determined by "practical diplomacy," that of America is the resultant of two tendencies in both of which practicality is swamped by sentiment. The one tendency, exhibited in our historical relations, to encourage Asian self-assertion, diverges from the other, to demand that they live up to a standard of conduct which we outline for them on Principle.

It would obviously be desirable for Americans to make their mental attitude toward Asia consistent with their historical policy. But it seems

likely that such a development will not come until America is a much older and more practical nation: until the smug age of prohibition and blue laws and anti-evolution legislation and parlor toryism as well as parlor bolshevism has been passed. Meanwhile we will continue to be a puzzle and a worry to Asia. However, we shall continue, more or less reluctantly to accept the results of our policy—until it comes to immigration. Unless we can get that problem separated from race prejudice and convince Asia so, we are headed for the great war of the Pacific, the struggle of the hemispheres, the desolation of the world.

CHAPTER XIV

ASIA AND THE MAKING OF AMERICA

THE destiny of the United States, unknown to most of its present citizens, has from the nation's embryonic beginnings been determined by Asia. In the future even more than the past, relationship to Asia will mould the history of the leading white nation.

Following the lure of Marco Polo's Cathay, Columbus discovered America. The settlements of New England were the offshoot of a century of persistent attempts to get by the bulking obstacle of the Western Continent and reach Polo's Indies¹ through a hypothetical northwest passage. La Salle set out to find a river route to China, and discovered the Mississippi, unfortunately flowing south, not west. A little town in Canada is called "La Chine" to this day in

¹ The term for Polo included Japan. Early confusion of ideas wrought the mishap to European languages whereby "The Indies" came to mean almost everything from Persia to America and the Antilles.

souvenir of the goal he named upon buoyantly setting off on his expedition.

When American independence had been established, it was a question whether the gaiety-loving aristocrats of the South or the Puritan Yankees of New England should dominate in politics and culture. Asia was a main factor in the portentous decision. By all odds of natural advantage the South should have taken the lead. But barren New England, if she had nothing else, had good timber to make ships, and ginseng, prized in China as a "vitality restorer," to load them with. It was the Pacific Asian trade which gave New Englanders the wealth to overcome their handicap and assume directive place in the making of the nation.

The Romance of Early Trade with Asia

The romance of the Asia trade that is bound up with the political history of our Revolution, with our dominion on the Pacific littoral and with American preeminence on that Ocean, tempts me to give a bit more space to the story than my plan of condensed presentation normally permits.

In 1784, the American ship *Empress of China*, flew our flag before Canton. Six years

later, a Salem schooner made the port of Calcutta. Our merchant fleet grew from 124,000 tons in 1783 to 981,000 tons in 1810; and a purple-corpuscled, iron-blooded race of seamen won a supremacy for our commerce in the China Seas and the Indian Ocean which lasted almost fifty years.

The Yankee pioneers of our merchant marine soon found that they could double profits by carrying "gimcracks"—including fire-water and firearms as well as glass beads—and stopping on the west coast to trade these for furs, which went along with the ginseng to Canton. But double profits were not enough, so deckloads of sandalwood were taken on at Hawaii until the islands were entirely denuded of the tree.

When all other cargoes failed there still remained that unsurpassed product of New England, pond ice. A merchant named Tudor loaded it in his ships and carried it to Canton and Calcutta. At first he lost deplorably, and became a joke in the marts of the world; then the tide turned and he made a fortune. The first refrigeration as well as iced-whiskey pegs in south Asia were the by-products of this amazing rush of American initiative.

Who that has read of the Boston Tea Party

can fail to visualize our return cargoes? The Yankees preferred to sell them in Europe and bring back good British gold. We fought the Revolutionary War, as much as for any other trade purpose, to break the Mother Country's monopoly on the tea trade. John Hancock was one of the many of our merchant leaders who gained directly by our new-born freedom in Asian Seas. Aaron Burr sold Oriental silks at retail; the great families of Boston, Salem, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore and Charleston owed their first profits to the immense returns of our China trade. Sea captains made bonuses and percentages on their voyages and then settled on shore like John Jacob Astor and R. H. Macy to found mercantile fortunes. Every member of the crew in many a ship traded on his own account, and came back to Boston after a year's voyage with the satisfaction of having made his stake in the kind of venture then most tempting to an American.

For these were the days when the cream of trade was in the Orient. The first of the clipper ships, the famous *Rainbow*, eight months at sea to China and back, paid two hundred per cent on her voyage counting all costs of building. Tea freighted at forty dollars a ton with bonuses for

extra speed. The American ships, the most competently manned in the world, plunged onward and prospered greatly. While a British ship would heave to at night, the Americans sailed through all hours and almost all weathers, without reefing a sail. Their snowy duck, stretched on masts that stabbed at the stars, loomed high above dirty hemp and canvas rigged to the stumpy spars of their rivals. Shipping was a career, and the pick of our people were in it. We got better freights and paid less insurance, we cut down the grog and built up the speed, and no foreign ships under sail, then or since, beat our time home from Canton or Shanghai.

Individual ships made great names for themselves. *The George* of Salem, which went out to Calcutta in ninety-five days and came back in eighty-nine, at a time when the honorable John Bull's vessels ploughing along their shorter course to London often took all of that one way, was known along the sea lanes of the earth as *The Salem Frigate*. The *Flying Cloud* ran 374 miles in a day, and during a stiff squall, eighteen knots of line did not suffice to measure her speed. The *Witch of the Wave* made the trip from Canton to Deal in ninety days and the *Architect* beat the British tea fleet home to London by a week

and earned ten dollars extra a ton on its cargo. No wonder that the London *Times* lamented in 1827: "Twelve years of peace, and what is the situation of Great Britain? Our commercial monopoly exists no longer, and thousands of our manufacturers are starving or seeking redemption in distant lands. We have closed the Western Indies against America from reasons of commercial rivalry. Its active seamen have already engrossed an important branch of our carrying trade to the Eastern Indies. Her starred flag is now conspicuous on every sea, and will soon defy our thunder." In the year 1826, the climax of the great shipping development of our early history, we carried 95 per cent of our shipping imports and 90 per cent of our exports in American-built, American-manned, American-flag shipping.

Early Trade Was Speculative Adventure

When we consider the results of this trade more closely, we find that greatly as it gratified the love of adventure and of profit, our Asiatic commerce never exerted as steady and powerful an influence on home fortunes as did the corresponding British trade. Canton tea clearances are

good evidence of how things stood. The record between 1784 and 1810 shows that in a period of three years, the pounds carried by vessels not English or American dropped from nearly half the total (16,000,000 lbs.) to under five per cent. It was entry of American competition that accounted for that. But the share of this taken by American traders varied greatly from year to year,—was never more than a third and fell sometimes to a tenth, due to speculative rigging of the market and gluts of merchandise; meanwhile the British market kept on steadily taking a total of about 20,000,000 lbs. for many years. It is a sufficient comment on the haphazard nature of our contact with China that no official provision was made for a Chinese interpreter to an American Consul until 1854.

But such, largely, was all sea trade at that epoch, astonishingly speculative as viewed from today. There remains no doubt that this trade in tea, spices, nankeens, opium, and specie made Pacific Asia the predominating agent in creating the greater individual fortunes built by early Americans. We hear of a financial panic caused in China between 1805 and 1818 by the receipt during that time of seventy million dollars in silver alone, from the United States. The first

American pepper ship from Sumatra brought home a profit of 700 per cent, and for a generation Americans maintained a monopoly in this lucrative trade. Our ships outnumbered all others for many years in the harbor of Zanzibar, a favorite port of call for them when voyaging to India and China via the Cape of Good Hope. When American trade lapsed in Calcutta in the '30's, the ice trade gave it a tremendous revival, and in 1857 alone, 152 American vessels departed from the great Indian port with cargoes valued at \$11,000,000.

Asian Trade Influenced National Policy

Many features of that trade, particularly our share in bringing Turkish opium to China, were not highly creditable to us. But in the main, our introduction into the commerce of the East had a highly individual national character, which forbade us from the start, the adoption of theories and practices then conventional in the employment of force. Our trade was a complicated network, built up by ingenious opportunism. Denied consistently any backing by force from the government at home, and enjoying neither political prestige nor treaty-pro-

tected monopoly, American traders had to rely fundamentally on good will. They were so little hampered by this and became so numerous that, man for man, more Americans knew Asia from personal experience then than now. The interest of the home-dwellers was proportionately greater. Good will to Oriental peoples was officially expressed by the United States very early in the century. It is surprising to find that without such catch phrases as "open door," "integrity of China," or "concert of the Powers" almost every modern American Oriental policy was stated and re-stated by secretaries of state and diplomatists long before John Hay.

The first efforts of American diplomacy in Asia were toward regularizing our trade there. In 1832 Edmund Roberts was sent with a small flotilla to seek commercial treaties with the Oriental potentates. Refused by Japan and scorned by China, he negotiated America's first Oriental compacts with Siam, and proceeding westward made treaties with the caliphs of Arabia. Twelve years later, when "The Son of Heaven" wanted to save his face by giving away to some one what Great Britain had just extorted by force, our envoy fared better.

It was this early Pacific trade, too, which led

to our part in introducing Japan to the comity of nations. Whalers had followed in the wake of the clipper ships, and a huge industry had sprung up in the north Pacific.

Whalers and traders alike greatly needed the privilege of refitting and taking on supplies in Japan. For a foreign ship to land or be wrecked on Japanese coasts was, however, a crime according to the Tokugawa "code of isolation." Repeated American protests against imprisonment of crews and confiscation of ships were unheeded. In 1843 Commander Biddle was sent with a squadron to compel release of American sailors and returned to lecture in America as our first Japanophobe. We should conquer the Japanese while that remained easy, he proposed, and conform them into outpost guardians of the American empire. Biddle was ignored, but in 1853 Perry was sent around to Japan by way of the Cape of Good Hope and south Asia, tactfully but firmly to require a treaty establishing intercourse and guaranteeing succor to mariners in distress. His firmness consisted in pointing terrifyingly large guns at the helpless Japanese; and his tact in interesting them with toy railroads and telegraphs, and going away to give them time to consider but—returning before they

were ready for him. America was drawn deeply into Asian affairs by this, the most active intervention we ever ventured there.

Lure of Asia Drew America to the Pacific

The trade lure of Asia not only decided the slant of our policy in Asia, but brought about American possession of the Pacific coast. It was in pursuit of our early Canton trade that Captain Grey, in the *Martha Washington*, sailed into the Columbia River in 1792. He wrote in the log of his ship: "The discovery (and use of the river as a base for dealing with the Indians) gives us an advantage over the British in the Canton trade."

Still it was Asia, not the Pacific country for its own magnificent sake, which was luring the white man on.

Thomas Jefferson was our first statesman to see the development of relationships across the Pacific. In a message to Congress he deplored that "the Great American Desert must ever bar the spread of the original states across the width of the continent," but he envisioned a "second great American commonwealth of Anglo-Saxon population and traditions complementary to the

United States on the Pacific shore, which would uphold the same liberties and subsist by trade with China." In pursuance of his vision he encouraged the expeditions of Lewis and Clark to the northwest, of John Ledyard to the Siberian coast, and the first American Pacific Coast settlement fostered by John Jacob Astor in 1812 at Astoria, and vigorously combatted the claim of the British to this region.

While Cushing and Perry were establishing treaty relations with Pacific Asia the Pacific Coast, from Puget Sound to San Diego, came definitely into American possession. The stalwart missionary, Whitman, succeeded in awakening Congress to the desirability of holding out for the Oregon country in the British boundary treaty, and Fremont's insurrection in California, although at first repudiated, transferred the moiety of the coast line from Mexico to the United States.

Death and Revival of Asian Trade

Having brought about this high point of development in America's history, Asia's influence on our national destiny lapsed for a period. The adventurous spirit turned from the merchant

marine to development of the great American interior, and railway building. The standard of living and price of labor rose in America until Scotland could build ships for half the cost. The American civil war and the advent of steel ships dealt the final blows to America's world shipping. The nation slipped into provincialism. The children of old New England seafarers grew up surrounded by Asian antiques about which they knew nothing, and unable to tell whether Bangkok were in China or India. In 1914 the last regular liner on the Pacific, flying the American flag, gave up her run.

Then came the Great War and the revival of shipping. It was a forced growth, but it was amazing. In 1923, for the first time in sixty years, over half the tonnage on the Pacific was carried in American bottoms. More fundamental than the revival of shipping was the reawakening of the American people to a world view. Since the war we have become a great foreign trading nation again. One-third of our imports are coming from Asia. This time it does not represent mere adventure in merchandising but is a vital and sustaining part of the American economic system.

We lead in supplying Japan's needs, and are

the leading customers for her products. In 1925 we took a third of China's exports, her imports to the value of \$110,000,000—twenty per cent of the total—came from us. The progress since 1913 when only eight per cent of the Chinese foreign trade, both ways, was with America, gave ground to believe that before long American trade might be preeminent in China. Our exports to India have increased by 400 per cent in twelve years and our imports by 200 per cent. Although the high price of rubber was an item, of course, it is notable that our imports from British Malaya in 1926 were greater than those from the United Kingdom, the figures being 384 as compared with 383 million dollars. Exports to the Dutch East Indies in twelve years rose from three to twenty-eight, and the return in imports, from nine to a hundred and twenty millions of dollars.

Trade—Present and Future—at Stake

The sum of \$1,966,000,000 was the enormous value of our trade with Asia in 1926. Asia today is our greatest source of imports—furnishing 32 as compared to Europe's 29 per cent. The proportion of our exports received by Asia as com-

pared to the other continents has become twice what it was under 1913 conditions. In consequence, wherever Americans touch in Asia, they find it affects their foreign trade.

It also affects American investments. The value of the physical plant dedicated by American societies and individuals for philanthropic purposes only is estimated to be in China alone little less than \$70,000,000. Some score of millions of dollars in Chinese bonds is also held in America. This is only a tenth of our holdings in Cuba, but it is the beginning not the climax of investment, and is the greatest sum our citizens have ever risked so far from home. Financial interests in Asia ramify into many phases of American life.

Asian Relations Involve Prosperity

The new financial advantage that has come to America since the war carries with it the necessity of leadership. America is the world's banker, and Asia, obviously, the greatest prospective customer. The United States investment market, which absorbs bonds to the value of more than \$8,000,000,000 in a year, is taking a widening in-

terest in foreign possibilities, and is influenced again by an impression that the strategic goal of progress is Asia. It is a kind of American pre-eminence which our fathers of the clipper ship era barely envisioned. And it demands that we turn, as they did, to the Orient.

Asian trade is still one of the lesser factors in our national existence. As compared to Britain's our investments are meager, and still more so in relative importance to our home economy. For Britain received annually from exports to Asia nearly a billion dollars, by way of equivalent to her placements of capital there, while we get half that. But if conditions inspire in us a proper foresight, we will have concern now for the American attitude toward the Revolt of Asia. It is a different Asia from that which we faced a hundred years ago. We cannot expect in the future that our relations will remain so haphazard as they were back there,—not while they are continually growing to be more essential and more extended. The measures that availed England to such degree in her dealings with the Orient for decades do not afford an example of practical use to the western powers in the future. The professions and practices of good will which distinguished some of our early emissaries, offer

more of a basis. But to serve in the future they must be modified by wise and definite practical applications. Luck may hold, but intelligence to supplement it is seldom amiss.

American business in Asia has been very lucky. The World War which brought us to activity eliminated the European manufacturing nations from the scene for several years. That left Japan as our competitor. Then the hostility stirred up by Japan in China through her short-lived imperialistic scheme crystallized in the Chinese boycott of Japanese goods, and we profited. Later the boycott was placed upon the British, with corresponding increase of business for American merchants.

We have flourished through the misfortunes of our rivals. But American trade, to be a substantial thing, must get on a self-reliant basis of broad cooperation and liberal capital investment. As Japan and Great Britain are doing, America, too, must find her particular line of "enlightened imperialism" to follow in dealings with Asia. Instead of an amiable sentimentality we must extend a sincere cultural sympathy based upon knowledge. Instead of our watchful aloofness there must be initiative in meeting these people half way.

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The Pacific Era

Asia is making the Pacific our front door. Omens multiply that the age of the Pacific is upon us. Economically, this is proved by the rise of Shanghai to the third port in tonnage in the world. Politically, amazing evidences confront us. China has taken the lead in the Revolt of Asia away from Turkey, which means that the United States of America, is left as the vanguard nation of the white race and western civilization. The two potentially greatest powers in the world, the United States and China, confront one another as leaders and spokesmen of their respective worlds.

Pacific Asia is no longer our "Far" but our Near East. Great Britain's policy is clear—to save her trade if possible. The old idea of the white man's prestige, to say nothing of the "white man's burden," is frankly abandoned by her. The initiative is going to rest upon America, who may feel considerably more concerned about the prestige of the Pacific.

Inciting a Hostile Alliance of Pacific Asia?

Although the Chinese leaders will not submit to Russia's hegemony any sooner than to ours,

Moscow hopes for a large hang-over of gratitude and schemes that outside irritations shall compel a close alliance of the two nations. Into such an alliance of the great powers of the Asiatic mainland Japan would be compelled to come, or suffer the complete isolation which she dreads to-day. Russia is offering her bait in the shape of renewed oil, timber, mining and fishing concessions (some of them taken from American firms) in Saghalien and Siberia. At the same time Russia carefully forefends any Japanese move against the nationalists in China by a significant mobilization on the Manchurian border. It is an axiom among foreign editors of newspapers that nearby rivalry is never overshadowed by the far-off benefit of cooperation. But does this certainly apply in the Sino-Japanese-Russian situation? China and Russia can bring tremendous pressure to bear on the economically dependent island kingdom. A Chinese boycott of Japanese goods would, as once demonstrated, bring Japan's industrial world to ruin, and Japan's need for the raw materials of Russia grows as urgent as her concomitant need for capital from America.

And there are the psychological factors I have shown, which in my belief will completely overshadow the economic in this problem of the

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meeting of the races, and bring elements on either side of the Pacific into their most acute and dangerous difference of thought.

In fact, what is the bitterness of Russia to-day, determined to use China to humble first Great Britain, and next, if possible, haughty America, but the same "inferiority complex"?—the resentment against the sentiment, "we are too good for you,"—be it morally, socially or racially, which is imputed to us.

If America maintains her present policies toward Japan and Russia, until China, having attained power, demands the respect normally due it, they will have one of the most powerful mutual incentives to strong alliance that the world has ever seen. In 1922, after I had welcomed Abraham Adolph Jaffe, the Soviet's first plenipotentiary to the Far East, into China at the behest of my then chief, Dictator Wu Pei-fu, I suggested in a New York publication that a triple alliance of Pacific Asia, under the leadership of China, was a possibility. Naturally I was laughed at, for these nations all seemed to be at one another's throats, and China doomed to break up. But the same principles were at work then which make that result appear so much more plausible to-day.

Here is where the next world war will start, unless we forestall it. The triple alliance of Pacific Asia would be as particularly hostile to America as America is obviously the most race-prejudiced nation on earth. The British Dominions exhibit the trait, of course, but attract much less attention. There would be injected the question of the mastery of the Pacific, with all its economic, commercial, and political phases and a rivalry as implacable as that between Rome and Carthage. Where the sympathy and support of the rest of Asia would lie in such a struggle is already evident. What Europe and Latin America would do is doubtful—and ominous to this nation.

A Chance to Make a Needed Friend

Fortunately the very picture we have drawn throws out in bold lines the remedies to prevent its realization. First, the Triple Alliance of the Pacific will never culminate unless under China's leadership, and China is traditionally friendly and traditionally reasonable—the governor fly-wheel of Asia's warming-up power plant as well as its main boiler. Still, a governor can fly off. Secondly, we see Japan desperately requiring

both our capital and Asia's resources, and sense the opportunity to put her on her feet as the upstanding, industrial nation of the Pacific, the friend and economic ally of America, and the "go-between" placed by providence kinder to us than to her in the midst of the coming three greatest powers of the world: America, China, and Russia. Japan must sense her solidarity with Asia, but it will be fortunate for us if we prevent alignment from becoming alliance. Fateful is the opportunity presented us to check Japan's economic drift toward Russia and China and to make unnecessary a resort to hostile pact for the saving of her racial pride.

But we must settle, with respect for human sensitiveness, this racial issue. Asia will require our recognition of racial equality to be one of deeds as well as words. To continue in the other path predicates in place of the world's most glorious era, culturally as well as materially, its complete desolation and mankind's utter impoverishment—the wiping out of all spiritual and material riches stored up in its five thousand years of struggle. Chinese, quoting an old proverb, say it would be the war of the tiger and the crocodile, in which each one horribly mutilated the other and then drew back into the impregna-

bility of its own element to rot from its wounds.

There are times in history when a page turns over suddenly, often so silently that it is unseen by those affected. Such, in a small way compared to the present crisis, was our own American Revolution. A British Cabinet official regarded the movement starting at Concord as only another minor annoyance and left dispatches unanswered while he went on a hunting trip. He returned to find that Britain had lost the best part of a continent, and allowed a new nation to come into being with an anti-British bias.

Asia will continue even more than in the past to dominate the history of this Nation. Never before, however, has the opportunity so patently been ours to determine whether for weal or woe. We must read quickly what is on the new page about Asia. Her peoples will not turn back from pursuance of what they consider their legitimate aspirations. Like all humans, they are likely to go to extremes. When we have given up our unusual "rights" their struggles to make nations of themselves will create, as in Mexico, many delicate issues in connection with our properties and interests.

But if we align ourselves pacifically on the fundamental controversy, other clashes will iron

out. If we cannot bring ourselves to this, let us at once start savings accounts for the next war.

What of the Philippines?

The most telling test of America's ability to adapt to the new Asia must come in the Philippines. America's involvement there is an anomaly. The basic facts are:

First, the Philippines are the sole exception to the United States government's consistent refusal to undertake empire in Pacific Asia—providence which puts America in such a more favored position than the European Powers in the present crisis. They were annexed in an age represented by President Roosevelt's speech in San Francisco in 1903: "America's geographical position on the Pacific is such as to insure our peaceful domination. . . . The inevitable march of events gave us the control of the Philippine Islands at a time so opportune that it may without irreverence be called Providential. Unless we show ourselves weak we must go on with the work. . . . We most earnestly hope it will ever be peaceful. Men of lofty soul should see that we keep our position . . . and accept with confidence a place of leadership. . . . Much of our

expansion must go through the Golden Gate, . . . the growth of American influence along the coasts and among the islands of that mighty ocean, where East and West finally become one. Before I came to the Pacific Slope I was an expansionist and after having been here I fail to understand how any man convinced of his country's greatness and glad that his country should challenge with proud confidence its mighty future, can be anything but an expansionist." Noble words when they were uttered, but anachronistic today, except for a Mussolini.

Second, our government of the Island people is anomalous in that it contradicts the fundamental principles of American political theory. They are protected by no constitutional guarantees, for the Constitution of the United States does not apply to them. They are entirely at the whim of a legislature in which they have no vote—the American Congress. The only legal charter of liberty they can claim is the preamble to the Jones act, which Americans whose interests lie in opposition to their independence sophistically claim is not binding since it is only a preamble, and since one session of Congress cannot bind any future session. They have home rule by grant which is revokable at any time and

which is proved a joke by repeated vetoes of measures regarding such purely internal matters as divorce, by the American Governor-General, who takes the position that they are not yet out of a position of political wardship even in home affairs.

Not only are the Filipinos subject to changing moods of Congress but to different executive interpretations of such status as is accorded them. The conflicting expressions of Presidents McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft, Wilson and Coolidge are evidence, and the utterly-opposite administrative policies of Governors-general Harrison and Wood reduce a serious matter to the point of absurdity.

We will not have the islanders as a state because we don't wish fifty Filipino members in Congress and unrestricted entry of Filipinos into our country and life, as full-fledged citizens. Their transformation to territorial status would be a betrayal of our pledges as to home rule, to say nothing of independence. The scheme of creating them into a "British-style" Dominion is talked, but would require a revamping of the United States Constitution—which makes no provision for that sort of thing—quite beyond hope of procuring. The anomaly of our rule is

summed up in a phrase quoted by Kalaw and Felix Morley: "The government of the Philippine Islands is a government foreign to the United States for domestic purposes but domestic for foreign purposes." With it all the statement of the Wood-Forbes report is doubtless true: "No people under the tutelage of another have made so great a progress in so short a time." Our government has been, in the slang phrase, "not so bad." But from now on it is destined to get either better or worse.

That is the third point. Thinking Filipinos do not ignore the foreign and economic dangers of cutting loose from the United States. But they are convinced that in the ultimate protection of their liberties these are simpler to meet—more to be preferred—than the danger of continuance in the present regime. As America's need of the Islands for rubber (a military as well as industrial necessity), sugar and other products grows, departments of the American government will be subject to influences to tighten grip on them. "God forbid that anyone discover oil!" exclaimed a Filipino leader to me. "If so, goodbye Independence!" Goodbye even home rule, for big American industry cannot be trammelled by native administrative whims. Filipinos are tak-

ing lessons from developments in Mexico and Central America. My friend suggested that one explanation of recent American policy in Nicaragua might be preparation against losing the Philippines as America's prospective rubber producer.

American Reactionary Trends

Again, as American sentiment in general becomes less imperialistic and leaders talk more liberally a corresponding reaction seems to take place in official policy toward the Philippines—possibly also toward Latin America. Is it the desire of an officialdom thinking of America's future needs, and subject to a scarcely realized instigation from exploiters, to secure American interests before the eagle's scream has been entirely converted by our "pacifists" into a coo? Or is it, in the Philippines, but the normal reaction to an increasingly active revolt against foreign domination?

However that be, the Filipino leaders have been given good arguments for preaching that America is now set upon destroying such autonomy as they have gained, and that trustful and inactive reliance upon American promises will show them up for dupes. President Coolidge

suggested to Congress that "more authority should be given to the Governor-general." Bills have been introduced in Congress to increase the powers of the American auditor, to provide the Governor-general with funds beyond reach of the legislature—an idea seemingly copied from imperial Japan,—and to bound off the islands most valuable industrially into a permanent possession. This last produced an interesting reaction—chiefs in the allegedly "pro-American" islands themselves threatening to fight rather than submit to separation. Fortunately for America's good name and future in Asia, none of these measures have passed.

Schisms Tend to Diminish

Conceding that there is considerable sentiment for retention of American rule among the Moslems of the south, it will be seen when accounted for as a phase that is likely to pass. Their traditions of a definitely "Christian" regime in Manila are not reassuring to their sentiment of individual liberty. And their proud conceit that they are the best fighters in the Islands makes them loath to submit to those whom they regard as more effeminate, if not more civilized, and whose gov-

ernment policy might be an effort to equalize them. It is an unknown danger, compared to the known, of the American rule, which as we said is "not so bad." This is a problem for the majority Filipinos themselves. They must show ability to respect the variations of indogenous culture within their borders, if they want unity. And they must convince the up-standing aborigines that they are not to be patronized, still less to be subjected to restrictions such as peoples more or less white and Christian practised upon the first Americans and upon the Africans. Occasional news from the back countries, American and African, to say nothing of the African Cape, would suggest to intelligent Moros that their suspicion is not an anachronism. But in proving that they can separate the ability to enjoy western culture from its "high hat" attitude toward those who prefer another, and their complete opposition to Spanish colonialism in all its phases, the leaders of the north are proving their right to become recognized as nation builders.

Can Our Tact Suffice?

That Americans would prefer friendship to enmity in dealing with the new Asia is clear. It

is sometimes not so clear that they will take the necessary trouble to acquire the fair understanding which must be the basis for satisfactory relations. There is an opacity between the viewpoints of East and West which conduces to oddly malaprop judgments of one another in different cases. If the conclusion of the old Scotch engineer on Gandhiism—that what was needed to clear the air in India was a mutiny, suppressed with machine guns—was typically British, a comment from an American whom I met at Karachi, anent the same situation, was a flash of the way we are apt to see things. He said “So you saw Gandhi!—have any clothes on?—not enough to take him far, I bet. He’s just plain crazy—kindest thing to say. I knew him when a dapper-dressed young lawyer in South Africa—tremendously clever—could have been a millionaire by now!”

The Filipinos with their willing modernity are not Gandhi followers to be sure, but as the pressure of events compels a reduction of the anomalies of the regime now existing, it will demand our best effort to be understanding and fair.

There are three alternatives: we must want these people in our union and persuade them to

enter, or we must frankly let them go, or we must boldly undertake the role of tyrant in Pacific Asia. They will allow us no middle ground. Perhaps the danger of loss of our trade, investments and opportunities is not so great if their national aspirations be frankly acceded to. No one doubts their ability to govern themselves at least as well as most of the Latin-American nations. Japanese colonization, should the Filipinos prove unable to rule it out, would not succeed, if we may judge by the failure of Japanese colonization elsewhere, especially in the tropics. As to this, we recall the scheme attributed to the industrialists who backed the idea of separation of the alleged pro-American regions of the Islands for a permanent United States colony. They were to bring in cheap labor to work the projected great plantations—not Japanese perhaps, but Chinese or Indian.

Prospects in an Independent Philippines

China and Japan would naturally come to dominate in the independent Islands commercially. The American feeling against the problematical pervasion of Japanese and Chinese influences there is largely unreasoning sentiment.

After all, once we have released all responsibility what of it to us? Opportunities for trade and investment gone? Haven't we a hundred times the trade with Japan now, that we have with the Philippines? Does Japan not welcome our investors? China, once in order, will give us even more opportunity. So on the hypothesis that the Philippines are to be absorbed by one of those nations, they would not likely be the less valuable to us. And should they stay free,—have we made less out of Cuba since we gave her freedom?

Have we such a sentiment for the preservation of Filipino racial entities that we would fight about it? Or is it fear that we would see the half civilized groups downtrodden and exploited by the Manila politicians? This altruistic possibility is somewhat offset by the attitude of American commercial interests in strenuous objection to the Philippine native law which to prevent destruction of the freedom of the peasantry prohibits the accumulation of an area more than 2,500 acres, under one control. Should we fight them for the privilege of extending to them benefits they do not want?

A little self-searching should convince Americans that the only sincere motive that can exist for "keeping" the Philippines against their will

is old fashioned territorial imperialism. America, as well as Great Britain, has her lessons in the "enlightened imperialism" to learn before being prepared to enter happily upon the Age of the Pacific. America need not sit at the feet of Russia to learn them, but only turn back to her own idealism and apply it to others.

"Damned impertinence," commented Governor-general Wood when the Filipinos chose George Washington's birthday for their day of prayer for independence. He was barely constrained from carrying out a military parade which might have clashed with the liberty-beseeching multitudes. Some Americans in Shanghai made similar comments when Chinese students chose an American holiday for their demonstration.

Are Americans big enough to recognize, even to the point of sacrifice, the logical working of ideas they have planted?

CHAPTER XV

THE NEW ERA

I BEG leave to end as I began, a reporter rather than a prophet. Yet a reporter must before all else be a "seer," and as one who is seeing rather than prognosticating, I may be permitted to set down the fundamentals of the present situation which determine the complexion of the era ahead.

The Features of the Crisis

First, Western control of Asia for profit, political or commercial, is discredited and in collapse.

Second, the general and conscious demand of Asian peoples for control of their own destiny nullifies the white man's responsibility for their welfare. This was a second thought anyway, and basically hypocritical, although much sincerity has gone into its outworking. A backward

people has the inalienable right, as Strunsky has expressed it, to be bad off under its own rulers rather than well off under aliens, should it so prefer.

Third, legitimate Western interests and properties and lives of individuals stand a fair chance of protection under the native sovereignties in prospect. There will be big sacrifice in the beginning. But "he who loses his life shall save it." He who fights for his security will lose it. Instance, the fact that the nation with much business and property which has had least to fear in an aroused China, is Germany.

Fourth, the Asian nations have lost their fear of the white man and are carrying forward their program resolutely. No longer can bluff deter them. "Our country is inflamed with manly indignation directed against all foreigners," says Eugene Chen. "China, this time, does not fear foreign arms. When the foreign nations approach us for negotiations they must completely separate themselves from the old conception that China is a pacific nation, and therefore subject to either cajolery or bullying. Negotiations will never be entered upon unless they first agree that they never had any right in our country, and that what interests they have were acquired

through duress; while we on our part, will recognize the equity they hold by virtue of the concessions granted by our pusillanimous or helpless forefathers. Liquidation of this equity can then take place in justice."

Fifth, the Western Powers, with the sole exception of America, frankly lack the ability to resist Asia's revolt. They may accede either as "good losers" or in sullenness, but they must accede.

Sixth, America is the only power that may make resistance of the white race to the ending of its world domination possible. Upon her depends whether the answer to Asia's self-assertion is to be the war of the hemispheres or the meeting in mutual enrichment of the races. Russia, flushed with her present success, may revert from her new policy of imperialism by attraction to imperialism by the sword, but the Asian nations promise to be too strong for real imperilment by the time that could occur.

Seventh, attempts to check the haste of the Asian movements by military demonstrations work the opposite result. "Understand that with the appearance of every foreign gunboat in our Chinese ports, a thousand youths will flock to the banner of the Nationalist armies,"

continues the largely Asian, part-European, part-African orator of China's struggle. "Let the whole world realize that the illegal standing of every foreign battalion on our soil will be a challenge to Chinese legions to rise and drive the foreigner into the sea."

If China, regarded as the most reasonable nation in Asia, attains her aspirations without having to fight the white man, the impression will go over Asia that after all he has a modicum of sympathy, and can be dealt with peacefully, and militarism will be set back through the continent. On the other hand, a clash with the troops of the Powers, regardless of who gives the provocation, will be interpreted to signify that the only argument the white man understands is the noise of guns, and raise the tide of militarism in Asia.

Eighth, Asia's movement thus far is entirely directed against the Westerner on Asian shores. There is not the bud, thus far, of an offensive against the white man in his own countries. It would be decades before a new Yellow Peril could be born, even in thought. Asia's reprisals, if she be driven to them, must be on her territory. The boycott would be the first; our military expeditions would be stoutly met.

Elements in Western Race Prejudice

Since America must be the determining factor in the great crisis it is well to speak in closing of race prejudice. This, rather than political or property disputes, would arouse the public opinion to throw America athwart of Asia's aspirations. How will we analyze this trait in the white mind? Added to the primitive dread of the stranger: the feeling that "we do not like them because we do not know them and we will not know them because we do not like them," there seem to be four cultural elements. There is the pride of culture, like that of the ancient Greeks. Our word "barbarian," from their term for all aliens, still expresses the feeling. There is pride of religion, remnant of the medieval perversion of Christianity which transformed acceptance of the most inclusively loving and humble teacher earth has known, into a ground for arrogance. The tone in which "pagan" and "heathen" are often pronounced, tells the story. There is pride of political efficiency, inherited perhaps from Rome, causing us to despise those unpossessed of organized power. Last to grow, perhaps, is the pride of scientific and mechanical achievement—that which impels a

Westerner to identify sanitary plumbing and speedy communication with "civilization." Does our preëminence in these things justify an attitude of superiority? More pertinent still, is it going to last? What about the rapidly approaching time when Asia demonstrates as much capacity in "culture," Christianity, nationalism, and mechanical equipment as we? Will we be as much at a loss to justify our attitude of racial superiority when no longer able to maintain it, as was the young educational officer with whom we talked on the train leaving Gandhi?

America has walked boldly into the danger of drawing lines of racial discrimination. The feeling in Japan we know well. The American Consul-general in Calcutta was asked by a high-class Hindu: "I suppose your country bars us out because we are not an independent nation. Once we attain national dignity that stigma will be removed?" Our official thought it as well not to try to explain. Shortly after our contact with this man of splendid physique, bright mind and high character, really of our own race, but "browned by a few millenniums of sun," I met a weazened, degenerate Semite in Persia. "I'm going to America to become an American citizen!" he boasted. "Can you?" I asked in aston-

ishment. "Why, of course! Persians, you know, are *white*."

Back in America, I related the incident to my boyhood schoolmate, clerk of the Immigration Committee of the House of Representatives. He was secretary to the Committee chairman, a man above reproach.

"Never mind," he assured me humorously. "As long as God and Albert Johnson are watching over this nation it will not be overrun by Persian undesirables. Only one hundred are admitted each year under the quota."

American officialdom must awake to the fact that it is not the smallness of the number of their people admitted but the discrimination expressed in ruling Asiatics out that arouses resentment,—and that individual manhood, not color or racial origin, must in some manner eventually be made the test.

This latter is a large order, and many temporary expedients may be required to aid toward its consummation. But the new nations of Asia will require privileges of travel and residence in the Western world that will be fairly equivalent to the privileges they grant in the East to Westerners. Amicable settlements on this basis are the alternative to a return to isolation as the basis

of international policy. There is no other ultimate solution.

Mutual Consideration or Destruction

We have come to the end of the White Man's world dominance. If he resigns himself to this historic evolution he will save his world and the Asiatic's world. If he resists he will likely bring about the destruction of both.

We have come to the beginning of the White and Colored Man's joint world, when each shall have control in his own house and a proportionate say in the general convocation of humanity.

We are passing from the era of Empire by Conquest into the era of Empire by Attraction, Service, and Business that asks only a fair field and no favors.

We have come to the time when any prolonged attempt of any race or nation or class or sex to dominate another can only bring destruction to both.

It is let live and live.

It is tolerance, or death.

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